BATSFORD CHESS

# DAVID VS GOLIATH CHESS

## How to beat a stronger player



Andrew
Soltis

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## How to beat a stronger player

Andrew Soltis

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# *Chapter One:*

# It's Good To Be A David

Masters are our heroes. Grandmasters are our super-heroes. We honor them and study their games. We respect their strengths, their superior skills.

How can a much lower-rated player, a David, manage to last long against such a Goliath, we wonder?

What we fail to appreciate is that stronger players also have vulnerabilities. They are not vulnerable *in spite* of their strengths. They are vulnerable *because* of their strengths:

## *Goliaths fear draws*

A player who outrates his opponent by one class (200 points) should score better than 75 percent. That is, in a four-game match, he would be expected to get at least three points. If the rating difference is a bit more, he should get three wins and only allow one draw, according to the Elo system.

He would be satisfied with that, wouldn't he? No, not at all.

Higher-rateds feel that wins are the natural result when they face much weaker players. Wins *should* happen. Draws shouldn't. Draws are disappointing.

What this means for a prospective David is that a Goliath won't be content to draw. If the game goes on long enough, he may try to get more out of the position than he deserves.

Or to put it more exactly, more than the *position* deserves.



**Battaglini – Yusupov**

Corsica 2012

*Black to move*

Play went **1 ... ♕h3+ 2 ♔g1 ♕h5**.

White signaled his willingness to shake hands, with **3 ♔g2**.

Black saw nothing better than **3 ... ♕h3+** and White replied **4 ♔g1**.

Black was a strong grandmaster. He had once been the world's third-ranked player and a potential world championship challenger. But in this position he had no reason to refuse the tacit offer of a draw that White has made.

Objectively, the position is even. White is the one who is most likely to open the center favorably with e4-e5.

Black chose **4 ... ♔g7?** and quickly went downhill, **5 ♗f1 ♕c8 6 ♗g2 dxe4 7 fxe4 ♘xa6 8 e5!**.



*Black to move*

Now 8 ... fxe5 9 ♘xa6 ♕xa6 10 ♖xe5 ♖xe5 11 dxe5 would threaten ♕xg5 and ♕d7+ (11 ... ♕b6+ 12 ♔h1 ♕d8 13 ♕xd8 ♖xd8 14 ♗xc6 is a big endgame edge for White). Or 11...♘f7 12 e6!.

Instead, the game went **8 ... ♘xc5?? 9 exf6+ ♔xf6 10 ♖xe7 ♖xe7 11 ♖xe7**. Since 11 ... ♔xe7 12 ♕xg5+ is hopeless, Black played **11 ... ♕f5** and **resigned** after **12 ♖e5 ♕b1+ 13 ♖e1**.

Why did Black reject a draw? He would have readily accepted one against a player who was closer to him in rating. His position didn't tell him to play for a win. His rating did.

You'll find similar examples in this book in which a much higher-rated player loses because of an irrational fear of perpetual check or repetition of the position. But rejecting a tacit – or overt – draw offer is not the only way that a fear of drawing endangers stronger players:

A Goliath as Black may avoid playing the opening he knows best. Why? Because that opening is designed to equalize against other Goliaths.

For example, he may normally meet 1 e4 with the Petroff Defense or the Berlin Defense of the Ruy Lopez when playing an equal. But those are not high-percentage weapons. Rather, they are I'm-happy-to-draw-with-you-today, Fellow-Goliath openings.

So, he may choose to play a Sicilian Defense that he knows less about, just because it is sharper. There are several examples of Sicilian upsets in this book. Similarly, a Goliath may answer 1 d4 with 1 ... d5 against another Goliath. But against a David he will risk a King's Indian or Benoni Defense – and live with the consequences.

In addition, a Goliath may opt for a double-edged middlegame when he would normally head into a slightly favorable endgame. He is abandoning his usual style of play – what former world champion Vladimir Kramnik called "normal chess."

"I should play more normal chess," Kramnik said in a 2015 open tournament where he faced weaker opponents. "But somehow I want to win too much every game."

There are other vulnerabilities of higher-rated players:

## *Goliaths are overconfident*

Their success fosters complacency. Complacency breeds carelessness. Carelessness costs.

Take the case of John William Schulten and his battles with Paul Morphy. Schulten was a 19th century American wine merchant who often visited Europe on business. He loved to drop in at chess hangouts and challenge the best players.

His enthusiasm far outran his ability. As a result he became one of the greatest losers in chess history.

Virtually all of his surviving games are defeats -- and there are likely to be hundreds of other losses that were not recorded. The list of his vanquishers reads like a *Who's Who* of Romantic-era chess – Adolf Anderssen, Johannes Zukertort, Pierre Saint Amant, Ignatz von Kolisch, Lionel Kieseritzky, Bernhard Horwitz, Gustav Neumann and Morphy.

Schulten came to New York in 1857 solely to play Morphy, according to Morphy biographer David Lawson. They contested 24 games over a short period. Morphy won 23. Here's the 24th:

**Schulten – Morphy**

New York 1857

*Falkbeer Countergambit C31*

**1 e4 e5 2 f4 d5 3 exd5 e4 4 ♘c3!?**

This was considered a reasonable alternative to 4 d3 at the time.

**4 ... ♘f6 5 ♗c4 c6?! 6 d3?! ♗b4**

The drawback to 4 ♘c3 is this pin, which can occur in a number of move orders.

**7 dxe4 ♘xe4 8 ♗d2 ♗xc3 9 ♗xc3**



*Black to move*

**9 ... 0-0?**

Schulten refused to accept material odds so Morphy was playing blindfold. That is, he made his moves without looking at the board. But his moves indicate he chose them without *caring* about the board. Against a stronger player he would have won with 9 ... ♕h4+ 10 g3 ♘xg3.

**10 ♕h5 ♖e8 11 0-0-0 ♘xc3 12 bxc3 ♕a5 13 ♔b2 g6 14 ♕h6 ♗g4? 15 ♘f3 ♗xf3 16 gxf3 b5? 17 f5!**



*Black to move*

A small miracle has occurred. Now 17 ... ♘d7 18 ♗d3 b4 allows 19 fxg6 fxg6 20 ♗xg6 and wins.

**17 ... bxc4?? 18 f6 Black resigned.**

"Undoubtedly the monotony induced by so many wins accounts for his lapse in a single game," Lawson wrote.

This is far from unique. Some of the worst defeats suffered by the greatest players came about because they just weren't concentrating. The following game was played by a world champion during a 33-board simultaneous exhibition.

**Capablanca – Kevitz**

Brooklyn 1924

*Orangutan Opening A00*

**1 b4 d5 2 ♗b2 ♗f5 3 e3 e6 4 f4 ♘f6 5 ♘f3? ♗xb4**

Black couldn't take the pawn earlier (4 ... ♗xb4? 5 ♗xg7). Capa apparently just forgot that it was hanging.

**6 ♘c3 ♘bd7 7 ♘e2 ♘g4!**



*White to move*

The threat of 8 ... ♘xe3 prompts another concession. Computers recommend 8 ♗c3 or even 8 ♘c3. Those moves are beneath the dignity of a world champion.

**8 c3? ♗e7 9 h3 ♘c5!**

With a threat of ... ♘d3 mate. Black later became a strong master but at the time he was just a promising amateur.

**10 ♘g3 ♗h4! 11 ♘xh4 ♕xh4 12 ♕f3**



*Black to move*

Hoping for 12 ... ♘e4? 13 hxg4 ♕xg3+ 14 ♕xg3 ♘xg3 15 ♖h3! and White has turned the game around.

**12 ... ♘xe3!**

But now 13 dxe3 or 13 ♕xe3 allow 13 ... ♘e4 and Black will be two pawns up.

**13 ♕f2? ♘xf1 White resigned.**

In view of 14 ... ♘d3(+). Also winning was 13 ... ♘c2+.

Another Achilles heel of stronger players is:

## *Goliaths want to win effortlessly*

Davids usually beat themselves. They make blunders when paired way up. Goliaths can rely on routine moves and wait for the double-question-mark moves.

"Well, I haven't seen this lemon before," GM Maxim Dlugy wrote about a dubious sixth move that a much lower-rated opponent played against him. "I guess I should just let him get in his weakening moves."

Dlugy responded with hum-drum replies. Soon his position was only slightly favorable. He got careless, blundered and lost.

A Goliath knows he can beat most Davids with very little thought. He can choose most of his moves based on intuition. He plays the first move that occurs to him.

Thanks to their superior intuition, this usually works. This is why a master can give a 20-board simultaneous exhibition, and score 19-1 or even 20-0 in less than three hours.

But when a Goliath depends on intuition he isn't calculating as he would against an equal. Many upsets come about because Goliaths didn't see a tactical resource for their opponent.



**Krush – Zimmer**

New York 1993

*Black to move*

White was a nine-year-old player rated 1681. Black was a master, rated nearly 600 points above her. The rating system says his winning chances – compared with losing chances – were about 96 percent.

And he could have won with 1 ... ♖d8!, cutting off the knight's escape. There is no defense to 2 ... ♖d7 and 3 ... ♕f7 followed by capturing the knight.

Instead, he played **1 ... ♖c8??** and was lost after **2 ♘d5! ♕e6 3 ♖xc8 ♖xc8 4 ♖xc8+** because 4 ... ♕xc8 5 ♘e7+ loses the queen. White, a future grandmaster, went on win. But at the time this was played, she was the youngest player to defeat a US master.

## *Some Goliaths want to win quickly*

They don't want to just beat much weaker opponents. They want to crush them.

So they may try a risky opening. This often results in a win in fewer than 25 moves against an opponent who is seeing this line for the first time.

Paul Keres won many games like that. But this adventurism also carried risks:

**Keres – Menke**
Correspondence 1933
*King's Gambit Accepted, Mason Gambit C33*

**1 e4 e5 2 f4 exf4 3 ♘c3 ♕h4+ 4 ♔e2 d5 5 ♘xd5 ♗g4+ 6 ♘f3 ♘c6 7 ♘xc7+ ♔d8 8 ♘xa8 ♘e5 9 h3**

Here or on the next move White should play ♕e1.

**9 ... ♗h5 10 ♖g1??**



*Black to move*

**10 ... ♕g3! 11 ♕e1 ♘xf3 12 gxf3? ♕xf3 mate.**

## *Anti-Goliath strategies*

There are occasions when a very strong player beats himself. Here is how a former world champion self-destructed against an opponent he outrated by more than 300 points.

**Lieb – Spassky**
Munich 1979
*Vienna Game C26*

**1 e4 e5 2 ♘c3 ♘f6 3 ♗c4 ♗c5 4 d3 ♘c6 5 f4 d6 6 ♘a4!?**

The normal move is 6 ♘f3. White's move scores well in databases and was a favorite idea of Boris Spassky's in similar positions.

**6 ... ♗xg1 7 ♖xg1 ♘g4 8 g3 exf4 9 ♗xf4**



*Black to move*

Spassky may have been tempted by 9 ... ♘ge5 because it threatens 10 ... ♗g4, followed by a knight fork, or 10 ... ♘xc4, eliminating the nice bishop and damaging White's pawns. But **9 ... ♘xh2** also threatens 10 ... ♗g4 and it wins a pawn.

Unfortunately, Spassky overlooked **10 ♕h5!**, which threatens mate on f7. He struggled for another 13 moves after **10 ... ♕f6 11 ♕xh2** before resigning.

But in the vast majority of cases, a David has to make an upset possible.

There are four guidelines that serve as good advice.

They are:

## *Play actively*

Too many would-be Davids begin a game defensively. They are already thinking about losing. When they realize their position is inferior, they hunker down. They look for defensive moves, passive moves.

Goliaths thrive on exploiting that. "A strong player's sense of weakness is kind of like a dog's," GM Larry Christiansen said before giving a simultaneous exhibition in 2016. "If you play like 'Mr. Passive,' we welcome that."

Davids should be looking for aggressive moves. Nothing is more likely to disorient a Goliath than threats. By the time he has built up a big edge, the idea of losing has been banished from his mind. He may be vulnerable to even a desperation tactic.

**Beukema – van Herck**
Belgian Open Championship 2013
*Caro-Kann Defense, Advance Variation B12*

**1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 e5 c5 4 c3?! ♘c6 5 ♗b5 ♕b6 6 ♗xc6+ bxc6!**

Black, a 2100-player, tricked his lower-rated opponent with a somewhat rare third move (best met by 4 dxc5!).

His last move is the kind a superior player finds with his intuition. He created a second c-pawn to attack the center (... cxd4 can be followed by ... c5!). He also opened the best diagonal on the board for his c8-bishop.

**7 ♘e2 e6 8 0-0 ♗a6 9 ♖e1 h5 10 ♘f4 g6 11 ♕c2 ♘h6 12 b3 ♘f5 13 ♗e3 ♖c8!**

Black could have assured himself of an advantage with ... cxd4 at any point, with or without ... ♘xe3. He is playing for more, perhaps to win in fewer than 30 moves.

**14 ♕d2 cxd4 15 cxd4 ♗b4! 16 ♘c3 ♘xd4! 17 ♗xd4 c5**



*White to move*

It's been an embarrassment of riches for Black. He could have secured a solid edge with 16 ... ♘xe3 and 17 ... c5. Also good was the immediate 16 ... c5 because 17 dxc5 ♕a5 would win material (18 ♖ac1 d4! 19 ♗xd4 ♖d8).

But his choice should also win, e.g. 18 ♗e3 d4 (19 ♖ac1 ♗xc3 20 ♖xc3 dxc3 21 ♕xc3 ♕b4 22 ♕c1 c4).

Instead of rolling over and dying that way, White found:

**18 ♘fxd5! exd5 19 e6!**

There was little to lose. White gets to make threats (♗xh8 and exf7+).

Black might be tempted by 19 ... ♖h7 but 20 ♕g5! is strong (20 ... cxd4 21 ♘xd5! or 20 ... ♗xc3 21 exf7+ ♔xf7 22 ♖e7+ and wins).

**19 ... 0-0??**

But 19 ... cxd4! would have won quickly. Black may have assumed he could capture on the next move.



*White to move*

**20 ♕h6! cxd4 21 ♘xd5! Resigns**

There was no defense: 21 ... ♕d8 stops mate but allows 22 ♖e5 and 23 exf7+.

Of course, Black should have won, even after 18 ♘fxd5. White's refusal to go quietly made the upset possible.

## *Encourage chaos*

John Grefe, who co-won a US Championship, was vulnerable to Davids. In open tournaments, he was occasionally beaten by players rated more than 500 points below him. "I can't play against them," he complained. "They don't know what they're doing."

What they were doing was creating the kind of double-edged position, even at positional cost, that Grefe hated to play. They sought chaotic middlegames and double-edged endgames.

One of Simon Webb's mantras in his classic book *Chess for Tigers* was that weaker players should try to "randomize." As he put it,

"The basic principle is to head for a complicated or unclear position such that *neither* of you has much idea of what to do, and hope that he makes a serious mistake before you do."

This sounds like terrible advice: After all, won't a Goliath be able to calculate a chaotic position, a random position much better than you?

Well, if the position is one given to calculation, the answer is yes. But Goliaths aren't computers. There are severe limits to human evaluation.

Just as bad as facing an unpredictable position is playing an unpredictable opponent. Less experienced players "don't know what to be afraid of," as Magnus Carlsen put it .

"So they play without fear, without prejudice, and that's sometimes difficult to face," the world champion said.

## *Be yourself*

A David may think to himself, "Grandmaster Goliath knows my favorite openings much better than me. I should try something new."

Wrong. As GM Alex Yermolinsky said, "Nothing makes a GM happier than when his less experienced opponent gets 'creative' from the very first moves."

"If you think your openings are good, play them against anyone, especially grandmasters!" he advised.

And the fourth guideline is:

## *Bend, don't break*

The longer that a lower-rated player can put up significant resistance, the greater the chance that his opponent will err. Goliaths get tired just like anyone else.

This doesn't mean you should play on a rook down. It means you should make it as difficult to win as possible for as long as possible.

**Patay – Rubinstein**
Merano 1924
*Colle Opening D04*

**1 d4 d5 2 ♘f3 ♘f6 3 e3 ♗f5 4 ♗d3 e6 5 ♘e5 ♘bd7 6 ♘d2 ♗d6 7 f4 0-0 8 ♘df3 ♘e4 9 0-0 h6 10 ♘xd7 ♕xd7 11 ♘e5 ♕e8 12 c4 c6 13 c5 ♗c7 14 b4 f6 15 ♘f3 a5! 16 bxa5 ♖xa5 17 ♕b3 ♕a8 18 a3 b6! 19 ♘d2 bxc5**

**20 ♘xe4 c4! 21 ♗xc4 ♗xe4 22 ♗d3 ♖b8 23 ♕c2 ♗xd3 24 ♕xd3 ♖ab5 25 ♖f2 ♖b3 26 ♕d1 ♕a6**

Black has a clear positional advantage based on White's weak a-pawn and bad bishop and Black's control of the b-file and the prospect of opening lines with ... c5 and/or ... e5.

Many of Akiba Rubinstein's master opponents would have lost if they were handling the White pieces now. The obscure player of the White pieces finds ways to prolong – and complicate.

**27 a4 ♗a5! 28 ♖c2! ♗c3 29 ♖aa2 e5! 30 fxe5 fxe5 31 h3!? exd4 32 exd4**



*Black to move*

**32 ... ♕c4?**

Black's last move seems to win the d4-pawn. But the superior 32 ... ♕b6! would have won after 33 ♗e3 ♖b1 or 33 ♔h1 ♕xd4 (33 ... ♗xd4 34 a5 is less clear) 34 ♕xd4 ♗xd4 35 ♖xc6 ♖e8! and ... ♖e1∓.

**33 ♔h2! c5?**

Black is looking for more than the favorable endgame of 33 ... ♕xd4! 34 ♕xd4 ♗xd4 35 ♖xc6 and now 35 ... ♗e5+! 36 ♔g1 ♗g3. He may not win then. But it's the best he can get now.

Rubinstein saw that 33 ... c5 34 dxc5 allows 34 ... ♗e5+! (35 ♔g1 ♖d3! and wins because of 36 ♕g4 ♕xg4 37 hxg4 ♗g3!, threatening ... ♖d1 mate). What he misjudged was:

**34 ♗f4!**

Now 34 ... ♖f8 35 ♗e5! allows White's pieces to get active.

A draw would be likely after 35 ... cxd4 36 ♕g4 ♖b7 37 ♕e6+. For example, 37 ... ♖bf7 38 ♖f2. Or 37 ... ♖ff7 38 ♗xd4! ♕xd4 39 ♕c8+. Or 37 ... ♔h7 38 ♖f2.



*Black to move*

**34 ... ♖e8**

So that 35 ♗c5 can now be met by 35 ... ♖xe5! 36 dxe5 ♗xe5+ 37 ♔h1? ♕f4 and wins, or 37 ♔g1 ♕e4!. But Black is entering a death spiral.

**35 ♕h5! ♖e4? 36 ♗e5 cxd4? 37 ♖f2! ♖xe5**

Or 37 ... ♖b7 (to stop ♕f7+) 38 ♕e8+ ♔h7 39 ♖f8.

**38 ♕xe5 ♖b7? 39 ♕e8+ ♔h7 40 ♖f8 Black resigned.**

Of course, following these four guidelines won't guarantee an upset. In fact, it is often impossible to follow all of them because they contradict one another.

If you are better at endgames than tactical middlegames, "Be yourself" tells you to trade queens. That may be the opposite of playing actively or breeding chaos. Here's a remarkable example:

**Badrakh Galmandakh – Alexander Motylev**
Gibraltar 2015
*Irregular Opening A00*

**1 d3 d5 2 e4?!?**



*Black to move*

White, a minor Mongolian master, had opened the same way, against a grandmaster opponent who outrated him by 400 points, at the previous year's Gibraltar tournament.

Black avoided the endgame with 2 ... e6?! and later made a promising sacrifice of his queen for a rook and bishop. But White didn't break and agreed to a draw – on the 129th move.

**2 ... dxe4 3 dxe4 ♕xd1+ 4 ♔xd1 e5 5 ♗e3 ♘f6 6 f3**

The truth is that this is a very hard position for Black to win, even with a 410-point rating edge. White has no weaknesses. His king is not a significant target with queens traded.

**6 ... ♘bd7 7 ♘d2 a5 8 a4 ♗c5 9 ♘c4 ♗xe3 10 ♘xe3 ♘c5 11 ♘c4 ♘fd7 12 ♘h3 ♔e7 13 c3 ♘b6?!**

This is a curious decision. Black damages his queenside pawn structure – and concedes d5 to White's pieces – in the hopes of generating strong rook-play on the c-file.

**14 ♘xb6 cxb6 15 ♗c4 ♗d7 16 b3 ♖ac8 17 ♗d5! ♖c7**

Black repeatedly passed up the pawn-wrecking ... ♗xh3. What was he afraid of?

Perhaps positions like 17 ... ♗xh3 18 gxh3 ♘e6 19 ♔c2 ♖c7 20 ♖hg1 g6 when 21 ♗xe6 ♔xe6 22 ♖ad1 brings about a rook endgame in which his winning chances are problematic.

**18 ♘f2 ♖fc8 19 ♔c2 f5? 20 c4!**



*Black to move*

Black certainly couldn't be complacent, over-confident or expecting to win quickly any more. Nevertheless, he still has some Goliath weaknesses.

**20 ... fxe4 21 ♘xe4 ♘a6 22 ♔b2 ♘b4 23 ♖ad1 ♗f5? 24 ♖he1? ♖d8 25 ♘g3**

Black is beginning to miscalculate – allowing 24 ♗xb7! ♖xb7 25 ♘d6.

Now he had to try something like 25 ... ♗c2 26 ♖d2 ♔f8, since 27 ♖xe5 ♘d3+ is a marginal White edge.

**25 ... ♘d3+? 26 ♔c3 ♘xe1 27 ♘xf5+ ♔f6 28 ♘e3!**



*Black to move*

This is apparently what Black overlooked. The Black knight is trapped. Although **28 ... ♘xg2 29 ♘xg2** gave him approximate material equality, White had most of the winning chances. Black conceded on the 77th move.

The idea for this book – and its title – came from Batsford's themselves. In choosing 50 instructive upsets I sought games in which the stronger player was at least 200 rating points better than his opponent. In several cases, the difference was much greater. You can enjoy the games in any of several ways.

First, you can root for the underdogs. We all like to see high-rated players being humbled. It's *schach-schadenfreude*.

Second, there are techniques employed in these games that may apply to your own games when playing a stronger opponent.

And, finally, these games are also a warning of what not to do when *you* are the one playing a much weaker opponent. Some days you will be a David and some days you will be a vulnerable Goliath.

It's not just an upset when a world-class player is beaten by a much weaker player. It's a historic event. The next chapter shows how super-Goliaths were slain.

Even though they were measurably stronger than other upset victims we'll see, they fell for many of the same reasons outlined in the first chapter. The Davids relied on active play or they fostered chaos. They exploited complacency, impatience, fear of drawing, and miscalculation.

# *Chapter Two:*

# When Titans Fall

## *1*

## Walter Grimshaw – Wilhelm Steinitz

### London 1870

### *Scotch Game, Steinitz Variation C45*

Few tournament players will recognize the name Walter Grimshaw. But every lover of composed problems certainly would.

His fame is secured by the "Grimshaw theme": Black pieces are forced to interfere with one another and allow a mating move. Grimshaw is also credited with winning the first-ever problem solving tournament in Great Britain, in London in 1854.

But he was also a strong over-the-board player, as this game attests. It was apparently played at the celebrated London chess hangout Simpson's Divan.

**1 e4 e5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 d4 exd4 4 ♘xd4 ♕h4**

This last move was a Steinitz specialty that is periodically revived.

It violates general opening principles. But as 19th century players knew well, abstract notions about a position are always secondary to what's happening on the board. In this case, Black's threat of 5 ... ♕xe4+ takes center stage.



*White to move*

**5 ♘b5!**

Play actively! Grimshaw's move ignored Black's threat by making a bigger threat (6 ♘xc7+).

If White were following the general principles that Black violated, he would choose 5 ♘c3.

Then the 5 ... ♗b4 pin renews the ... ♕xe4+ threat. Black would stand well after 6 ♘b5? ♗a5.

Better is 6 ♗e2 ♕xe4 7 ♘b5 ♗xc3+ 8 bxc3 ♔d8, when Black has a better version of what happens in the game

Bear in mind that Steinitz was well aware of 5 ♘b5. Databases show that he eventually defended this position at least nine times. He scored seven wins and one draw, with only one loss.

**5 ... ♕xe4+? 6 ♗e3**

Today 6 ♗e2 is more popular. Steinitz liked to meet that with 6 ... ♗b4+ and, if 7 ♗d2, then 7 ... ♔d8.

**6 ... ♗b4+ 7 ♘d2!**

This is superior to 7 c3 because if Black defends c7 with 7 ... ♕e5?, he stumbles into 8 c3 and 9 ♘c4!.

Also 7 ... ♔d8? loses the bishop to 8 c3!, because 9 ♘xe4 is the main threat.

**7 ... ♗xd2+ 8 ♕xd2 ♔d8**



*White to move*

Steinitz is credited with saying that an extra pawn is worth a little trouble. But it's hard to imagine how he thought he could complete development.

He was betrayed by over-confidence in his own opening and chess philosophy.

**9 0-0-0 ♕e6**

This would have been the shortest loss by a world champion after 9 ... d6?? 10 ♘xc7! resigns.

Steinitz's move protects the key d6 square and eyes ... ♕xa2. But White has been ignoring Black's threats since 5 ♘b5! and he can continue to do so.

**10 ♗f4! d6 11 ♗xd6!**

White also wins after 11 ♘xc7 ♔xc7 12 ♗xd6+ (12 ... ♔b6 13 ♕c3! and 12 ... ♔d8 13 ♗f8+ and ♗xg7 or 13 ♗b5). But the text is more punishing.

**11 ... cxd6 12 ♘xd6**

Some computers prefer 12 ♕g5+ followed by ♖xd6+ or ♕xg7. The text allows Black to play a lost endgame after 12 ... ♔c7 13 ♗c4 ♕h6 14 ♘xf7 ♕xd2+.

**12 ... ♕xa2**



*White to move*

But Steinitz evidently wanted the game over. White can mate in nine moves with 13 ♘xc8+ or in six (if Black meets 13 ♘b5+ with 13 ... ♕d5).

**13 ♘b5+! ♔e8 14 ♘c7+ ♔f8 15 ♕d6+ ♘ge7 16 ♕d8+! ♘xd8 17 ♖xd8 mate**

This game was so embarrassing that in later years Steinitz repeatedly used his *International Chess Magazine* to deny that it happened. "Bogus manufactured forgery" were his words. However, eyewitnesses eventually stepped forward to say, yes, it occurred. They all saw a Goliath mated in 17 moves.

## 2

# Milton Otteson – Bobby Fischer

## Milwaukee 1957

### *Reti Opening A05*

Bobby Fischer had already earned international fame with his "Game of the Century" in 1956. He was a month away from winning the US Open when he played this game in a holiday weekend tournament.

He began it impressively, outplaying his opponent in the opening, seizing a positional advantage by move 12 and then a slight material edge five moves later.

But Fischer's Achilles heel was a tendency to relax when he felt his position was won. His opponent capitalized on this complacency.

**1 ♘f3 ♘f6 2 g3 g6 3 b4 ♗g7 4 ♗b2 0-0 5 ♗g2 d6 6 d4 e5!**

This is a good way of handling this and the similar positions with 3 b3. Black threatens to gain space and a small edge with 7 ... e4.

**7 dxe5 ♘g4 8 ♘bd2**



*Black to move*

**8 ... ♘c6!**

Fischer's choice is more ambitious than 8 ... ♘xe5 9 ♘xe5 dxe5 (or 8 ... dxe5 9 h3 e4 10 ♗xg7 exf3 11 ♘xf3). Fischer scored 6-1 in his other games in this tournament and was seeking more than equality in this one.

**9 b5 ♘cxe5 10 ♘xe5 ♘xe5 11 0-0**

His goal was to win the two-bishop edge with ... ♘f3+ followed by ... ♗xb2.

If White protects his b2-bishop, 11 ♖b1, he runs into other problems, such as 11 ... a6! 12 a4 axb5 13 axb5 ♕e8! (14 c4? ♘d3+).

**11 ... ♘f3+! 12 ♗xf3! ♗xb2 13 ♖b1 ♗g7 14 ♘c4**

Black would like to complete development quietly. But after 14 ... ♗e6 15 ♘a5! his queenside comes under fire.

**14 ... ♗h3! 15 ♖e1 ♗c3**



*White to move*

Black wants to convert the "2Bs" into a harder currency, the Exchange. He would also have good winning chances after 16 ♘d2 ♗e6 17 a4 d5 or 17 ♗xb7 ♖b8, for example.

**16 ♗xb7!? ♗xe1 17 ♕xe1**

Now 17 ♗xa8?? ♕xa8 loses a piece because of the threat of ... ♕g2 mate.

**17 ... ♖b8 18 ♗f3 ♕g5 19 a4**

Does a trade of bishops help White or Black? The answer is Black in variations such as 19 ... ♗g4 20 ♗xg4? ♕xg4.

But from now White has the good square c6 – and later d5 – for his bishop. Preserving material (19 ... ♗g4 20 ♗c6!) preserves his chances to make matters more double-edged.

**19 ... ♕c5 20 ♘e3 ♗e6!**

Black's rooks can't act like rooks and that means the extra Exchange isn't significant yet. For example, 20 ... ♖fe8 21 ♘d5 ♔g7 looks right, to rule out ♘f6+ tricks.

But then 22 ♖b3! followed by 23 ♕a1+ or 23 ♖c3 is suddenly looking good for White.

**21 c4! a6?**

Not 21 ... ♗xc4?? 22 ♖c1! d5 23 ♗xd5. It's not clear what Fischer had in mind since a pawn exchange on b5 will hand his opponent an outside passed pawn.

**22 ♖d1 axb5 23 cxb5! ♗b3 24 ♖c1 ♕d4**



*White to move*

Suddenly White is better. Or he would have been, if he had realized the value of his passed pawn.

With 25 ♗c6! it would threaten to advance to a6. For instance 25 ... f5 26 a5 f4 27 gxf4 ♖xf4 28 a6.

To play 25 ♗c6! he would have to see the tactics that protect the a-pawn.

They are 25 ... ♗xa4 26 ♖c4 ♕a7 27 ♕a1! and 25 ... ♕xa4 26 b6!, threatening ♗xa4 or bxc7.

Instead, he opted for another anti-Goliath strategy, making threats on the opposite wing.

**25 ♖xc7!? ♕xa4 26 ♕c3**

Now a capture on b5 permits 27 ♘g4! followed by ♘h6 mate or a strong ♘f6+. The position is getting murky.

**26 ... ♗e6 27 ♗c6 ♖fc8**



*White to move*

When his position declines, a Goliath sets traps.

This is a neat one – 28 b6 ♖xc7 29 bxc7 looks like it wins for White.

But 29 ... ♖b3! is solidly in Black's favor (30 ♗xa4? ♖xc3, 30 ♕c1 ♕b4 or 30 ♕c2 ♕a1+ 31 ♔g2 ♖b1).

**28 ♖e7! d5**

Returning the Exchange, 28 ... ♖xb5 29 ♗xb5 ♕xb5, offered no real winning chances. Only slightly better is 28 ... ♕xb5 (29 ♖e8+ ♖xe8 30 ♗xb5 ♖xb5).

**29 ♕f6! ♖xc6?**

The threats were 30 ♘xd5 and 30 ♖xe6. But they should have been stopped by 30 ... ♕e4!.

Fischer seemed confused about what to expect around this time. He didn't want a draw last move (28 ... ♖xb5 or 28 ... ♕xb5). But now he wanted one and must have thought that giving back material would do the trick.

**30 bxc6 ♕xc6 31 ♘g4!**



*Black to move*

**31 ... ♕c1+?**

He must have seen that 31 ... ♖b7 stops the threat of 32 ♘h6+ ♔f8 33 ♖xf7+.

But he probably talked himself out of it because of 32 ♘h6+ ♔f8 33 h4 and 33 ... ♖b1+ 34 ♔h2.

What he missed is the insertion of 31 ... ♖b1+! turns 32 ♔g2 ♖b7! into a trap.

The difference is that 33 ♘h6+ ♔f8 34 h4?? loses the queen to 34 ... ♗h3+!.

That doesn't end the tactics. White might have found 33 ♕e5!

That is based on 33 ... ♖xe7?? 34 ♘h6+ ♔f8 35 ♕h8 mate. White would have kept winning chances after 33 ... ♔f8 34 ♖xb7 ♕xb7 35 ♕h8+ and ♕xh7.

But now he gets a once-in-a-lifetime chance to mate a future world champion.

**32 ♔g2 ♖f8**



*White to move*

**33 ♖xe6**

This is good enough to win. But 33 ♖c7! would have made 33 ... ♕d2 34 ♖c2! ♕xc2 35 ♘h6 mate one of the prettiest-ever defeats of Fischer.

**33 ... fxe6 34 ♕xe6+ ♔g7 35 ♕e5+ ♔f7 36 f4 ♖c8 37 ♘h6+?**

This and the errors that follow look like the spawn of time pressure. White should have won quickly with 37 ♕f6+ ♔e8 38 ♘e5!.

**37 ... ♔f8 38 ♕h8+ ♔e7 39 ♕xh7+ ♔d6 40 ♕xg6+ ♔c5 41 ♕d3 ♕c4 42 ♘g4 ♖g8?**

There were slim drawing chances available in the 42 ... ♕xd3 43 cxd3 ♔d4 endgame.

**43 ♘e5 ♕xf4? 44 ♕c3+ ♔b5 45 ♕c6+ ♔a5 46 ♕xd5+ ♔a4 47 ♕xg8 ♕xe5 48 ♕c4+ ♔a3 49 h4 Black resigned.**

## *3*

# Artiom Samsonkin – Hikaru Nakamura

## Toronto 2009

### *Sicilian Defense, Kan Variation B43*

Hikaru Nakamura was already a world-class grandmaster when he met a 19-year-old Canadian student midway through a large Swiss System open tournament. One careless move in the opening should have warned Black that he was entering must-calculate territory. Only two mistakes were enough to lose.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 e6 3 ♘c3 a6 4 d4 cxd4 5 ♘xd4 ♕c7 6 ♗d3 ♗e7 7 0-0 ♘f6 8 a4 b6 9 ♕e2 d6**

Black has been keeping his options wide open. He didn't commit his d-pawn until he needed it to stop 10 e5. He doesn't make a decision about his QN until he's decided against ... ♘c6. And he doesn't castle early because it would have given White a reason for g2-g4-g5!.

**10 f4 ♗b7 11 ♗d2 ♘bd7 12 ♖ae1 ♘c5**



*White to move*

That stay-flexible policy seems to be working because 13 e5? gives Black a small pull after 13 ... ♘xd3! 14 ♕xd3 dxe5 15 fxe5 ♘d7.

That fits in with a Sicilian rule of thumb: If e4-e5 doesn't generate immediate White threats, it fizzles out quickly.

Well, if White can't exploit Black's failure to castle with e4-e5, what about forcing matters on the queenside?

**13 b4!? ♘xd3 14 cxd3**

The test of White's idea is 14 ... 0-0 15 ♖ac1 ♕d7. The queen move avoids a discovered rook attack on it (16 ♘d5).

But what's next? White doesn't achieve anything by doubling rooks, 16 ♖c2 ♖fc8 17 ♖fc1 ♗f8.

More adventurous is 16 g4 and then 16 ... ♘e8 17 f5. But 17 ... d5! gets to a very double-edged endgame after 18 fxe6 fxe6 19 exd5 exd5 20 ♕e6+ that Black may be happy to play.

**14 ... ♘d7? 15 ♖c1 ♕d8**

Black's knight retreat is hard to explain. There was no reason to fear e4-e5.

**16 f5!**

White wants to create either a target on e6 or an outpost on f5 (16 ... exf5? 17 ♘xf5).

After 16 ... ♗f6! 17 ♗e3 e5 18 ♘b3 he would have chances on either wing, with ♘d2-c4 on the queenside or ♕g4 on the kingside.

Black has to be careful because he is behind in development. For example, 17 ... ♕e7 (instead of 17 ... e5) would allow 18 fxe6 fxe6 19 ♕h5+ g6 20 ♕h3.

If Black counters the 21 ♘xe6 threat with 20 ... ♖c8 he'd get a Goliath-sized surprise from 21 e5! (21 ... ♘xe5 22 ♘d5! ♗xd5 23 ♖xc8+ or 21 ... ♗xe5 22 ♘d5! exd5 23 ♖xc8+ ♗xc8 24 ♘c6!).

**16 ... e5?**



*White to move*

What happens in the next three moves looks impossible for a David to calculate. It isn't because:

(a) An improving David would know that ♘e6 (or ♘xe6) is a common sacrificial theme in the Sicilian Defense.

(b) He could see White's most forcing moves that follow 17 ♘e6.

(c) He would then see that Black's replies are more or less forced.

**17 ♘e6! fxe6 18 ♕h5+ g6**

Or 18 ... ♔f8 19 fxe6+ and mate next move.

**19 fxg6 ♘f6 20 g7+ ♔d7**

When he began calculating 17 ♘e6 White could have seen this far and realized that 21 gxh8(♕) would put him a winning, full Exchange ahead.

**21 ♕f7!**

But here he would have noticed that this is even better. His main threat is 22 ♖xf6 followed by 23 ♕xe6+.

**21 ... ♕e8 22 gxh8(♘)! ♕xh8**



*White to move*

Some computers want a brilliant finish with 23 ♘b5 axb5 24 ♖c7+! ♔xc7 25 ♕xe7+ ♔b8 26 ♕xd6+ ♔a7 27 axb5 and ♖a1+ or 25 ... ♘d7 26 ♖c1+ ♗c6 27 axb5. Those wild and crazy machines.

White actually has a wide choice, since 23 ♗g5 and 23 ♘e2 – even 23 ♘a2 and 23 ♘b1 – win eventually.

**23 ♘e2 b5 24 ♗g5! ♕g8**

Black could resign after 24 ... ♖f8 25 ♗xf6. He allows White a prettier kill.

**25 ♖xf6 ♕xg5 26 ♕xe6+ ♔d8 27 ♖c7! ♕e3+ 28 ♔f1 ♔xc7 29 ♕xe7+ ♔b6 30 ♕xd6+ ♔a7 31 ♕c7 Black resigned.**

The threats were 32 ♕b6+/33 ♖f8 mate as well as 32 ♖xa6+! ♔xa6 33 ♕a5 mate.

## 4

# Kaarle-Sakari Ojanen – Paul Keres

## Finland-Estonia match, Helsinki 1960

## *Modern Benoni Defense A65*

Openings are supposed to be the strong suit of Goliaths. They know more about them because they study them more. Their knowledge of crucial variations may last past move 25. Davids are lucky to get past move eight before they have to start thinking for themselves.

But a Goliath's opening can also conceal a vulnerability. In this game Paul Keres adopts an opening he rarely played. This might maximize his winning chances against some weaker opponents. But when this White tried out a relatively new sacrificial theme, Keres was the one floundering in unfamiliar waters.

This is a complicated game but one worth studying by improving Davids.

**1 d4 ♘f6 2 c4 e6 3 ♘c3 c5**

Keres usually relied on classical openings. He often met 1 e4 with 1 ... e5 and 1 d4 with either 1 ... d5 or a main-line defense like the Nimzo-Indian. He had tried the Benoni a few times previously, mainly against Davids.

**4 d5 exd5 5 cxd5 g6 6 e4 d6 7 ♗d3 ♗g7 8 ♘ge2**

White's setup seems innocuous compared with the more ambitious systems involving f2-f4, ♗g5 or a ♘f3-d2-c4 maneuver.

Instead, White overprotects his e-pawn and will add more security with ♘g3.

**8 ... 0-0 9 0-0 ♖e8 10 h3 ♘bd7**

A good case can be made for the alternative use of this key piece, 10 ... ♘a6 and 11 ... ♘c7. Then Black has better chances of achieving ... b5, his first middlegame goal.

**11 ♘g3 a6 12 a4 ♕c7**

Black opts for a different idea, ... c4 followed by ... ♘c5. A less ambitious White would avoid 13 f4 because it could endanger his e4-pawn.

**13 f4! c4 14 ♗c2 ♘c5**



*White to move*

Black's play is logical, and your computer may declare the position dead even because ... ♗d7 and ... b5, his strategic goal, are on the horizon.

The tactics also seem to be running in Black's favor: 15 ♗e3 allows 15 ... ♘cxe4! 16 ♘gxe4 ♘xe4 17 ♘xe4 f5! and he regains his piece favorably.

But this is where his position begins to get difficult. During an England-USSR match in the 1960 Olympiad team tournament, the game Penrose – Tal developed just like this one until White played the more accurate 15 ♕f3!.

Black realized that the thematic 15 ... ♗d7 16 ♗e3 b5 17 axb5 axb5 would walk into 18 ♖xa8 ♖xa8 19 e5!.

Then White enjoys a big edge, e.g. 19 ... dxe5 20 fxe5 followed by 21 d6 (or 20 ... ♕xe5 21 ♗xc5).

Mikhail Tal, who had just become world champion, fell back on 15 ... ♘fd7 and then 16 ♗e3 b5 17 axb5 ♖b8.

He would have gotten active play following 18 bxa6 ♖xb2. But his English opponent replied 18 ♕f2 axb5 19 e5! dxe5 20 f5!.



*Black to move*

White gets e4 for his pieces, a passed d-pawn and open lines with fxg6. That was more than enough compensation after 20 ... ♗b7 21 ♖ad1 ♗a8 22 ♘ce4!.

Black was losing after 22 ... ♘a4 23 ♗xa4 bxa4 24 fxg6 fxg6 25 ♕f7+ ♔h8 26 ♘c5! ♕a7? 27 ♕xd7.

Where did White get the idea for 19 e5 and 20 f5 ? Probably from the Ojanen –Keres game, which was played a few months earlier.

**15 ♔h1 ♗d7 16 ♕f3 ♔h8**

White's insertion of ♔h1 means that he will be one move slower in getting the center break he wants.

That matters after 16 ... b5! 17 axb5 axb5 18 ♖xa8 ♖xa8 19 e5 dxe5 because 20 fxe5? ♕xe5 doesn't work, because 20 d6 ♕c6 is nothing and because 20 f5 can be handled by 20 ... b4, among others.

**17 ♗e3 ♘g8**



*White to move*

Keres' idea was that 18 e5 dxe5 19 fxe5 ♗xe5 and now 20 ♕xf7 is not a check, thanks to ... ♔h8.

But the story goes on: If 20 ... ♗xc3 White has 21 ♗xc5! ♕xc5 22 bxc3 with a small advantage. The key point is that 21 ... ♗xb2? explodes after 22 ♗xg6! hxg6 23 ♕xg6 with ♖f7 or ♕h5+ coming up.

White could change gears with 19 f5, instead of 19 fxe5. He could play for positional pressure with 19 ... ♘f6 20 ♗g5 ♖f8 21 a5 or 21 ♖ad1. But why not prepare the f4-f5 idea with 18 ♖ad1 ?

**18 ♖ad1! b5 19 axb5 axb5 20 e5 dxe5 21 f5!**



*Black to move*

The square-clearing sacrifice works nearly as well as in Penrose – Tal. Black doesn't have to worry as much about fxg6. But he does have to be concerned with d5-d6! followed by ♗xc5 or ♘d5. He should watch e4 with 21 ... ♘f6 or d6 with 21 ... ♘b7.

**21 ... b4 22 d6 ♕a5 23 ♘ce4 ♘d3?**

This is positional capitulation. Black would be worse after 23 ... ♘xe4 24 ♗xe4 ♖ac8 25 ♗b7 ♖b8 26 ♗d5 but far from terminal.

**24 ♗xd3 cxd3 25 f6! ♗f8 26 ♖xd3**

Material is equal but White pieces dominate (26 ... ♗b5 27 ♖d5). The rest of the game demonstrates how to centralize forces behind a passed pawn.

**26 ... ♘h6 27 ♖fd1 ♖ed8 28 ♕f2 ♕b5 29 ♕d2**



*Black to move*

White aims to create threats such as 29 ... ♘g8 30 ♘g5 and ♘xf7 mate, e.g. 30 ... ♗e8 31 d7.

Also good was 29 ♖d5 ♕c4 30 ♖xe5 or 29 ... ♕a4 30 ♘c5.

**29 ... ♘f5 30 ♘xf5 ♗xf5 31 ♖d5 ♕b7 32 ♘c5 ♕c6 33 ♗h6!**

White can play d6-d7 or ♕xb4 whenever he wants to. His last move adds another way to win, a trade of bishops and threats of ♕g7 mate.

**33 ... ♗xh6 34 ♕xh6 ♖g8 35 ♖xe5 ♖ad8 36 ♖d4!**



*Black to move*

The threat is not 37 ♖h4 g5 but 37 ♕xh7+! ♔xh7 38 ♖h4 mate.

**36 ... g5 37 ♖xf5 ♖xd6 38 ♖xg5! Black resigned.**

Would-be Davids can't expect to surprise a Goliath with a new idea as White did in that game. But they should realize that even Goliaths can find themselves in unfamiliar territory in the late opening.

### *5*

## Anatoly Karpov – Valery Nebolsin

### Soviet Armed Forces Championship, Leningrad 1969

### *Sicilian Defense, Rossolimo Variation B31*

Anatoly Karpov was already recognized as a player with a great future when this game was played, a few months before he won the World Junior Championship. His opponent had only a brief playing career. He wins when Karpov miscalculates. How can a David get a Goliath to miscalculate? Let's see what set the stage.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 ♗b5 g6 4 0-0 ♗g7 5 c3 a6**

Black's last move tries to exploit White's fifth, which prepared d2-d4 but temporarily weakens d3.

**6 ♗xc6 dxc6 7 d3**

White pushed this pawn to prevent 7 ... ♕d3!, which would have throttled his development.

The main alternative to 7 d3 was 7 d4. The young Karpov knew relatively little about openings and probably had doubts about what to do after 7 ... cxd4 8 cxd4 ♗g4, which threatens the d4-pawn (9 ♘c3 ♗xf3 or 9 ♗e3 c5).

**7 ... ♘f6 8 h3 0-0 9 ♕e2 a5?! 10 ♗f4 a4**

Black's space-gaining on the queenside could have been halted by 10 a4! followed by ♘a3.

Instead, Karpov is relying on simple and solid developing moves, based on instinct and general principles. That's a good, intuition-based response to an unfamiliar opening. But he is approaching a point when he will have to calculate to make his developed pieces work best.

**11 ♘a3 ♖e8 12 ♖fd1 ♘d7**



*White to move*

Black advertises his intent to contest the center with 13 ... e5! (14 ♗g5 f6!). Once d3-d4 has been stopped for good he can target White's d-pawn with his heavy pieces and perhaps his bishop (... b6/... ♗a6).

White has two ways to anticipate 13 ... e5, by pushing his e- or d-pawn.

For example, 13 e5 followed by 14 ♕e3 or 14 ♕d2 and ♗h6. Black minor pieces won't get to the newly-freed d5 outpost because of 13 ... ♘b6 14 c4!.

**13 d4 cxd4 14 cxd4 ♕a5 15 ♖ac1 ♘b6**

When you have the two bishops, you may have to wait for your opponent to open diagonals for them to work best. Black is content to complete development with ... ♗e6 and force White to defend the a2-pawn. Karpov finds a tactical flaw.

**16 ♗c7! ♕a6**

He was ready to punish 16 ... ♗e6? with 17 d5! cxd5 18 exd5 and win material (18 ... ♗d7 19 ♘c4 or 18 ... ♗xd5 19 ♗xb6 ♗xf3 20 ♕e3!).



*White to move*

**17 ♕e3! f5!**

Black had to anticipate 18 d5 followed by 19 ♕xb6.

He could have tried 17 ... e6, based on 18 d5? exd5 19 ♕xb6 ♕xb6 20 ♗xb6 ♗xb2 with a superior endgame.

But 17 ... e6? would have doomed him to passivity and White could build up slowly with moves he doesn't have to calculate such as 18 ♖d2, 18 ♖c2 and 18 ♘e5.

But White does have to calculate after 17 ... f5!. A quiet move like 18 ♗e5 offers a tiny edge after 18 ... fxe4 19 ♕xe4 ♗f5 20 ♕h4 ♕e2 – and not 19 ♗xg7? exf3 20 ♗h6 ♕e2 or 20 ♗e5 ♖f8.

**18 d5?**

White fails the test. If he had calculated more accurately he would have rejected this in favor of 18 ♖c5!.

Among the points is that 19 b4 and 20 ♖a5 would be threatened (and 19 ... axb3 20 ♕xb3+ ♔h8 21 ♘e5! or 20 ... e6 21 ♘c2 is good for White).

Another key to the position is that 18 ... fxe4 19 ♕xe4 ♗f5? allows a strong sacrifice, 20 ♖xf5! gxf5 21 ♕e6+ and ♘g5.

Similar to that is 18 ... ♗e6 19 exf5 ♗xf5 20 ♖xf5! gxf5 21 ♕e6+ ♔h8 22 ♘g5 ♖f8 23 ♗e5!.

**18 ... fxe4 19 ♗xb6 exf3**

If White had rechecked his calculation, he could have bailed out with 20 ♘c4. Then 20 ... ♖f8 21 dxc6 bxc6 is unclear.

**20 d6?**

Karpov counted on 20 ... ♗xb2 21 d7! and 21 ... ♗xd7 22 ♖xd7 ♗xc1 23 ♕e6+.

White would win after 23 ... ♔g7 24 ♖xe7+ ♖xe7 25 ♕xe7+ ♔h6 26 ♗d4. Or 25 ... ♔g8 26 ♕e6+ ♔g7 27 ♗d4+ ♔f8 28 ♘c4.

But in looking at these very long variations when he considered 18 d5 he missed a short one.



*Black to move*

**20 ... ♕e2! 21 d7**

No choice now, since 21 ♘c4 exd6! and 21 ♕xe2 fxe2 22 ♖e1 ♗xb2 or 22 ♖d2 exd6 are lost endgames.

**21 ... ♗xd7 22 ♖xd7 ♕xe3 23 fxe3 ♗xb2! 24 ♖c4 ♗xa3 25 ♖xb7**

Two pawns down, White wants to trade as many pawns as possible. That might have led to a draw if he had managed to swap the a-pawns.

Perhaps 25 gxf3 would have posed greater technical difficulties for Black because he would need to untangle his pieces with moves like 25 ... ♖eb8 and ... ♔f7/... ♖a6/... ♗d6.

**25 ... fxg2 26 ♔xg2 ♗d6 27 ♖xc6 ♖ec8 28 ♗c7**

White would love to trade into a single-rook endgame in which he controls the seventh rank (28 ... ♗xc7? 29 ♖cxc7 ♖xc7 30 ♖xc7). But now his rooks become frozen on their squares.

**28 ... a3 29 ♔f3 ♖a5 30 e4 ♖g5!**



*White to move*

Black finds a splendid way to exploit the White king. The threat is 31 ... ♖g3+ and ... ♖xh3. If 31 ♔f2 Black has 31 ... ♗g3+ 32 ♔f3 ♗e5! 33 ♔f2 ♗d4+ 34 ♔e2 (or 34 ♔f3 ♖f8+) ♖g2+ 35 ♔d3 ♖b2!.

**31 ♗xd6 ♖xc6 32 ♗xe7 ♖c3+ 33 ♔f4 ♖g2 34 ♗f6 ♖xh3**

According to an early collection of Karpov games, White resigned here. In fact, he did what a Goliath would. He set a trap with ...

**35 ♔e5**

If 35 ... ♖xa2??, White would draw with 36 ♔e6! because of the ♖b8 mate threat (36 ... h5 37 ♖b8+ ♔h7 38 ♖h8 mate). Black could reply 36 ... ♖b2, after which 37 ♗xb2 is an easy draw.

Black avoided the trap and harassed the bishop until he found a winning idea. The real end of the game was:

**35 ... ♖e3 36 ♖g7+ ♔f8 37 ♖xh7 ♖xa2 38 ♖d7 g5!** (creates a flight square at g6, e.g. 39 ♖d8+ ♔f7 40 ♖d7+ ♔g6 41 ♖g7+ ♔h6 42 ♖xg5 ♖b2 and ... a2) **39 ♗xg5 ♖b3 40 ♗e7+ ♔g8 41 ♖a7 ♖a1 42 ♗f6 a2 43 ♔d5 ♖f1 44 ♗d4 ♖b4 45 ♗c3 ♖d1+ 46 ♔c5 ♖b3 47 ♗e5 ♖c1+ 48 ♔d6 ♖b6+ 49 ♔d7 ♖c2 50 ♗a1 ♖b1 51 ♗e5 ♖b5 52 ♔e6 ♖b6+ 53 ♔d7 ♖f2! 54 ♖a8+ ♔f7 55 ♗d6 ♖c2 56 ♖a7 ♖b7+! White resigned.**

It would be wrong to say Black *lured* his opponent into a miscalculation. Rather, he played actively (17 ... f5!) in a dubious position and created a more random situation.

True, if White had seen the consequences of 18 ♖c5! he would likely have won. That's the danger that Davids face.

## 6

# Miguel Najdorf – Wolfgang Heidenfeld

## Torremolinos 1961

## *Dutch Defense A99*

Davids rarely get a chance to annotate their Goliath-slayings. But Wolfgang Heidenfeld took the opportunity when he wrote a collection of his games, titled *Lacking the Master Touch*. The title was ironic modesty. Heidenfeld was anything but humble. (He was called many things, from "feisty" to "arrogant.")

In this game he finds an ingenious way of turning a one-sided middlegame into an increasingly unstable situation. Black didn't understand how unstable when he analyzed the game at length afterwards. But his mistakes in print didn't count. White's costly errors at the board did.

**1 d4 e6 2 c4 f5 3 g3 ♘f6 4 ♗g2 ♗e7 5 ♘f3 0-0 6 0-0 d6 7 ♘c3 ♕e8**

In the non-Stonewall Dutch Defenses, Black typically shoots for ... e5.

**8 b3 ♘bd7 9 ♗a3 e5?! 10 ♘b5!**



*Black to move*

Although Miguel Najdorf was 50 when this was played, he was still among the world's top 20 players, as he had been for the previous 20 years and would remain for most of the 1960s.

His last move points out the problem with Black's setup. Black has to defend against ♘xc7 and this will prevent him from recapturing on e5 with a pawn as he hoped.

**10 ... ♗d8 11 dxe5 ♘xe5**

Computers like to grab material with 12 ♘xe5 ♕xe5 13 ♘xd6 cxd6 14 ♗xd6. White gets two pawns and a rook for two minor pieces, a slight plus.

But in a middlegame the pieces may count much more. Humans distrust those situations.

**12 e3 ♔h8 13 ♘xe5 ♕xe5 14 ♕c2**

White can benefit from a change in the pawn structure, such as c4-c5. Black has only one thing going for him, the gossamer prospect of a mating attack.

**14 ... a6 15 ♘c3 ♕e8?! 16 ♖ad1 ♕h5**

After the game Black criticized his queen maneuver and said 15 ... ♖b8 was better. But it would only be slightly better after 16 ♗b2.

**17 ♘e2 ♘g4 18 h3 ♘e5 19 ♘f4 ♕h6**

"Black has been playing with the same two pieces all the time and is now hopelessly behind in development," Heidenfeld admitted in his notes.

**20 c5! ♘f7 21 cxd6 cxd6 22 h4 g5??!**



*White to move*

Objectively, Black's last move is awful because it shreds his kingside. But in retrospect, it deserves at least a partial exclamation point for psychology. It told White to expect more bad Black moves and an easy win.

**23 hxg5 ♗xg5 24 ♗d5! ♘e5 25 ♔g2!**

White could have won with positional moves but wanted to punish Black on the kingside with ♖h1.

**25 ... ♗d7 26 ♖h1 ♖ac8**

The endgames that arise after 27 ♕xc8 ♖xc8 28 ♖xh6 ♗xh6 29 ♗xd6 or 27 ... ♕xh1+ 28 ♖xh1 ♖xc8 29 ♗xd6 would be winning for White.

But he concluded (correctly) that he could end matters in the middlegame. "As a result of Black's defiance, White wants to win quickly," Heidenfeld wrote.

**27 ♕b2! ♕f6 28 ♘h5**

And with 29 f4 is coming up, it looked like he would. (But 28 ♗xd6! and 28...♕xd6 29 ♕xe5+ ♕xe5 30 ♘g6+ would have been faster.)

**28 ... ♕g6 29 f4! ♗f6**



*White to move*

Now 30 fxe5 resigns would be a natural way for the game to end.

**30 ♘xf6 ♖xf6 31 ♗xd6??**

White suddenly realized that 31 fxe5 would allow 31 ... f4 followed by either 32 ... ♕xg3+ or 32 ... ♖c2+.

Black thought so, too. They both missed 32 ♖xh7+!. The key points are 32 ... ♔xh7 33 ♖h1+ ♔g7 34 exf6+ and 32 ... ♕xh7 33 ♖h1! ♖c2+? 34 ♕xc2!.

White is still winning after 31 ♗xd6 in view of 31 ... ♘g4! 32 ♖he1! ♕h6 33 ♖d2 or just 33 ♔g1, when there's nothing left to calculate.

Black's next move is second-best but forces White to keep making critical choices.

**31 ... ♖xd6?! 32 fxe5?**

Of course White saw 32 ♕xe5+ ♕f6 33 ♗xb7 ♖c2+ 34 ♔f3!.

But he shrugged it off, perhaps because that postpones victory until the endgame (34 ... ♕xe5 35 fxe5 ♖xd1 36 ♖xd1 ♗b5 37 ♖d8+ ♔g7 38 a4).

White miscalculated 32 fxe5 in two ways – and Heidenfeld did it in one way.



*Black to move*

Heidenfeld saw that 32 ... ♖xd5 invites 33 ♖xd5 ♗c6.

But he figured he would be lost after 33 e6+. He wrote that after 33 ... ♕g7 34 ♕xg7+ ♔xg7 35 exd7 ♖c2+ 36 ♔f3 the d7-pawn "costs the rook." Actually Black would draw with 36 ... ♖cd2!.

White does have some winning chances following 32 ... ♖xd5 but it comes from 33 ♖xd5! ♗c6 34 e6+ (34 ... ♕g7 35 ♕xg7+ ♔xg7 36 e4! or 34 ... ♔g8 35 ♕e5). This indicates that the position is becoming harder and harder to calculate.

**32 ... ♕g7!**

Heidenfeld was a man of many resources. At various times he held jobs ranging from door-to-door salesman to crossword puzzle designer. Here he was improvising resourcefully.

True, he would still stand worse after, for example 33 ♗f3 or 33 ♔f2. But it would be far from a forced loss. So:

**33 ♗xb7? f4!**



*White to move*

**34 exf4**

"Only this loses," Heidenfeld wrote. What he meant was that White had to play 34 ♖xh7+, based on 34 ... ♕xh7 35 exd6+.

The key line runs 34 ... ♔xh7 35 ♕b1+ ♔h8 36 ♖xd6 ♕xg3+ and now not 37 ♔f1? ♗b5+ but 37 ♔h1 ♕h3+ 38 ♔g1 ♖g8+ 39 ♖g6! and White survives.

But 39 ... ♗f5! (instead of 39 ... ♖g8+??) wins for Black. In fact, White was lost after 33 ♗xb7?. As the game goes, Black also gets to execute a pretty finish.

**34 ... ♗h3+! 35 ♔h2**

Or 35 ♔xh3 ♖h6+ 35 ♔g2 ♕xb7+ and wins. Also 35 ♖xh3 ♕xb7+ and ... ♖xd1.



*Black to move*

**35 ... ♖h6! 36 ♗xc8 ♗f1+ 37 ♔g1 ♕xg3+ 38 ♔xf1 ♕f3+ White resigned.**

"What a patzer I am!" Najdorf said after he resigned. A better Goliath would have tried a desperate trap, 36 ♗d5.

That would have forced Black to find 36 ... ♖c2+! (or 36 ... ♗f5+!) 37 ♕xc2 ♗f5+.

## 7

# Bela Soos – Yefim Geller

## Olympiad, Varna 1962

### *King's Indian Defense, Four Pawns Variation E76*

This game was one of the sensations of the golden age of Soviet chess, a staggering upset of one of the world's very best players.

Although Bela Soos (pronounced "Shoosh") was an International Master, he was playing one of the half-dozen best players in the world. And it was in Geller's favorite opening.

"Before Geller we did not understand the King's Indian Defense," Mikhail Botvinnik said. Even David Bronstein, who was considered one of the godfathers of the opening, regarded Geller as his superior. When Bronstein suffered a stroke, his wife Tatiana tested his ability to talk.

"Who plays the King's Indian better than anyone?" she asked.

"Yefim Geller" was the reply.

"Not you, papa?" "No, Geller."

**1 d4 ♘f6 2 c4 g6 3 ♘c3 ♗g7 4 e4 d6 5 f4 c5 6 d5 0-0 7 ♘f3 a6**



*White to move*

White can stop 8 ... b5 with his next move. If Black was intent on making that break, 7 ... b5!? would have offered a Benko Gambit-like position after 8 cxb5 a6 that was more suiting to Geller's style.

**8 a4 e6 9 ♗e2 exd5 10 exd5! a5?**

If Black's last move could talk it would say, "I tricked you. I got you to play 8 a4. You no longer have a pawn that can control b4. My QN is headed for that square."

Of course, he's right about the square. But by the time the knight arrives on b4, White's bishop will have safely reached the key b1-g6 diagonal. Then the knight will find little to do.

The book moves were 10 ... ♗f5 – with the idea of 11 ... ♘e4 – and 10 ... ♖e8 – with the idea of ... ♘g4-e3. Without the insertion ... a6 and a2-a4, the opening experts of the day endorsed Boris Spassky's idea of 9 ... ♘h5, and 10 0-0 ♗xc3 11 bxc3 f5 to rule out an f4-f5 push.

**11 0-0 ♘a6 12 ♗d3! ♘b4 13 ♗b1 ♖e8 14 f5!**



*Black to move*

No one had ever attacked Geller and his beloved King's Indian Defense quite like this before – and it soon shows.

In the tournament book 14 ... ♘g4 was recommended without further comment. It didn't explain what to do after 15 ♗g5!.

Black's king bishop is both a good offensive and a good defensive piece, so he would be reluctant to play 15 ... ♗f6 16 ♗xf6 ♘xf6 17 ♕d2 or 16 ... ♕xf6 17 fxg6 and ♕d2.

And 15 ... f6 16 ♗c1! is just ugly (16 ... gxf5 17 ♘h4 ♘e3 18 ♗xe3 ♖xe3 19 ♗xf5 followed by a trade of bishops and ♘f5).

That leaves 15 ... ♕b6. The complications escalate after 16 h3 (16 ... ♘e5 17 f6!).

For example, 16 ... ♘e3 17 ♕e2! prompts 17 ... ♗d4 18 ♘xd4 cxd4 19 fxg6 and 20 ♘e4 with advantage to White.

Black could try the immediate 16 ... ♗d4+. But both 17 ♘xd4 and 17 ♔h1 ♘f2+ 18 ♖xf2 ♗xf2 19 ♕d2 are unpleasant for him. So his position is more precarious than was thought at the time.

**14 ... gxf5**

If Black had taken on f5 with his bishop, 14 ... ♗xf5 15 ♗xf5 gxf5, then 16 ♘h4 ♘e4 17 ♘xf5 would be lost. Geller was counting on his next move.

**15 ♘h4! ♘e4**

Black has survival chances after 16 ♘xf5 ♗xf5 17 ♖xf5 ♗d4+.

**16 ♘xe4! fxe4**

On 16 ... ♕xh4 White would lose quickly after 17 ♘xd6?? ♗d4+ 18 ♔h1 ♗e5!.

But he would reach a very favorable ending after 17 ♗g5! ♕g4 18 ♕xg4 fxg4 19 ♘xd6.

**17 ♕h5**



*Black to move*

If Black tries to give the pawn back with 17 ... f5? he is punished by 18 ♗g5!.

**17 ... ♕e7**

This deprives Black of his last chance, an opportunity to drive White back with ... ♖e5.

For example, 17 ... ♕c7 18 ♖a3 ♖e5 or 18 ... ♘d3 19 ♗xd3 ♖e5. Also 18 ♘f5 ♗xf5 19 ♕xf5 ♘d3 and ... ♖e5.

White would still have a murderous attack if he meets 17 ... ♕c7 with 18 ♘f3! (18 ... exf3? 19 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 20 ♗h6!). Or 18 ... ♖e7 19 ♘g5 ♗d4+ 20 ♔h1 f5 21 g4!.

**18 ♖a3! f5**

But now it's too easy. There was no good defense to ♖g3 followed by ♗h6.

For example, 18 ... ♗f6 19 ♖g3+ ♔h8 20 ♗g5! ♗xg5 21 ♖xf7 – or just 19 ♖af3! (19 ... exf3 20 ♕xh7+ and mates).

**19 ♖g3 ♖f8 20 ♗h6 ♖f7**



*White to move*

**21 ♖xf5!**

Wins outright (21 ... ♖xf5 22 ♘xf5 and ♖xg7+ or ♘xe7+).

**21 ... ♗xf5 22 ♘xf5 ♕e5 23 ♗xg7 Black resigned.**

Soos went on to defeat Geller a second time, also in Varna, two years later.

Some David-vs.-Goliath upsets can be repeated – and that brings up:

## *8*

# Pia Cramling – Viktor Korchnoi

## Biel 1984

### *Caro-Kann Defense B14*

One of the greatest Goliath-slayers is the Stockholm-born Pia Cramling – if only for her games with Viktor Korchnoi.

She was crushing Viktor the Terrible in a 1982 game when he escaped with a draw. That should have been a warning to him.

This game was played two years later when Korchnoi was the world's fifth best player – and Cramling was somewhere around Number 450. Korchnoi tried to show that the previous game was a fluke.

**1 e4 c6 2 c4 d5 3 exd5 cxd5 4 cxd5 ♘f6 5 ♘c3 ♘xd5 6 ♘f3 e6 7 d4**

White has transposed into a version of the solid Panov-Botvinnik Variation.

**7 ... ♗b4 8 ♗d2 ♘c6 9 ♗d3 ♗e7**

Black announces with his last move that he will pressure the d4-pawn (with ... ♘db4 or ... ♗f6). White has to create countervailing chances and the most likely theater is the kingside.

**10 a3 ♗f6 11 0-0**



*Black to move*

**11 ... 0-0**

Not 11 ... ♘xd4?? 12 ♘xd4 ♗xd4 13 ♕a4+ and ♕xd4.

Black could have taken the pawn with 11 ... ♗xd4 and grant White compensation after 12 ♘xd4 ♘xd4 13 ♕a4+ ♘c6 14 ♖ad1.

By castling he made ... ♘xd4 more of a threat. White surely didn't want to defend it with 12 ♘e2?!.

**12 ♕e2!**

More ambitious than 12 ♗e3.

Now 12 ... ♘xd4 13 ♘xd4 ♗xd4 would be answered by 14 ♗xh7+ ♔xh7 15 ♕d3+ and ♕xd4 with a slight edge.

**12 ... ♗xd4**

With 12 ... g6 Black would anticipate 13 ♕e4 but allow White the more active pieces, 13 ♗h6 ♖e8 14 ♖ad1 or 13 ... ♗g7 14 ♗xg7 ♔xg7 15 ♗e4 and 15 ♗c4.

**13 ♘xd5!**

Much more promising than 13 ♕e4? ♘f6 or 13 ♘xd4 ♘xd4.

After 13 ♘xd5 the recapture 13 ... exd5 leads to the same kind of bishops-of-opposite-color play as in the game except that Black doesn't have an extra pawn (14 ♗xh7+ ♔xh7 15 ♕d3+ and ♘xd4).

**13 ... ♕xd5 14 ♗e4 ♕d6 15 ♗xc6 bxc6**

If equality was all she wanted, 16 ♖fd1 would have demonstrated it (16 ... e5 17 ♗f4!).

Worse for Black is 16 ... c5 17 ♘xd4 ♕xd4 18 ♗b4 and 16 ... ♗c5 17 ♖ac1 ♕e7 18 ♗f4.

Instead, White forces Black into a middlegame in which his extra pawn matters much less than her better bishop.

**16 ♘xd4 ♕xd4 17 ♗b4**



*Black to move*

This is a splendid psychological situation for a David. Black has to be concerned about trades of heavy pieces because they head toward a bishop endgame in which one extra pawn isn't nearly enough to win.

Fear of drawing may be why Black begins to reject some natural – and good – moves, such as 17 ... ♖d8. He would have some winning chances after 18 ♖fd1 ♗a6! 19 ♖xd4 ♗xe2 20 ♖xd8+ ♖xd8 but not great ones.

**17 ... ♖e8?! 18 ♖fd1 ♕b6 19 ♕e5 ♕b5 20 ♕c7 ♕b6 21 ♕e5 a5**

No draw by repetition today. But the a-pawn will be weak now.

**22 ♗c5 ♕b3 23 f4**

This last move temporarily rules out ... f6 followed by ... e5 and ... ♗e6-d5, which was one of Black's goals.

As it stands, the only safe way to develop his bishop and connect rooks is ... ♗a6 or ... ♗b7. But that will allow ♖d7.

Even 23 h3 f6 would be problematic after 24 ♕h5!. The attacked rook doesn't have a safe square and neither 24 ... g6 25 ♕h4 ♔g7 26 ♖d6 nor 24 ... ♗a6 25 ♖d7 ♔h8 26 ♖ad1 (threat of 27 ♖xg7!) are inviting.

**23 ... ♗a6 24 ♖d7 ♕c2! 25 ♗d4**



*Black to move*

Black found the best dark-square defense (not 25 ... f6?? 26 ♖xg7+! and mates).

**25 ... ♕g6 26 ♖e1**

White threatens 27 f5!, e.g. 26 ... ♗c4 27 f5 ♕h6 (27 ... exf5?? 28 ♕xe8+) 28 f6.

**26 ... f6 27 ♕c5**

White would be at no risk after 27 ♕xa5 (or 26 ♕xa5) but this move keeps Black from energizing his bishop with 27 ... ♗c4 and 28 ... ♗d5.

**27 ... ♕f5 28 ♕d6**

Not 28 ♕xc6? ♗b5 – or 28 ♕xf5 exf5 29 ♖xe8+ ♖xe8 30 ♖a7 ♗c4 31 ♖xa5 ♖e1+ 32 ♔f2 ♖e2+.

Why rush to a drawish ending when Black is playing a middlegame with one piece? Black should activate his bishop now with 28 ... ♗c4 and ... ♗d5.

**28 ... e5? 29 fxe5 fxe5**

The e-pawn push is based on tactics (30 ♖xe5?? ♕f1 mate or 30 ♗xe5 ♖xe5! 31 ♕xe5 ♕xd7).

**30 ♗c5**



*Black to move*

But now Black must have noticed that 31 ♖e7 would win the e5-pawn.

After 30 ... ♕e6 White can safely play 31 ♕c7 ♕g6 32 ♕xa5 or just 31 ♕xe6+ ♖xe6 32 ♖e7. In fact, White has various ways of securing a likely draw if she wants it.

Korchnoi found a move that promises an equal-material but positionally favorable endgame.

**30 ... ♕f6?? 31 ♕xf6 gxf6**

Now 32 ♖d6 ♔f7 33 ♖xc6 a4 might keep Black's winning hopes alive.

**32 ♖e3!**

This is what he overlooked. White threatens to double rooks on the seventh rank.

Black can meet the threat with 32 ... ♗c4 33 ♖g3+ ♔h8 and then 34 ♖gg7 ♗g8.

But 34 ♗e7! threatens ♗xf6 mate and forces an Exchange-down position after 34 ... ♖xe7.

So he played **32 ... ♔h8?** and resigned after **33 ♖h3!**. Cramling and Korchnoi met again in 1995 – and she won again.

## *9*

# Alexander Alekhine – Arturo Bonet

## Gijon 1945

### *Ruy Lopez, ♘c3 Variation C77*

This was one of the last games played by the fourth world champion and it shows traces of his greatness – and much of his overconfidence.

In the previous year, against the same obscure opponent, Alekhine had an easy time winning as Black after 1 d4 ♘f6 2 ♘f3 d5 3 c4 dxc4 4 ♗g5? ♘e4 5 ♕c2 ♘xg5 6 ♘xg5 e5! 7 ♘f3 exd4 8 ♕e4+ ♗e6 9 ♘xd4 ♕d5.

This time his remarkable style is both an asset and a liability. Alekhine was legendary for exerting pressure simultaneously on both wings to spread the enemy defenses to the breaking point. In this game he passes up a very favorable endgame as well as a promising shift of both rooks to the kingside in order to press his two-wing attacks. That set the stage for being surprised by a tactical shot.

**1 e4 e5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 ♗b5 a6 4 ♗a4 ♘f6 5 ♘c3**

This rare alternative to 5 0-0 was periodically tried by Alekhine and later Paul Keres. White tries to get a superior form of the Four Knights Game by finding a good time to play ♘d5.

In the Four Knights, (1 e4 e5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 ♘c3 ♘f6 4 ♗b5), 4 ... ♗b4 is good because 5 ♘d5 can be met by 5 ... ♘xd5 6 exd5 e4! 7 dxc6 dxc6!.

But in Alekhine's position, 5 ... ♗b4 6 ♘d5 ♘xd5 7 exd5 e4? loses a pawn (7 dxc6 exf3 8 cxd7+).

**5 ... b5 6 ♗b3 ♗e7 7 0-0 d6 8 ♘d5**

Now 8 ... ♘xe4 9 d4! gets into complications that may favor the better developed player – and almost certainly would benefit the superior tactician.

Later experience showed that 8 ... ♗b7 or 8 ... ♘a5 9 ♘xe7 ♕xe7 10 d4 ♗b7 and 10 ... 0-0 are quite safe.

**8 ... ♗e6?! 9 c3!**



*Black to move*

Alekhine believed White would still stand well after 9 ... ♘xe4 10 d4. Black evidently agreed – and also recognized that 9 ... ♗xd5 10 ♗xd5 ♘xd5 11 exd5 hobbles the Black knight (11 ... ♘b8 12 d4).

**9 ... ♘a5 10 ♘xe7!**

This neatly gains the two-bishop advantage (because 10 ... ♘xb3? 11 ♘c6! ♕d7 12 ♘cxe5 wins a pawn at least).

**10 ... ♕xe7 11 ♗c2! c5 12 d4**

We are headed to a familiar Ruy Lopez pawn structure but with the important difference that White has the two bishops.

Trading pawns on d4 (12 ... cxd4 12 cxd4 exd4?) is bound to worsen Black's weakness on dark squares (13 ♘xd4 followed by 14 b3 and 15 ♗a3).

**12 ... ♕c7 13 ♗g5 ♘d7 14 ♘xe5! ♘xe5!**

Black cuts his inferiority to a minimum. White would have had a splendid 2Bs- vs.-2Ns middlegame after 14 ... dxe5? 15 d5.

**15 dxe5 dxe5 16 ♕h5 0-0 17 b3!**

What distinguishes this from a generic Ruy Lopez middlegame are two minor pieces:

Black's knight is offside and his efforts to make it more useful are about to backfire.

White's c2-bishop also lacks scope but he will have opportunities to create targets for it with f2-f4 (because ... exf4 allows e4-e5!).

**17 ... f6 18 ♗e3 c4? 19 b4 ♘b7 20 f4 ♕f7**



*White to move*

White can enter a very nice endgame with 21 ♕xf7+ followed by 22 fxe5 and 23 a4.

Something similar would have arisen after 20...a5 21 fxe5 ♕xe5?! 22 ♕xe5 fxe5 23 ♖xf8+ ♔xf8 24 bxa5 and 25 a4. The value of the 2Bs grows as the other pieces leave the board.

But Alekhine had good reason, based on Black's play so far, to hope for a middlegame knockout.

**21 ♕e2 exf4**

The threat was 22 fxe5. After 21 ... ♕c7 White could launch the kind of wing attacks he personified with 22 f5 ♗f7 23 a4!.

That could be followed by doubling rooks on the a-file or attacking the kingside with ♕g4 and ♖f3.

**22 ♖xf4 ♕e7 23 ♖af1 ♖f7 24 ♗d4! ♖af8 25 ♕h5 ♕d7 26 a4!**

White could have played this last move at almost any point since 19 b4.

An alternative is 26 e5 with threat of ♕xh7 mate. Then 26 ... g6 27 ♕e2 f5 28 a4 is good (28 ... bxa4 29 ♖a1). But Alekhine didn't want to burn kingside bridges.

**26 ... bxa4**

An indication of how bad things are getting is 26 ... ♘d8, intending 27 ... ♘c6 to put Black's worst-placed piece to work.

Then 27 ♗c5! ♖e8 28 ♖d1 is strong in view of 28 ... ♕c7 29 e5! (29 ... g6? 30 ♗xg6! hxg6 31 ♕xg6+ ♔h8 32 ♖h4+ ♖h7 33 ♕xe8+). Or 29 ... f5 30 ♖xf5! ♗xf5 31 ♗xf5.

That would be vintage Alekhine – pressuring one wing, then springing tactical surprises in the center or other wing.

**27 ♖a1 a3**



*White to move*

Annotators praised Black for setting a trap: 28 ♖xa3 would allow 28 ... a5 and 29 ... axb4 – because 29 bxa5 loses one of the rooks to 29 ... ♕d6.

But they overlooked 30 e5!, which threatens ♕xh7 mate and leads to a winning endgame after 30 ... g6 31 exd6. Or 30 ♕xh7+ ♔xh7 31 e5+.

Black would have been in trouble after 28 ♖xa3 because White can switch wings (28 ... ♖a8 29 ♖f1 and ♖fa1). But Alekhine isn't done on the kingside.

**28 e5!? f5?**

It's bad for Black if he allows a pawn capture on f6 or e5 (28 ... g6 29 ♕e2 fxe5? 30 ♖xf7 and 31 ♕xe5).

However, 29 ... a5! would have given him the counterplay he desperately needed: 30 bxa5 ♘xa5 31 ♖xf6 ♕e7! or 31 exf6 ♘b3!.

**29 ♖xa3 ♕c6 30 ♖a1 ♗c8 31 g4**

A less confident player would have brought the a1-rook back to the kingside. For example, 31 ♖e1 aims for e5-e6 or ♖e3-g3, e.g. 31 ... a5 32 b5! ♕xb5? 33 e6! and wins.

Or 31 ... ♗e6 32 ♖e3! a5 33 ♖g3 and 34 ♖h4 (34 ... g6 35 ♖xg6+).

Alekhine may have left his rook at a1 because he wanted to hit the Black queen with ♗a4 at the appropriate moment.

**31 ... g6 32 ♕h6 ♘d8!**



*White to move*

Black plays this phase very alertly. After the game 32 ... fxg4 33 ♖f6 and 33 ♗e4 were analyzed. But White has the much stronger 33 e6! ♕xe6 (33 ... ♗xe6 34 ♗xg6!) 34 ♖af1!.

The threat then is 35 ♕g7+! and mate next. Had White won that way – or after 34 ... ♕e7 35 ♗xg6! ♖xf4 36 ♗xh7+! ♕xh7 37 ♕g5+ – this would be remembered as Alekhine's last great game.

**33 gxf5 ♗xf5 34 ♗a4?**

One footnote to Black's 32nd move is the threat of mate on g7, 34 ♗xf5 ♖xf5 35 e6?, is foiled by 35 ... ♘xe6! and Black wins.

Alekhine may have counted on 34 ♗a4 because either 35 ♗c5 will trap a Black rook or win the c4-pawn.

**34 ... ♕b7 35 ♗c5 ♘e6!**



*White to move*

Another footnote: Now 36 ♖xc4 is answered by 36 ... ♗d3! 37 ♗xf8 (else ... ♖f1+ mates) ♗xc4 38 ♗d6 ♘f4 and wins.

No better is 36 ♖xf5 ♖xf5 37 ♗xf8 ♖g5+.

**36 ♗xf8 ♘xf4 37 ♕xf4 ♗h3!**

Or maybe Alekhine overlooked this mate threat. He is lost in view of 38 ♕d2 ♕f3! and ... ♕f1+!.

He tried **38 ♕g3 ♖f3! 39 ♕xh3** (or 39 ♕g5 ♕f7!) **♖xh3 40 ♗c5** and adjourned the position. "All the fans knew the world champion was lost, but could Bonet control his nerves?" asked Alekhine biographer Pablo Moran.

The answer was yes and he prompted **resignation** soon after play resumed, **40 ... ♕e4 41 ♗d7 ♖xc3 42 ♗e6+ ♔g7 43 ♖f1 ♔h6 44 ♗f2 ♕xe5 45 ♗c8 ♕g5+ 46 ♔h1 ♖c1**.

## *10*

# Ivan Calero – Mikhail Tal

## Capablanca Memorial, Havana 1963

### *Modern Benoni Defense A64*

Two years after losing the world championship title in 1961, Mikhail Tal was still among the super-elite. His opponent, Ivan Calero, was never among the world's top 500 players. The players live up to their ratings in the early part of the game.

But as time trouble approached White created an increasingly random position. Rising expectations led to a Black miscalculation.

**1 d4 ♘f6 2 c4 c5 3 d5 e6 4 ♘c3 exd5 5 cxd5 d6 6 ♘f3 g6 7 g3**

White may have been reminding Tal that he had lost as Black to Viktor Korchnoi in this variation less than a year before.

**7 ... ♗g7 8 ♗g2 0-0 9 0-0 a6**

In the Korchnoi – Tal game, Black tried the alternative knight deployment, 9 ... ♘a6 10 h3 ♘c7.

But he dallied with 11 e4 ♘d7 12 ♖e1 ♘e8? 13 ♗g5! ♗f6 14 ♗e3! ♖b8 15 a4 a6 16 ♗f1 ♕e7 17 ♘d2 ♘c7 and never recovered from the loss of time.

**10 a4 ♖e8 11 ♘d2 ♘bd7 12 ♘c4 ♘b6 13 ♘xb6?**

A standard policy for Black in the Benoni is to swap a pair of knights to ease his constriction. A standard White *counter*-policy is to avoid a trade (not 13 ♘e3 ♘g4! but 13 ♘a3!).

**13 ... ♕xb6 14 a5 ♕c7 15 e4 ♖b8**

Black is at least equal – and soon better.

**16 f4 ♗g4 17 ♕c2 b5! 18 axb6 ♖xb6**



*White to move*

In the 1950s, when the Modern Benoni was a toddler, this pawn structure was thought to favor White. Experience soon taught us that Black's play on the b-file compensates for his isolated a-pawn and White's pawn center.

There's a tactical question: What did Black have in mind after 19 f5 ? His bishop would be trapped after 19 ... gxf5 20 h3 ♗h5 21 exf5 and 22 g4.

This David had an advantage – because he knew he was playing not just any Goliath but a Tal. Before choosing 19 f5 he had to look for a Tal-like sacrifice by Black. The search would turn up 19 ... ♘h5! and 20 h3 ♗xf5 21 exf5 ♘xg3.

Rather than try to calculate the consequences of that (22 fxg6 ♗d4+!) White wisely steered towards a quieter middlegame.

**19 h3! ♗c8! 20 ♔h2 ♘d7 21 ♖a3 ♗b7?**

And he was rewarded with this lemon. Black's queenside pieces create a traffic jam. Correct was 21 ... ♖b4 followed by ... ♘b6-c4 and ... ♕b7.

**22 ♘a4! ♖b5 23 ♗d2 ♘b6 24 ♘c3 ♖b4 25 ♘d1 ♖b5**



*White to move*

Black lacks the pressure on b2 that ... ♕b7 would have provided. Now 26 ♖e1! with the idea of ♗f1 would have given White the upper hand.

**26 f5?! ♕e7 27 fxg6 hxg6 28 ♖af3 ♖f8?**

This was another sign that Tal was not Tal that day. The real Tal would have seen that 28 ... ♕xe4! 29 ♕xe4 ♖xe4 was playable.

Then 30 ♘c3 ♗xc3? 31 ♖xf7! works for White (31 ... ♗xd2? 32 ♖f8+ ♔g7 33 ♖1f7+ ♔h6 34 ♖h8+ ♔g5 35 h4+ and mates).

But 30 ... ♗xd5! (instead of 30 ... ♗xc3?) 31 ♘xe4 ♗xe4 offers excellent compensation for the Exchange.

**29 ♗c3 ♘d7! 30 ♗xg7 ♔xg7 31 ♖f4 ♘e5**

Despite the miscues, Black stands well thanks to the e5-square that White surrendered at move 26.

**32 ♘e3 ♖b4 33 ♕c3 ♗c8 34 ♘c2 ♖b8**



*White to move*

What were White's expectations here? He must have seen that 35 ♘e3 would prepare 36 ♘c4, after which 37 ♘xe5! would likely favor him.

Black could stop 36 ♘c4 with 35 ... ♖b4. But 36 ♘c2! would repeat the position and tacitly offer a draw.

If Black declines, with 36 ... ♖b8 37 ♘e3 f6, White can try 36 h4 and ♗h3. In other words, by threatening to draw, 35 ♘e3! might have gotten him an edge.

Instead, White realized he could force knights off the board in another way.

**35 ♘e1!? c4! 36 ♖4f2**

However, 36 ♘f3 would have been met by 36 ... ♖b3 37 ♕d4 f6! or 37...♖d3 38 ♕f2 f6 with a rock-solid formation that favors Black.

Note that 37 ♘xe5?? ♖xc3 38 ♖xf7+ ♖xf7 39 ♖xf7+ ♕xf7 40 ♘xf7 doesn't work – 40 ... ♔xf7 41 bxc3 a5 hands Black a winning outside passed pawn.

But the ♖xf7 capture becomes the elephant in the room. It's too big an idea to ignore and it won't go away.

**36 ... ♖b3 37 ♕d4 ♖h8**



*White to move*

Now on 38 ♖xf7+? ♕xf7 39 ♖xf7+ ♔xf7 the rooks may outweigh the queen, e.g. 40 ♘f3? ♖xh3+! 41 ♗xh3?? ♘xf3+.

Or 40 ♕a7+ ♗d7 41 ♕xa6 ♔e7 42 ♕a1 ♖f8 and ... ♖f2.

And 38 ♘f3 ♖d3 39 ♘xe5 still fails following 39 ... ♖xd4 40 ♖xf7+ ♕xf7 41 ♖xf7+ ♔g8.

**38 ♖f3! ♖b7 39 h4?**

It was time for 39 ♖xf7+! ♕xf7 40 ♖xf7+ ♔xf7 41 ♘f3!. The difference is that 41 ... ♖xh3+! isn't as strong with Black's rook on b7 rather than b3.

After 42 ♔g1! the attractive 42 ... ♘xf3+ 43 ♗xf3 ♖xg3+ 44 ♔f2 ♖g5 actually favors White thanks to 45 ♕h8!. Or 44 ... ♖h3 45 e5.

Black should play 43 ... ♖b3! when a draw by perpetual check is the most likely result.



*Black to move*

White's last move was designed to safeguard h3. But it gave Black a new target to exploit. The right way was 39 ... ♔g8! and 40 ... g5!.

**39 ... g5?**

This weakening of the kingside virtually compelled White to take another look at the Rs-for-Q swap.

**40 ♖xf7+! ♕xf7 41 ♖xf7+ ♖xf7 42 ♘f3! ♖e8?**

After this Black is lost. He could have put up better resistance with 42 ... ♖xf3! 43 ♗xf3 gxh4.

**43 ♘xg5 ♖f6 44 ♕a7+ ♗d7 45 ♗h3! ♖e7 46 ♘e6+ ♔h7 47 ♗f5+ ♔g8 48 ♕b8+ ♖e8 49 ♕xd6 ♘f3+ 50 ♔g2 ♘e1+ 51 ♔f1 ♗xe6 52 dxe6 ♘d3**

There might have been technical difficulties if White didn't see how to give back the queen:

**53 ♕d7 ♖exe6 54 ♕xe6+! ♖xe6 55 ♗xe6+ ♔g7 56 ♗xc4 ♘xb2 57 ♗xa6 ♘a4 58 ♗e2 ♔f6 59 ♔f2 ♘c5 60 ♔e3 ♔e5 61 ♗f3 ♘e6**



*White to move*

Three pawns down, Black played quickly, hoping for a miracle. There are tricks in which White ends up with just his bishop and the h-pawn – and a book draw. But not today.

**62 h5 ♔f6 63 ♗g4 ♘c5 64 ♔d4 ♘a6 65 ♗e2 ♘b4 66 ♔c5! ♘c2 67 ♔d6 ♘d4 68 e5+ ♔g5 69 e6 ♘f5+ 70 ♔e5 ♘e7 71 g4 ♘g8 72 ♗f3 Black resigned.**

In view of 72 ... ♔h6 73 ♔f4 and 74 g5+ or 72 ... ♘e7 73 ♔d6 ♘c8+ 74 ♔d7 ♘b6+ 75 ♔c7.

## *11*

# Vasily Smyslov – Eleazar Jimenez

### Capablanca Memorial, Havana 1965

### *English Opening A16*

This game showcases "Bend, don't break."

Black is outplayed in the opening, makes a series of positional concessions and has a thoroughly unpromising position by move 30. But he doesn't give White an easy way to finish him off.

After White resigned spectators felt he had simply overlooked Black's spectacular 37th move. But analysis showed that White was already lost.

It's worth playing over this game at least twice. On the second look you'll find that what proved crucial was a David's tenacity and a Goliath's loss of a sense of danger.

**1 c4 ♘f6 2 ♘c3 d5 3 cxd5 ♘xd5 4 g3 e5 5 ♗g2 ♘e7**

The knight retreat looks odd but it seeks a reversed version of a perfectly acceptable Dragon Sicilian line that runs 1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♘xd4 g6 5 ♘c3 ♗g7 6 ♘de2. White's plan then is to fianchetto his KB, castle and play ♘d5.

**6 ♘f3 ♘bc6 7 b4!**

This is the drawback to Black's move order. Usually White has to spend a tempo on moves such as ♖b1 to support the b-pawn push. Here he saves time because after 7 ... ♘xb4 he could choose between a favorable middlegame (after 8 ♘xe5) and a favorable ending (8 ♕a4+ ♘bc6 9 ♘xe5 ♕d4 10 ♕xd4 ♘xd4 11 ♖b1).

**7 ... a6 8 ♗b2 ♘f5**

Black abandons the reversed Sicilian strategy (... g6 and ... ♗g7) at the cost of somewhat misplacing his knight on f5.

**9 a3 ♗e7 10 0-0 ♗e6 11 d3 0-0 12 ♖c1 f6 13 ♘a4 ♕d7 14 ♘d2**



*Black to move*

To understand why White is better, look at the positional threat of 15 ♘b3 (or 15 ♘e4) and 16 ♘ac5!.

If Black has to retreat, 14 ... ♖fd8 15 ♘b3 ♕e8 16 ♘ac5 ♗c8, White will have a free hand in the middlegame. One good plan then would be 17 ♕d2 and 18 f4.

Mixing it up with 14 ... a5!? is a good active plan (15 b5 ♘cd4 or 15 ♘e4 axb4 16 ♘ac5 ♕c8). But it requires more calculation than a David may feel comfortable with.

**14 ... ♘h6?! 15 ♘e4 ♕c8 16 ♘ec5 ♗xc5 17 ♘xc5 ♗h3**

Now the point of Black's 14th move is clear. If White grabs a pawn, 18 ♗xh3? ♕xh3 19 ♘xb7??, he gets mated by 19 ... ♘g4.

**18 ♗d5+ ♔h8 19 ♖e1**

White had the option of an Exchange sacrifice, 19 ♘xb7 ♗xf1 20 ♕xf1, because he would dominate the light squares and have good queenside play.

But the zwischenzug 19 ... ♘e7! muddies the water. After 20 ♘d6? ♕d8! Black is better because 21 ♗xa8 ♕xa8 threatens 22 ... ♕g2 mate.

White would have the upper hand after 20 ♗e4 (or 20 ♗f3) ♗xf1 but not by as much as after the move he played, 19 ♖e1, which threatens 20 ♘xb7.

**19 ... ♘d8 20 d4! c6 21 ♗f3 exd4 22 ♕xd4**



*Black to move*

Add a superior center to the two bishops and other positional goodies in White's basket. In the next stage Black tries to find a job for his clumsy knights but they just seem to wander about.

Nevertheless, this is bending, not breaking. He is not creating new weaknesses.

**22 ... ♘e6 23 ♕h4 ♘g5**

Trading knights, 23 ... ♘xc5 24 ♖xc5, seems right but Black has to do something before 25 ♗c1 ♘f7 26 g4!.

For example, e.g. 24 ... ♗e6 25 ♖h5 with a threat of 26 ♖xh6 gxh6 27 ♗xf6+.

He can be easily overwhelmed (24 ... ♕e6 25 ♗c1 ♗g4! but 26 ♗g2 ♘f7 27 h3 ♗f5 28 e4 ♗g6 29 f4 ♘d6 30 g4 and 30 ... ♗xe4 31 f5).

**24 ♗h1 ♘f5 25 ♕c4 ♘d6 26 ♕f4 ♘df7 27 ♖cd1**

When an opponent in a poor position just bends and bends, it may be hard to force matters. Computers look at 27 ♘xb7 ♕xb7 28 ♗xc6 briefly then see that 28 ... ♕b8 29 ♗xa8 ♕xa8 30 f3 ♖e8 isn't at all clear.

**27 ... ♘e6 28 ♘xe6 ♗xe6 29 ♖d3 ♘g5 30 ♕h4 ♔g8!**

"Play actively" is a good guideline – but not when your pieces are so passive. Black would only help his opponent with, for example, 30 ... ♕e8 31 ♖ed1 ♗f5 32 e4! (32 ... ♗xe4 or 32 ... ♘xe4 lose to 33 ♖e3).

Black can afford pass moves until White takes more vigorous action – which he does with his next move.

**31 f4?! ♘h3+ 32 ♔f1**

The knight is not trapped on h3 because it can escape the way it came (32 ... ♘g5 33 fxg5?? fxg5+ costs a queen).

The danger to Black is that his pieces are being stretched beyond natural defenses. White can build up slowly, with 33 ♖c1 and 34 e4, threatening 35 f5, for example.



*Black to move*

**32 ... ♗g4!**

White's queen had free rein of the board for so long that it may not have occurred to him that it could be trapped by 33 ... h5, 34 ... ♕f5 and 35 ... g5.

**33 ♗f3 h5**

If you played through the game once quickly, you might not have noticed the first time that 34 e4 stops ... ♕f5 – but it allows 34 ... ♕e6! with a threat of 35 ... ♕c4.

Then 35 ♗d1 ♗xd1 remains in White's favor (36 ♖dxd1 ♕c4+ 37 ♔g2 ♕c2+ 38 ♔xh3 ♕xb2 39 ♕xh5).

But Black can play 35 ... ♖ad8!!. Then 36 ♗b3 wins the queen – but loses the endgame after 36 ... ♕xb3 37 ♖xb3 ♖d2! (threat of 37 ... ♖f2 mate as well as 37 ... g5). Or 36 f5 ♖xd3! 37 fxe6 ♖d2.

This is the turning point of the game. White had to calculate a way to keep Black's queen at bay. That means 34 ♖d6! (34 ... ♕f5 35 ♗xg4 hxg4 36 e4!).

Instead, 34 ... a5! would keep matters in balance.

**34 ♗xg4 hxg4 35 ♕h5?**

Black threatened ... ♕e6-e4 followed by ... ♕h1 mate. If White stopped him with 35 e4? he would allow 35 ... ♘g5! and 36 ... ♘f3.

But the 35 ♖d6! idea would still work (35 ... ♕f5? 36 e4! and White is on top again).

White could also play 35 ♖ed1 and 35 ... ♕e6 36 ♖d7 but didn't want to have to work 36 ... ♕e4 37 ♖xg7+! ♔xg7 38 ♕xg4+ out to a conclusion.

**35 ... ♕e6! 36 ♕g6 ♖ad8!**



*White to move*

Can you see the threat? It's disguised -- 37 ... c5!! clears c6 so that Black can play 38 ... ♕c6! 39 e4 ♖xd3.

If White stops that with 37 ♖c1 Black has 37 ... ♖fe8! 38 ♖c2 ♕e3!.

That is even stronger than when it happens in the game (39 ♖xe3 ♖d1+ and mates; 39 ♗d4 ♖xd4 40 ♕xe8+ ♕xe8 41 ♖xd4 ♕e3 and wins).

**37 ♖ed1 ♕e3!**

Not 37 ... ♖fe8 because White had set up 38 e3 or 38 ♖1d2.

After 37 ... ♕e3! there is the pretty finish of 38 ♖xe3 ♖xd1+ 39 ♔g2 ♖g1 mate.

**38 ♔e1 ♕g1+ 39 ♔d2 ♖xd3+ 40 exd3**

Or 40 ♕xd3 ♕xd1+! 41 ♔xd1 ♘f2+ and ... ♘xd3, with an extra Exchange.

**40 ... ♕xh2+ 41 ♔c3 ♕xg3 42 ♗c1 ♘xf4 43 ♗xf4 ♕xf4 44 ♖e1 ♕g5 45 ♕e4 ♕e5+**

The rook endgame is easily won – even against the player who wrote the definitive book on rook endings – because Black can cut off the White king from the kingside passers.

**46 ♕xe5 fxe5 47 ♖xe5 ♖f4! 48 ♔d2 ♔h7 49 ♔e3 ♖f3+ 50 ♔e2 ♔h6 51 ♖e4 ♔g5 52 ♖e7 g6 53 ♖xb7 ♖f6!**

The rest is a one-sided battle between Black's king and g4-pawn and White's rook.

**54 ♖h7 g3 55 ♖h1 ♔g4 56 ♖g1 ♖e6+!**



*White to move*

A final finesse to keep White's king at bay, e.g. 57 ♔f1 ♔f3 followed by 58 ... ♖e3.

**57 ♔d2 ♔h3 58 ♖h1+ ♔g2 59 ♖h4 ♔f3 White resigned.**

## *12*

# Shimon Kagan – David Bronstein

## Interzonal, Petropolis 1973

## *Sicilian Defense, Najdorf Variation B91*

Traditional David strategies often come into conflict with one another, as they did in the last game when Black had to choose between active play and "Bend, don't break."

Another conflict: Play a solid opening you know – but play actively. What do you do if that opening is relatively quiet?

In the following game David Bronstein, who was still one of the world's top two dozen players, chooses perhaps the sharpest major defense to 1 e4. White could have guaranteed a tactical game with 6 ♗g5, 6 ♗c4 or 6 ♗e3. Other active choices include 6 f4 and 6 h3 (and 7 g4!). Instead, he picks the most conservative system. It works – because he knew it well.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♘xd4 ♘f6 5 ♘c3 a6 6 g3 e5 7 ♘de2**

Two rounds before, Shimon Kagan obtained an edge against another legendary player, Samuel Reshevsky, with simple play: 7 ... ♗e7 8 ♗g2 ♗e6 9 a4 ♘bd7 10 0-0 ♖c8 11 h3 0-0 12 ♔h2 ♕c7 13 a5 ♖fd8 14 ♗e3 h6 15 ♕d2 ♗f8 16 ♖fc1! and then 16 ... b5 17 g4 ♘c5 18 ♘d5! ♗xd5 19 exd5 ♖e8 20 ♘g3.

**7 ... ♘bd7 8 a4 ♗e7 9 ♗g2 0-0 10 0-0 ♖b8**

White could try a4-a5 st some point, as he did against Reshevsky and then take en passant after ... b5.

**11 h3 b5 12 axb5 axb5**

By allowing ... b5 unmolested, White gives himself the option of 13 b4.

Then the b5-pawn is a fixed target. But that requires a good look at 13 ... d5. Can Black unravel his pieces from 14 ♘xd5 ♘xd5 15 ♕xd5 ♗xb4 16 ♖a7 and 17 ♗b2 ? That may not be worth calculating when there is a good alternative.

**13 ♖a7**



*Black to move*

**13...♗b7**

Black intends to drive the rook back with ... ♘b6-c8. But if White keeps control of the a-file. Black might be reluctant to exchange rooks with ... ♖a8 because it eliminates a piece that can defend his b-pawn.

Hanging over Black's head is the thematic ♘d5! idea that had worked well in Kagan's game with Reshevsky. It was time to force matters with 13 ... b4!.

For example, 14 ♘d5 ♘xd5 15 ♕xd5 ♘c5 and ... ♗e6 or ... ♗b7 with equality. Or 15 exd5 ♗g5.

**14 ♗e3 ♘b6 15 b3 ♘c8?**

Consistent – and wrong. This was the last good chance for 15 ... b4!. After 16 ♘d5 ♘bxd5 17 exd5 ♕c7 Black can oust the rook with ... ♖a8. Then the b4-pawn will be just as weak as the c2-pawn (and perhaps the d5-pawn as well).

**16 ♖a2! ♕d7 17 ♕d3**

Now on 17 ... b4 18 ♘d5 Black is worse after 18 ... ♘xd5 19 exd5 f5 (intending ... ♗f6 and ... ♘e7) 20 ♕c4! ♗a8 21 ♖fa1!. Or 19 ... ♗f6 20 ♖a4.

Black can protect the b4-pawn better after 18 ... ♗xd5 19 exd5. But ♖fa1 will still confer a positional plus on White.

**17 ... ♗c6 18 ♘d5! b4**

Black didn't want to allow 19 ♘b4 ♗b7 20 ♘c3. He found a way to reorganize his minor pieces (... ♗d8 and ... ♘e7).

**19 ♕d2 ♗d8 20 g4 ♕b7**

The awkward-looking 20 ... ♖b5 works after 21 g5? ♘xd5 22 exd5 ♗b7 and ... ♘b6. But 21 ♘xf6+ ♗xf6 22 ♘g3 favors White solidly because of 22 ... d5 23 exd5 ♗xd5 24 ♖d1 ♖d8 25 ♘e4!.

Black expected pressure on the d5-knight and e4-pawn after 20 ... ♕b7 but it never materializes.

**21 ♘g3 ♘xd5 22 exd5 ♗d7 23 ♖fa1**



*Black to move*

This is the kind of position White has been aiming for. His knight will have a good square at e4 and an even better one at f5.

**23 ... ♕c7 24 ♗e4 g6 25 ♗h6 ♖e8 26 ♔h2! ♗f6 27 ♖g1**

White tries to have pressure on both wings and (after ♘f5) a threat to the d6-pawn. But Black's position is pretty solid.

**27 ... ♕d8 28 ♖a6 ♗h8 29 ♘f5 ♕c7 30 h4 ♗b5! 31 ♖6a1**



*Black to move*

**31 ... ♕c3?**

Prolonged pressure takes its toll. Black had plenty of good neutral moves, even 31 ... ♗d7.

**32 ♕xc3 bxc3 33 ♘e3 ♗f6 34 ♗g5! ♗xg5 35 hxg5**

The c3-pawn is doomed by ♘d1 and ♖g3. Even if Black retains material equality, it will be the connected passed White pawns that do him in.

**35 ... ♘b6 36 ♘d1 ♖ec8 37 ♖g3 ♗e2 38 ♘xc3 ♗xg4 39 ♘b5 ♗f5 40 ♘xd6! ♗xe4 41 ♘xe4 ♘xd5 42 c4!**

The upshot is that White has two powerful passers and a great knight outpost at f6. The outcome would be clear after 42 ... ♘b4 43 ♖h3! ♔g7 (else 44 ♘f6+) 44 ♔g2 ♖a8 45 ♖ah1 ♖h8 46 ♖h6 ♖a3 47 ♖1h3 and ♘f6.

**42 ... ♘f4 43 ♖a7 ♖b6 44 ♖c3 h6 45 c5 ♖e6 46 b4! hxg5 47 ♖3a3 ♔g7 48 ♖a8! ♖6e8 49 ♖xc8 ♖xc8 50 b5! ♘e6**

Or 50 ... f5 51 ♖a7+ ♔h6 52 b6! (52 ... fxe4 53 b7 ♖b8 54 c6).

**51 c6 ♖b8 52 ♘d6 e4 53 ♖a7 ♔f6 54 c7**

White has had many alternative winning moves since 42 c4. Here, for example, 54 b6! does it faster (54 ... ♖xb6 55 ♖xf7+ ♔e5 56 ♘c4+).

**54 ... ♘xc7 55 ♖xc7 ♔e6 56 ♘b7 f5 57 b6 ♔d5 58 ♔g2 ♔d4 59 ♖d7+ ♔c3 60 ♘c5! ♔c4 61 ♖c7 ♔b5 62 ♘d7 ♖xb6 63 ♘xb6 ♔xb6 64 ♖g7 ♔c5 65 ♖xg6 ♔d4 66 ♖xg5 e3 67 fxe3+ ♔xe3 68 ♖xf5 resigns**

## 13

## Salo Flohr – Rudolf Pitschak

### Bilin 1930

### *Queen's Indian Defense A46*

The German-Czech master Rudolf Pitschak is dimly remembered today because his heyday was the 1930s . Few fans know that after emigrating to the United States he drew a game with Bobby Fischer – at age 55.

His opponent in this game, Salo Flohr, was one of the world's dozen or so strongest players at the time. But carelessness – sloppy move order in the opening – was compounded by a failure to calculate accurately when it mattered.

**1 d4 ♘f6 2 ♘f3 e6 3 ♘bd2**

A harmless transpositional idea by White. On 3 ... b6, a good move against 3 e3, White can play 4 e4! ♗b7 5 ♗d3 and he has won the mini-battle of the center.

**3 ... c5 4 e3 b6 5 ♗d3 ♗b7 6 0-0 ♗e7 7 c4 0-0 8 b3 d5 9 ♕c2?**

White's moves in this kind of position look like they are interchangeable. In many cases, they are. He can play ♗b2 before or after castling, for example.

But here the move order matters.

**9 ... ♘c6!**

White's premature queen development allows Black to threaten to secure the two-bishop advantage with 10 ... ♘b4 or a material edge with 10 ... cxd4.



*White to move*

White didn't realize how bad things were. After all, it's only the tenth move. Yet there was no way to equalize.

After 10 ♗b2 ♘b4 11 ♕b1 ♘xd3 12 ♕xd3 dxc4 Black gets a positional pull due to the two bishops.

He could try 10 ♗a3 but 10 ... cxd4 11 ♗xe7 ♕xe7 and ... ♘b4 also favors Black.

**10 a3? cxd4!**

White can avoid the immediate loss of a pawn with the awkward 11 exd4 dxc4 12 ♕xc4.

Then 12 ... ♖c8 would threaten discovered attacks on the queen. For example, 13 ♗b1 ♘e5 14 ♕e2 ♘xf3+ 15 ♘xf3 ♗xf3 16 ♕xf3 ♕xd4.

Getting the queen off the file, 13 ♕a4, allows 13 ... a6! to threaten it further (14 ... b5) e.g. 14 ♗xa6 ♖a8 or 14 b4 ♘xd4.

**11 cxd5 ♕xd5**



*White to move*

And not 11 ... dxe3 12 dxc6 exd2 13 cxb7 dxc1(♕) 14 ♖fxc1 when White escapes with an edge.

What turns this game into a miniature – instead of a methodical, ho-hum rout (12 e4 ♕h5 13 ♗b2 ♖ac8 and so on) – is White's efforts to conjure tactical chances.

**12 exd4 ♘xd4 13 ♕b1 ♖fd8**

The new threat of 14 ... ♘xf3+ and 15 ... ♕xd3 prompts a retreat because the alternative is more clearly lost– 14 ♖d1 ♕h5! 15 ♗b2 ♘xf3+ 16 ♘xf3 ♗xf3 17 gxf3 ♘d5 and ... ♗d6.

**14 ♘e1 ♕h5 15 ♗b2?**

Not a good day at the office for Salo Flohr.

**15 ... ♗d6!**

White can only choose between pretty ways to lose:

(a) 16 h3 ♗xg2! 17 ♔xg2 ♕g5+ 18 ♔h1 ♕f4, or

(b) 16 h3 ♗xg2! 17 ♘xg2 ♕xh3 18 f4 ♘g4! and mates, or

(c) 16 f4 ♘g4 17 h3 ♗c5! and wins (18 ♔h1? ♕xh3+).

**16 g3 ♘g4! 17 h4**



*Black to move*

**17 ... ♕xh4! White resigned.**

Black didn't do anything to prompt White's opening miscues. But he did have the presence of mind to realize that reasonable-looking moves like 9 ♕c2 and 10 a3 could be very bad.

## *14*

# Manuel Aaron – Max Euwe

## Olympiad, Leipzig 1960

### *Queen's Indian Defense A47*

Max Euwe, the fifth world champion, was nearly 60 when this game was played and had been in the world's top 25 players since he was 19. His young Indian opponent loses a pawn right out of opening. But he shrugs it off and manages to make the position increasingly double-edged. Euwe eventually panics.

**1 d4 ♘f6 2 ♘f3 b6 3 c4 ♗b7 4 ♘c3 e6 5 ♗g5 h6 6 ♗h4 ♗e7 7 e3 d6 8 ♗d3**

White's last move is actually risky because the g2-pawn is unprotected.

**8 ... g5 9 ♗g3 g4!**



*White to move*

And this is why. On 10 ♘h4 ♖g8 the knight is threatened by 11 ... ♘h7 followed by ... ♗xh4.

White can save the knight with 11 h3. Then Black has a promising pawn sacrifice, 11 ... ♘h5! 12 hxg4 ♘xg3 13 fxg3 ♘d7 and ... ♘f6, with compensating play on the dark squares and pressure against White's g-pawns.

White makes a good anti-Goliath decision: He will be the one sacrificing a pawn because it ensures him the more active pieces for at least a few moves. Of course, he couldn't calculate beyond that. He had to trust his instincts.

**10 ♘d2!? ♗xg2 11 ♖g1 ♗b7 12 e4 e5!**

Black had good alternatives, such as 12 ... ♖g8. But he forced White to make a decision about the center.

The natural response of a gambit player is to seek open lines with 13 dxe5 dxe5 14 ♘d5 (not 14 ♗xe5?? ♕xd3).

But Black's pieces become as active as White's after 14 ... ♘c6 15 ♕a4 ♘d7 16 ♘b3 h5 or 15 f4 exf4 16 ♗xf4 ♗d6.

The alternative is closing the center with 13 d5. That concedes he will play a middlegame in which he is simply a pawn down but Black will lack space and a good place to hide his king.

**13 d5!? ♘bd7 14 f3! h5 15 ♗e2 gxf3 16 ♗xf3**



*Black to move*

White seems to be several moves away from making a threat. But routine play by Black – such as 16 ... ♘c5 17 ♘f1 ♖g8 18 ♘e3 h4 19 ♗f2 ♖xg1+ 20 ♗xg1 ♕d7 and ... 0-0-0 – can leave him with badly placed pieces.

For example, 21 ♘f5 0-0-0 22 b4 ♘a6 23 a3. Some computers say his advantage has disappeared. Humans would say it's much easier to play the white pieces than the black ones.

**16 ... ♘f8 17 ♕e2 ♘g6 18 0-0-0 ♗c8**

Black's g6-knight is headed to its best outpost, f4, while his redeployed bishop will capture a White knight if it reaches *its* best outpost, f5.

**19 ♘f1! h4 20 ♗e1 ♘f4 21 ♕c2 ♗h3 22 ♘e3 ♕d7 23 ♗f2**

Once Black connects rooks he will be ready to start swapping rooks on the g-file and trading minor pieces with ... ♗g4 or ... ♘g4.

**23 ... 0-0-0 24 a4!**

If Black locks the queenside pawns with 23 ... a5 it is a temporary measure. Among the pretty possibilities is 24 ♘b5 ♔b8 25 c5!:

(a) 25 ... bxc5 26 ♘c4 and ♘xa5,

(b) 25 ... dxc5 26 ♘c4 and now 26 ... ♘g6 27 ♖xg6! fxg6 28 ♘xe5 is fine for White.

But so is 26 ... ♗d6 27 ♘bxd6 cxd6 28 ♘xb6 ♕c7 29 ♘c4 and ♗e1xa5.

**24 ... ♔b7 25 b4**



*Black to move*

**25 ... c5?**

Why would Black voluntarily open this side of the board? The answer was hinted in the last note. In some cases White can play the line-clearing sacrifice c4-c5.

One possibility is 25 ... ♖dg8 26 a5 ♘g4 and then 27 ♘xg4 ♗xg4 28 ♗xg4 ♖xg4 29 c5.

Black's king suddenly becomes a target (29 ... dxc5 30 bxc5 bxc5 31 ♖xg4 ♕xg4 32 a6+ ♔xa6?? 33 ♕b3 or 32 ... ♔c8 33 ♘b5).

Some computers like 25 ... ♖hg8 (based on 26 ♗xh4 ♘6xd5).

Then on 26 a5 bxa5 27 bxa5 ♔a8 White has 28 c5! dxc5 29 ♘c4 ♘g6 30 ♘a4.

For example, on 30 ... ♘g4 31 ♘xc5 ♗g5+? White has 32 ♖d2!.

Then 32 ... ♕b5 33 ♗xg4 loses. And on 32 ... ♕c8 33 ♗xg4 ♗xd2+ 34 ♔xd2 ♗xg4 White has 35 ♘b6+! cxb6 36 axb6! with an attack.

Black can defend better than that. But this gives you an idea what a former world champion was seeing. Losing to an unknown opponent in a line like that would be embarrassing.

**26 dxc6+ ♕xc6 27 ♘cd5!**

This virtually forces a swap of all four knights and may release the energy of the f3-bishop.

**27 ... ♘6xd5 28 ♘xd5 ♘xd5 29 exd5 ♕c8 30 c5!**

The bishop comes alive after 30 ... dxc6? 31 d6+.

The endgames that could arise after 30 ... ♕f5 31 c6+ ♔c7 aren't at all clear because of Black's weak a7-pawn (32 ♕xf5 ♗xf5 33 a5! bxa5 34 bxa5).

The tournament book recommended 30 ... bxc5 instead. For example, 31 bxc5 ♖dg8 32 c6+ ♔b8.

But opening the b-file is punished by 33 ♖xg8 ♖xg8 34 ♖d3 and ♖b3+.

Better, but unclear, is 32 ... ♔a8 33 ♔d2!. In other words, Black has lost his advantage.

**30 ... ♖dg8 31 c6+ ♔c7? 32 a5! bxa5**

And here, 32 ... ♗f5 was recommended. That drives the queen where it wants to go, 33 ♕a4!.

The real mistake was 31 ... ♔c7. Black's king should have retreated to b8 or a8, where it defends the a7-pawn. Euwe evidently overlooked White's next move.



*White to move*

**33 ♕a4! ♔d8**

On 33 ... ♔b8 White has 34 ♕xa5 ♕c7 35 ♕b5+ ♔a8 36 ♔b2! followed by a powerful ♖a1.

**34 ♕xa5+ ♕c7 35 ♕xa7**

Even better is 35 ♗xa7. But the two connected passed pawns are enough to win:

**35 ... ♕xa7 36 ♗xa7 ♗g5+ 37 ♔b2 ♔e7 38 b5 ♖a8 39 ♖xg5 ♖xa7 40 b6 ♖a4 41 b7 ♖b8 42 ♖a1! ♖b4+ 43 ♔c3 ♖4xb7 44 cxb7 ♖xb7**

In team tournaments, players often refuse to resign when quite lost. Even former world champions.

**45 ♖h5 ♖c7+ 46 ♔d3 ♗d7 47 ♖xh4 ♗f5+ 48 ♗e4 ♗xe4+ 49 ♖xe4 ♖c5 50 ♖a7+ ♔f6 51 ♖e2 ♖xd5+ 52 ♔e3 ♔e6 53 ♖d2 ♖b5 54 ♖a6 ♖b3+ 55 ♔f2 Black resigned.**

## *15*

# Emil Ungureanu – Mark Taimanov

### Bucharest 1973

### *King's Indian Defense, Classical Variation E91*

One of the oldest anti-Goliath strategies is to play his own opening against him.

"What???" the prospective David is bound to ask. "Doesn't Goliath know much more about his variation than I do?"

Yes, he does. But that can actually be an asset for you.

He knows all of the weaknesses of the positions for *both* sides. He may sidestep positions you consider unpromising for you – because he knows they are really unpromising for him.

In the following game, Mark Taimanov didn't play 6 ... e5 7 0-0 ♘c6, although theory at the time regarded that as his best option. Taimanov had pioneered the White side of that variation and may have seen new moves that would turn the dial back in White's favor.

There is another reason to play a Goliath's own opening against him: He may not want to reveal what the best moves are. If he gives away secrets, those secrets may be used against him in the future – by other Goliaths. He's better off if he can beat a David with slightly inferior moves that David doesn't know.

**1 ♘f3 ♘f6 2 c4 g6 3 ♘c3 ♗g7 4 e4 0-0 5 d4 d6 6 ♗e2 c6 7 0-0 a6?!**

Black tries to set up the same queenside phalanx as in Game 44 but against a different White setup.

**8 a4**

This stops 8 ... b5 and threatens to gain valuable queenside turf with 9 a5. But since Black has made no claim on the center, 8 e5! (8 ... ♘e8 9 ♗f4) is a good alternative.

**8 ... a5**

Black has carried out the same positional finesse as in Game 7. His slight loss of time doesn't matter much until the position is opened.

**9 h3 ♘a6 10 ♗e3 ♘d7 11 ♕d2**



*Black to move*

**11 ... ♖e8**

Black is reluctant to open it. Both 11 ... e5 12 ♖ad1 (12 ... ♘b4 13 dxe5 dxe5 14 ♗g5) and 11 ... c5 12 ♖ad1 favor White. So he postpones a decision about his center pawns.

**12 ♖ad1 ♕c7?! 13 ♘h2!**

But Black has dilly-dallied too long. White threatens both 14 ♘g4 (15 ♘h6+) and 14 f4!.

**13 ... e5 14 f4**

White's most likely targets are on the f-file, after 15 fxe5 dxe5 16 ♘g4 and 17 ♘h6+.

**14 ... exd4 15 ♗xd4**



*Black to move*

**15...f6**

You can tell you're in trouble when the only playable moves you see are ugly.

The d6-pawn was in White's sights. Black could have threatened the e4-pawn with 15 ... ♘ac5 so that 16 ♗xg7 ♔xg7 17 ♕xd6 ♕xd6 18 ♖xd6 ♘xe4.

But then 16 ♗xg7 ♔xg7 17 ♕d4+! is strong (17 ... ♔g8? 18 ♘g4 and 19 ♘h6+). Or 17 ... f6 18 ♖f2 (to avoid tricks on the g1-a7 diagonal involving ... ♕b6) followed by 19 f5.

Black can try to improve on that with 15 ... ♘dc5 so that 16 ♗xg7 ♔xg7 17 ♕d4+ f6 18 ♘g4 ♗xg4.

But 15 ... ♘dc5 weakens f6 and makes 16 ♗xg7 ♔xg7 17 f5! strong because ... ♘e5 is no longer possible (17 ... ♘xe4 18 ♕d4+ ♘f6 19 fxg6).

**16 ♘g4 ♘ac5**



*White to move*

**17 ♕c2**

White could have gained valuable space with 17 f5 because 17 ... ♘b3 was not a threat (18 ♕e3 ♘xd4 19 ♕xd4 with huge pressure).

But when a Goliath has passive pieces and a David has an obvious plan (♖d2 and ♖fd1) the latter should limit enemy options.

**17 ... ♘e6 18 ♗e3 ♘ef8?**

Black's knight dance looks strange – yet 18 ... ♘d8! and 19 ... ♘f7 would have protected his d6-pawn and avoided new problems.

**19 f5! ♘e5**

White was going to force this move anyway with 20 ♗f4.

**20 ♘xe5 dxe5**

Black loses material after 20 ... ♖xe5 21 ♗f4 and 20 ... fxe5 21 f6.

**21 c5! ♖d8 22 ♘b1!**

This move, sending the knight on a journey to c4 and then b6 or d6, is good enough to win. But an even stronger way to follow up his previous move was 22 ♗c4+ ♔h8 23 ♗a2! followed by ♕b3 and its threat of mate on g8.

**22 ... ♔h8 23 ♘d2 gxf5 24 exf5 ♗d7 25 ♘e4! ♗e8 26 ♗c4 ♖d7 27 ♖xd7 ♘xd7**



*White to move*

**28 ♗a2!**

"*Luchshe pozdna chem nikogda*" (Better Late Than Never) was a popular Russian song Taimanov knew. Even though White delayed, there is no painless way to defend against his belated mate threat against g8.

**28 ... b5 29 ♕b3 ♗h5 30 g4 bxa4 31 ♕c4 ♕b7 32 gxh5 h6 33 ♖f2 ♕b4 34 ♖d2 a3 35 bxa3 ♕xa3 36 ♔f2 ♖b8?! 37 ♖xd7 ♕b2+**

Black is playing out of pure momentum (37 ... ♖b2+ 38 ♘d2 ♕xa2 39 ♖d8+ ♔h7 40 ♕g4).

**38 ♘d2 ♖f8 39 ♖f7 ♖d8 40 ♖d7 ♖f8 41 ♕g4 Resigns**

# *Chapter Three:*

# All Hail The Unknowns

"How do you spell your name?" a Goliath asks his opponent as they sit down to play. He is facing a David who is unknown to him – and perhaps unknown to any players outside of the David's circle of friends.

Yet these Davids have pulled off some of the most remarkable upsets. Very few people today could identify the winner of one of the most famous David-vs.-Goliath games.

**E.Z. Adams – Carlos Torre**
New Orleans 1920
*Philidor's Defense C41*

**1 e4 e5 2 ♘f3 d6 3 d4 exd4 4 ♕xd4 ♘c6 5 ♗b5 ♗d7 6 ♗xc6 ♗xc6 7 ♘c3 ♘f6 8 0-0 ♗e7 9 ♘d5 ♗xd5 10 exd5 0-0 11 ♗g5 c6 12 c4 cxd5 13 cxd5 ♖e8 14 ♖fe1 a5? 15 ♖e2! ♖c8? 16 ♖ae1 ♕d7 17 ♗xf6! ♗xf6**



*White to move*

**18 ♕g4! ♕b5**

The tactical theme, here and for each of the remaining moves, is the vulnerable eighth rank (18 ... ♕xg4 19 ♖xe8+ mates).

**19 ♕c4! ♕d7**

And here 19 ... ♖xc4 or 19 ... ♕xc4 allow 20 ♖xe8+.

**20 ♕c7! ♕b5 21 a4! ♕xa4 22 ♖e4! ♕b5 23 ♕xb7! Black resigned.**

Carlos Torre went on to become one of the world's best players of the 1920s. E.Z. Adams is remembered mainly as being Torre's friend – and for "winning" this game. (Historians believe this was actually a joint analysis of an opening position that led to the fantasy-variation finish that has charmed chess fans ever since.)

The games – all of them legitimate – on the following pages feature some Goliaths who are not nearly as famous as the ones in the previous chapter. But the rating differences are larger – in some cases more than 500 points. They give us a more accurate idea of what a completely unexpected upset is like.

## *16*

## V. Kappe – Paul Keres

### Tallinn 1933

### *Irregular Defense A40*

One of the most mysterious of Davids is known to databases as just "V. Kappe." We know he tied for first place in an Estonian tournament in 1933 and also played two other games against countryman Paul Keres (both losses). But what else he achieved is a blur.

Here he takes advantage of Keres' youthful tendency towards unexplored openings. Did Keres choose these lines because he wanted to discover new resources? Or was it to surprise opponents and win quickly? Perhaps a bit of both.

**1 d4 e5? 2 dxe5 ♘c6**

This could be called the "Budapest Defense Accelerated." It slightly resembles 1 e4 ♘c6 2 d4 e5, which Keres was fond of until the 1970s. It really has only one virtue: It sets traps.

**3 ♘f3 ♕e7 4 ♗f4**

White seems to fall into one on cue. He would have had the better game after 4 ♘c3 ♘xe5 5 ♘d5! ♘xf3+ 6 gxf3.

**4 ... ♕b4+!**

This could bring about one of the shortest games in history:

One game would run 5 ♘c3?? ♕xf4 6 resigns.

Another could go 5 ♕d2 ♕xb2 6 ♕c3 ♗b4! 7 resigns.

**5 ♗d2 ♕xb2**



*White to move*

Two other possible miniatures are 6 ♗c3?? ♗b4! 7 ♗xb4 ♘xb4 8 resigns and 7 ♕d2 ♗xc3 8 ♕xc3 ♕c1 mate.

**6 ♘c3!**

This smothers Black's initiative (6 ... ♘b4 7 ♘d4 ♗c5? 8 ♖b1 with 9 ♘cb5 or 9 ♘db5 coming). Experience has favored White after 7 ... a6 8 e4 or 8 ♖b1 in other games.

**6 ... ♗b4 7 ♖b1 ♕a3 8 ♖b3**

White would have terrific compensation for a pawn – except that he hasn't sacrificed one. Note that he avoided 8 ♘b5 ♕a5 9 ♘xc7+ because after 9 ... ♕xc7 10 ♗xb4 ♘xb4 11 ♖xb4 ♕c3+ Black has at least a perpetual check.

**8 ... ♕a5 9 e3 a6?!**

Keres was afraid of 10 ♘b5 but the prospect of a2-a3! should have been a greater concern. Sometimes a young Goliath who attacks well is thrown off balance when he has to defend.

**10 ♗d3**

Now 10 ... ♘ge7 11 a3! ♗xa3 12 ♘a2! and Black must shed material to save his queen after 12 ... ♕a4 13 e4 and 14 ♘c3 ♕a5 15 ♘d5.

Better is 11 ... ♗xc3 12 ♗xc3 ♕a4 but Black's development is a mess after 13 0-0.

**10 ... d6 11 a3!**

White avoids 11 exd6 ♗e6! and looks for a better way to sacrifice the Exchange.

**11 ... ♗xa3 12 0-0**

More punishing is 12 ♘a2! ♕a4 13 e4 as in the note to 10 ♗d3.

**12 ... ♗b4 13 exd6**



*Black to move*

Now 13 ... ♗xd6 14 ♘b5 or 13 ... exd6 14 ♘e4! ♗xd2 15 ♘xd6+ are so bad that Black tried:

**13 ... ♗e6 14 ♖xb4! ♘xb4**

Black could resign after 14 ... ♕xb4? 15 ♘b5!.

**15 ♘e4! ♕b6**

Also ugly is 15 ... c5 16 ♘fg5 and 15 ... ♘f6 16 dxc7.

**16 ♕a1**

Black would be lost after 16 ... ♘xd3 17 ♕xg7 because of the recurring tactical trick of ♘f6+!. For example, 17 ... ♘c5 18 ♘f6+! ♘xf6 19 ♕xh8+ wins.

White might have finished more quickly with 16 ♗xb4! because 16 ... ♕xb4 17 ♕a1 threatens 18 ♖b1 as well as 18 ♕xg7.

**16 ... ♘d5 17 ♕xg7 0-0-0 18 c4**

This was one of many ways to win.

**18 ... ♘gf6!? 19 cxd5 ♘xd5 20 ♖b1 ♖dg8 21 ♕a1 ♕a7 22 dxc7**

Threatening 23 ♘d6+ and ♖xb7(+).

**22 ... ♔xc7 23 ♕e5+ ♔d7 24 ♕d6+**



*Black to move*

**24...♔e8**

Shorter is 24 ... ♔c8 25 ♖c1+ and mates. After the text White has several killing shots, including the computer move 25 ♗xa6! followed by ♗b5+.

It is based on 25 ... bxa6 26 ♖b8+ and 25 ... ♕xa6 26 ♘f6+ ♘xf6 27 ♕b8+. The rest:

**25 ♘c5 b6 26 ♘xe6 fxe6 27 ♕xe6+ ♘e7 28 ♗c3 ♕b7 29 ♗xh8 ♖xh8** (29 ... ♕xf3 20 ♕xg8+) **30 ♕xb6 ♕d7 31 ♕xa6 ♔d8 32 ♗e2 ♕c7 33 ♕b6 ♕xb6 34 ♖xb6 Black resigned.**

## *17*

# Galuszka – Bogdan Sliwa

### Krakow 1947

### *Queen's Gambit Accepted D20*

Black in this game was a Polish champion whose 40-plus-year career was crowned with an honorary grandmaster title. White is so obscure that his first name seems to have slipped off the pages of history.

This semi-anonymity isn't as rare as it sounds. The Patay who upset Akiba Rubinstein in Chapter One is repeatedly identified in books and databases as "B. Patay" or "G. Patay" or even "J. von Patay" – with no given name. ("Gyula Patay" seems correct.)

But if Davids aren't always remembered by their full names, they are by at least some of their moves.

**1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ♘c3 e5!**

Black's third move is the reason 3 ♘f3! is considered more accurate.

**4 dxe5**

On 4 d5 Black gets a nice square for his minor pieces on c5. White should have kept queens on the board with 4 e3.

**4 ... ♕xd1+ 5 ♔xd1?**

Now White's king is a target and Black gets to hold onto his c4-pawn, which may be more useful than the e5-pawn.

If White was trying to equalize, 5 ♘xd1 ♘c6 6 e4! and 6 ... ♘xe5 7 ♗f4 was the way to go.

**5 ... ♗e6! 6 e4 ♘c6 7 f4!**

This is risky but 7 ♘f3? 0-0-0+ was worse (8 ♔e1? ♘b4 and ... ♘c2+; 8 ♔e2 ♗g4; 8 ♗d2 ♗c5 and 8 ♔c2 ♘b4+ 9 ♔b1 ♘d3).

**7 ... 0-0-0+ 8 ♔c2 ♘d4+**

Black's position looks so good that he has to weed out the better moves from the merely good ones. With this check he aims for an initiative that lasts longer than 8 ... ♘b4+ 9 ♔b1 ♘d3 10 ♗e3 ♘h6 11 ♗e2.

**9 ♔b1**



*Black to move*

**9 ... b5?**

White was not threatening the immediate 10 f5 because Black could reply 10 ... ♘xf5! (11 exf5 ♗xf5+ mates).

Therefore Black could have chosen a developing move (9 ... ♗c5, 9 ... ♘h6) or tried to alter the pawn structure (9 ... f5 10 exf6 ♘xf6 with a threat of 11 ... ♘xe4! 12 ♘xe4 ♗f5).

Development alone won't do much for Black. For example, 9 ... f5 10 ♘f3! ♘xf3 11 gxf3 ♘e7 looks good because he can play ... ♘c6, ... ♗c5 (or ... g6/... ♗c5) and ... ♖hf8 quickly. But 12 ♗e3 ♘c6 13 f4 is unconvincing.

The best may be 9 ... g5!? 10 fxg5 ♗g7 and ... ♘e7-c6. But Black seems to feel he can win with routine moves.

**10 ♘f3 a6**



*White to move*

On 10 ... b4 White would reach a reasonable endgame with 11 ♘xd4 ♖xd4 12 ♗e3 ♖d8 13 ♘e2.

He can do the same after 10 ... a6 – with 11 ♘xd4 ♖xd4 12 ♗e3 ♖d8 13 a4 (13 ... b4 14 ♘d5! and ♗xc4).

How much of what follows did he calculate and how much was the result of lucky randomizing? We'll never know.

**11 a4! ♘b3**

The resiliency of White's position is amazing. He could even play 12 f5 and then 12 ... ♘xa1 13 fxe6 ♘b3 14 exf7 with advantage.

For example, 14 ... ♘h6 15 ♗g5! and the attacked rook has no good move.

The true nature of the position is illustrated by 14 ... ♘e7 15 axb5 axb5 and now 16 ♘xb5! ♖d1 17 ♗xc4! ♖xh1 18 ♗xb3. The passed White pawns are more important than his loss of the double Exchange. We'll see this idea return in the game.

**12 ♖a2 b4 13 f5! bxc3**

Black must have suspected he was in trouble when he saw that 13 ... ♗d7 is bad in view of 14 ♘d5 or 14 ♗xc4.

**14 fxe6 ♖d1 15 ♗xc4! ♖xh1 16 ♗xb3**



*Black to move*

Black's rooks don't play, as this sample line shows: 16 ... fxe6 17 ♗xe6+ ♔b7 18 bxc3, preparing ♖b2+ and later ♗e3.

Black can defend with 18 ... ♗c5 19 ♔c2 ♘e7 20 ♖b2+ ♔a8. But then 21 ♗g5 would threaten to win with 22 ♗xe7 ♗xe7 23 ♗d5+.

Even if White's last rook is traded, 21 ... ♖b8 22 ♖xb8+ ♔xb8, his king is stronger than the enemy army after 23 ♔d3! and ♔c4.

For example, 23 ... ♖a1 24 ♔c4 ♗a3 25 ♘d4 (threat of ♗xe7 and ♘c6+) ♘g6 26 ♘c6+ ♔b7 27 ♗d5 ♔c8 28 e6 and 29 e7.

**16 ... f6 17 bxc3 ♗e7**

More exact was 17 ... a5 because now White could play 18 a5! and win the a6-pawn with ♗c4. Then his own a-pawn becomes a passed powerhouse.

**18 ♗c4 a5 19 ♗a6+**

Now on 19 ... ♔b8 White can hunt the king with 20 ♔c2 ♔a7 21 ♗c4 and threaten 22 ♗e3+ c5 23 ♖b2 and 24 ♗d5 or even 24 ♘d4.

Black could avoid mate with 21 ... ♗c5 and force White to try to win the endgame slowly with 22 ♗f4 followed by exf6 and ♗xc7.

Then a cute might-have-been is 22 ... c6 23 ♖b2 with a threat of 24 ♖b8! (24 ... ♔xb8 25 exf6+ and 26 fxg7 makes a queen).

The minor pieces would slowly outplay the Black rooks after 23 ... ♘e7 24 exf6 gxf6 25 ♗c7 ♖g8 26 g3.

**19 ... ♔d8? 20 ♖d2+ ♔e8 21 ♗b5+ ♔f8 22 ♖d7**



*Black to move*

White's main winning idea is 23 ♔c2 followed by 24 ♗a3! and ♖d8 mate (24 ... ♝xa3 25 ♜f7 mate or 24 ... c5 25 ♝xc5).

**22 ... g6 23 ♔c2 h6**

In very bad positions there are only bad moves.

**24 ♗a3! ♖h7 25 exf6 ♘xf6 26 ♖d8+ ♔g7 27 ♗xe7 g5 28 ♗f8+ ♔g6 29 e5 ♘g8 30 g4! Black resigned.**

Mate from ♗d3 can only be delayed by sacrificing rooks.

## *18*

# Emojong Elijah – Ilmars Starostits

## Olympiad, Istanbul 2012

### *Slav Defense (by transposition) D11*

One of the reasons that huge upsets are so rare is that Davids often have to win a game twice. A Goliath doesn't roll over and die when he gets a bad position.

Against an equal, Goliath might try to swap down to an inferior endgame. Then he has no winning chances but just might draw.

But against a David he tries to set traps, create swindles or simply try to bluff his way to safety – and maybe to victory.

In this game an unknown player from Uganda catches a Latvian grandmaster in an oversight that costs a piece. But with a rating difference of nearly 350 points, Black refuses to lose quietly. He forces White to win the game a second time.

**1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ♘f3 c6!? 4 a4**

Black's somewhat rare third move was intended to lure his opponent into a complex – and most likely unfamiliar-to-White – position such as 4 e4 b5.

After 4 a4, Black decided he had nothing better than to transpose into a main Slav Defense line that is usually reached via 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 ♘f3 ♘f6 4 ♘c3 dxc4 5 a4.

**4 ... ♘f6 5 ♘c3 ♗f5 6 e3 e6 7 ♗xc4 ♗b4 8 0-0 ♘bd7 9 ♘h4 ♗g4 10 f3 ♗h5**



*White to move*

A natural space-gaining move is 11 g4 (11 ... ♗g6 12 e4), to shut Black's light-squared bishop out of play.

If Black has castled in place of ... ♘bd7, then 11 g4 ♘d5!, threatening 12 ... ♕xh4 as well as 12 ... ♘xc3, is a double-edged book position.

White had a different idea in this game, to protect the knight and avoid tricks like ... ♘d5.

**11 g3 a5 12 e4 ♕b6 13 ♗e3**

Black could grab a pawn with 13 ... ♗xc3 14 bxc3 ♘xe4. Then 15 g4 can be met by 15 ... ♘d6 (not 15 fxe4?? ♗xd1).

Even so, White would get some compensation from 16 ♗d3 ♗g6 17 ♘xg6.

**13 ... ♘e5?! 14 ♗e2**

Not 14 dxe5 ♕xe3+ 15 ♔h1 ♘d7 or 15 ... ♗xc3, which favors Black.

**14 ... ♖d8?**

Black's prepares to exploit the pin on the d-file with 15 ... c5. But he's overlooked a finesse.



*White to move*

**15 g4! ♗g6 16 g5!**

Black must lose a piece:

(a) The e5-knight is trapped after 16 ... ♘fd7 17 f4.

(b) The other knight falls after 16 ... ♘h5 17 f4.

(c) And the g6-bishop would be trapped after 16 ... ♘g8 17 f4 ♘d7 18 f5.

If a fellow GM were White, Black might resign on the spot. But GMs don't do that against unknowns.

**16 ... c5! 17 gxf6 cxd4 18 ♗f2**

White could also have tried 18 ♘xg6, 18 fxg7 or 18 ♗b5+. He preferred caution. That means Black, who only gets two pawns for his knight, has to look for swindles.

**18 ... gxf6 19 ♗b5+ ♔e7 20 ♘e2**

White is not trying to win a pawn back because 21 ♘xd4? or 21 ♗xd4? would run into 21 ... ♗c5.

Instead, he wants to consolidate with ♖c1 and ♔h1. Now for example, 20 ... ♗c5 21 ♖c1 or 20 ... ♘c6 21 ♖c1 makes his task easier.

**20 ... ♖hg8!**

Black prepares 21 ... ♗xe4 with discovered check. He might even scare up some tactical tricks after 21 ♘xg6+ hxg6 22 ♘g3 g5 23 ♖c1 ♖h8 24 ♔g2 ♗d2 (25 ♕xd2? ♖xh2+ or 25 ♖c2 ♗f4).

**21 ♔h1 ♘xf3!?**

In practical terms, this sacrifice is as good as anything else. White could have consolidated without thinking hard after 21 ... ♘c6 22 ♖c1 or 22 ♘f4.

**22 ♘xf3 ♗xe4**



*White to move*

This looks dangerous. But it's pure bluff. White would win easily after 23 ♗xd4!.

After 23 ... ♗c5 24 ♗xc5+ ♕xc5 he has a choice of responses, including 25 ♕e1 ♕e3 26 ♖a3! and 25 ♕c1 ♕f5? 26 ♕c7+.

Instead, White looks for super-solid moves he wouldn't have to calculate far.

**23 ♘g3!? ♗d5 24 ♕e2 ♖g4 25 ♖ad1**

Now 25 ... ♔f8 would prepare ... ♖f4. But White would end all danger by getting his king off the hot diagonal, 26 ♔g1.

**25 ... ♖f4 26 ♗xd4! ♖xf3 27 ♖xf3 ♗xf3+ 28 ♕xf3 ♖xd4**

Black has battled back to rough material equality, three pawns for his knight. White can get one pawn back with 29 ♖xd4 ♕xd4 30 ♕xb7+ ♔f8. But that is not an easy position to win.

White now demonstrates why he deserved to beat a Goliath.



*White to move*

**29 ♘f5+! exf5 30 ♕e3+**

Since 30 ... ♖e4 31 ♕xb6 is hopeless, the rest was **30 ... ♕e6 31 ♕xd4 ♕e4+ 32 ♕xe4 fxe4 33 ♖d7+ ♔e6 33 ♖xb7 f5 34 ♗d7+** and **Black resigned**. White can stop the advanced pawns with his king and doesn't need tricks like 34 ... ♔e5 35 ♖b5+.

## *19*

# Manuel Moraza – Ventzislav Inkiov

## Olympiad, Lucerne 1982

### *Sicilian Defense, Najdorf Variation B98*

When a booked-up European grandmaster surprises an unrated Puerto Rican opponent with a rare opening, the odds against the unknown should escalate sharply. But in this first-round game from an Olympiad team tournament, it is the David that provides the additional surprises.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♘xd4 ♘f6 5 ♘c3 a6 6 ♗g5 e6 7 f4 ♗e7 8 ♕f3 h6 9 ♗h4 g5!? 10 fxg5 ♘fd7**

This is the notorious Argentine Variation. It's notorious because it was introduced with disastrous results by three Argentine players in a 1955 interzonal tournament against three Soviet players.

Each of the Soviets responded with 11 ♘xe6! and, after 11 ... fxe6 12 ♕h5+ ♔f8, the key move 13 ♗b5!. (It's important for White to meet ... ♘c6 with ♗xc6! in some lines.)

The Soviets won all three games. But the variation was revived four years later by Bobby Fischer and the soundness of 11 ♘xe6 remained unclear until the computer era.

In this game White takes the practical exit against an opponent who must have known the intricacies of 11 ♘xe6 better than him.

**11 0-0-0 hxg5**

More exact is 11 ... ♘e5 because 12 ♕h5 ♗xg5+ 13 ♗xg5 ♕xg5+ 14 ♕xg5 hxg5 is an excellent endgame for Black. He would have good control of dark squares and a terrifically posted knight.

Better for White is 12 ♕f2 and 12 ... hxg5 13 ♗g3 ♘bd7 14 ♗e2, when 14 ... ♕c7? would transpose into the game. Black can improve with 14 ... b5 and 15 ♘f3 ♕a5 16 ♖hf1 f6.

**12 ♗g3 ♕c7**

Black is about to play ... ♘e5 and continue ... ♘bd7/... b5/... ♗b7, with excellent chances.



*White to move*

Neither player seemed aware of a 1960 game that saw White stop 13 ... ♘e5 with the remarkable 13 ♗b5!?.

He obtained a strong attack after 13 ... axb5 14 ♘dxb5, e.g. 14 ... ♕a5 15 ♗xd6 ♘a6 (to stop ♘c7+) 16 e5.

**13 ♗e2 ♘e5 14 ♕f2**

Quite wrong is 14 ♗xe5? dxe5 because the doubled pawns control the key central squares and cannot be exploited after 15 ♕g3 b5 or 15 ♘b3 b5 16 ♖hf1 f6.

**14 ... ♘bd7 15 h4!**

This presents Black with an unpleasant choice:

He can keep the kingside closed with 15 ... g4. That gives White a passed h-pawn, a potentially huge asset.

Or he can open a tactical door with 15 ... gxh4. To do that Black has to calculate very carefully. Specifically he has to calculate the possibility of ♘xe6 over and over.

**15 ... gxh4? 16 ♗xh4 ♗xh4 17 ♖xh4**

If Black trades rooks he has little left on the kingside to defend his king. But 17 ... ♖f8 18 ♖h7 is also bad.

White would threaten a slow buildup against f7 (♖f1, ♗h5) – as well as the immediate 19 ♘xe6! fxe6 20 ♗h5+ ♔d8 21 ♕h4+ ♖f6? 22 ♖h8+ ♔e7 23 ♖e8 mate.

For example, 18 ... ♕c5 gives White a choice between 19 ♗h5 and 19 ♖f1, both strong, e.g. 19 ♖f1 ♘b8 (otherwise 20 ♗h5 wins) 20 ♖h6! threatens 21 ♘xe6!.

**17 ... ♖xh4 18 ♕xh4**



*Black to move*

White again threatens to take on e6 (19 ♘xe6 fxe6 20 ♗h5+ ♘f7 21 ♗xf7+ ♔xf7 22 ♖f1+ and wins).

But a sacrifice on b5 is also "in the air." On 18 ... ♘f8 White has 19 ♘db5! axb5 20 ♘xb5 ♕b8 21 ♘xd6+ ♔d7 22 ♘b5+ ♔c6 23 ♕e7 and wins.

**18 ... ♘g6**

Black has to start looking for a way to survive the opening. This move seems to do the job (18 ... ♘g6 19 ♕h7 ♘df8 20 ♕g7 ♕e7 21 ♖f1 ♗d7).

**19 ♘xe6! fxe6 20 ♕h7!!**

Black overlooked the power of this shot, which threatens ♕xg6+ but also prepares ♗h5 and the entry of the d1-rook at f1.

For example, 20 ... ♘f4 21 ♗h5+! ♘xh5 22 ♕xh5+ ♔e7 23 ♕h7+ ♔e8 24 ♖f1! and White wins.

**20 ... ♘gf8**



*White to move*

This game appeared in an article, “Sensations of the Olympiad,” in the celebrated Soviet magazine *Shakhmaty v SSSR* with notes by its editor, Yuri Averbakh. He noted that 21 ♗h5+ ♔d8 22 ♕f7 could be met by 22 ... ♕c5 “and the Black king runs away.”

**21 ♕h5+! ♔d8**

Black is also lost after 21 ... ♔e7 22 ♕g5+ ♘f6 and now 23 e5! dxe5 24 ♕g7+ and ♕xc7.

**22 ♕g5+ ♘f6**

Black must return his extra knight since 22 ... ♔e8?? 23 ♗h5+ is a quick mate.

**23 ♕xf6+ ♕e7 24 ♖xd6+! ♗d7**



*White to move*

**25 ♕xe7+?**

Two extra pawns up, White begins to play like the unrated player he was. In fact, both sides act as if the game is over.

It might have been over – if White had kept queens on the board and followed with e4-e5, ♗f3 and ♘e4 or ♘a4. For instance, 25 ♕e5 ♖c8 26 ♘a4 and ♘c5 or ♘b6.

**25 ... ♔xe7 26 ♖d1 ♘g6 27 ♖h1 ♘e5 28 g4 ♖g8**

Black has finally gotten the positional assets he sought since 9 ... g5 – a great knight on e5 and rook play on the g-file. White would have a lot of work to do after 29 ♖g1.

**29 ♔d2? ♗c6?**

Black had to try 29 ... ♘xg4. He would have been worse after 30 ♖g1 ♘h6 31 ♖xg8 ♘xg8 32 e5 or 30 ♖h7+ ♔d6 31 ♗xg4 ♖xg4 32 e5+, of course. But it wouldn't be obvious how White would win.

**30 ♖g1 ♘f7 31 ♔e3 ♔f6 32 ♖f1+ ♔e7** and **Black resigned.**

The outlook would have been bleak after, say, 33 a4 and perhaps 34 b4/35 b5. But Black could have made things difficult. Sometimes a Goliath just wants to be done with the game.

## *20*

# Slaheddine Hmadi – GM Johann Hjartarson

### Olympiad, Thessaloniki 1984

### *Sicilian Defense, Richter-Rauzer Variation B64*

This game is a worthy companion to the last one. Again, a strong European GM plays the Sicilian Defense as Black. Again, an unrated player (this time from Tunisia) avoids the main line of a complex variation.

But there is a major difference. This time White forces his way into an endgame. His winning chances are slim. But Black's are slimmer – and that is a problem for the much higher rated player.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♘xd4 ♘f6 5 ♘c3 ♘c6 6 ♗g5 e6 7 ♕d2 ♗e7 8 0-0-0 0-0 9 f4**

This position has been played tens of thousands of times.

**9 ... h6 10 ♗h4 e5**

And this is one of the most complicated lines, with the usual continuation of 11 ♘f5 ♗xf5 12 exf5. It's the usual continuation because it is White's best chance for advantage. This is what a Goliath would play as White.

**11 ♘xc6!?**

But Black didn't properly appreciate this – or that his next four moves are more or less forced.

**11 ... bxc6 12 fxe5 dxe5 13 ♕xd8 ♖xd8 14 ♖xd8+ ♗xd8 15 ♗c4**



*Black to move*

White's remaining pieces are well-placed, with ♖f1 or ♖d1 coming up.

Black can protect key squares with 15 ... g5 16 ♗g3 ♗c7 17 ♖f1 ♔g7. But how does he play for a win after 18 h3 ?

Since he can't rely on his endgame technique, a Goliath would look for ways to complicate. He would consider 15 ... ♗a5, with the idea of 16 ... ♗xc3 17 bxc3 ♘xe4.

But White can get an edge with 16 ♗xf6 gxf6 17 ♖d1 and ♖d6. Worse is 16 ... ♗xc3 17 ♗e7! ♗-moves 18 ♖f1.

**15...♗b6 16 ♖f1 ♗e6**



*White to move*

This looks like Black's best chance to keep winning hopes alive. In fact, they were extinguished by:

**17 ♗xe6 fxe6 18 ♗xf6!**

This doesn't win a pawn because of Black's pinning reply. But 18 ♗xf6 stopped Black from getting strong play with 18 ... ♘g4!, e.g. 19 h3 ♘e3 20 ♖f2 ♘c4 21 ♖e2 ♖f8 and ... ♖f1+/... ♗e3+.

**18 ... ♖f8 19 ♘a4!**



*Black to move*

Superior players regularly outplay lower-rateds in even endgames. But it will be virtually impossible for Black to generate winning chances in a rook ending, 19 ... gxf6? 20 ♘xb6 axb6 21 ♖d1!. There just aren't many ways for White to go wrong.

Nor are there real winning chances for Black in a R+N-vs.-R+B endgame, 19 ... ♗e3+ 20 ♔d1 gxf6 21 ♔e2 ♗g5 22 ♖d1!. White would be clearly on top after 22 ... f5 23 ♘c5.

**19 ... ♖xf6 20 ♖xf6 ♗e3+!**

And a pawn endgame is disastrous because White has a queenside majority: 20 ... gxf6 21 ♘xb6 axb6 22 a4!.

For example, 22 ... ♔f7 23 b4 ♔e7 24 a5 bxa5 25 bxa5 ♔d7 26 g4! and wins.

Or 22 ... c5 23 c4 ♔f7 24 b4! and 24 ... cxb4 25 c5 bxc5 26 a5.

**21 ♔d1 gxf6 22 ♔e2 ♗d4 23 c3 ♗g1 24 h3 ♔f7 25 b4!**



*Black to move*

White can try for a winning passed pawn on either wing. He can go after the h6-pawn with ♔f3-g4-h5. He can also raid the queenside with ♘b2-c4-a5.

Black also has a pawn majority. But after ... f5 and ... fxe4 his three passed are easily stopped.

**25 ... ♔e7 26 ♘b2 a6**

The a-pawn is a target for ♘c5 on this square but there was nothing significantly better.

**27 a4 ♗h2 28 ♘c4 ♗g1**

The problem with Black's majority is shown by 28 ... f5? 29 ♔f3.

He would lose on the queenside after 29 ... ♔f6 30 ♘a5!. And he drops material on the kingside after 29 ... ♔d7 30 g3! (30 ... fxe4+? 31 ♔g2).

**29 ♔f3 ♔d7**

Another bad line for Black is 29 ... h5 30 ♔g3 (threat of ♔h4xh5) ♔f7 31 ♘a5! c5 32 b5.

After the text White misses a chance to win quickly with 30 ♔g4. The bishop can't create counterplay (30 ... ♗f2 31 ♔h5 ♗e1 because the h-pawn runs, 32 ♔xh6 ♗xc3 33 ♔g6 ♔e7 34 h4).

**30 g3 ♔e7 31 ♘e3**

Pawn endings are still lost, e.g. 31 ... ♗xe3 32 ♔xe3 ♔d7 33 g4 or 32 ... f5 33 g4 f4+ 34 ♔f3.

**31 ... c5!**



*White to move*

Black starts setting traps. The first one is 32 b5?, which seems to create a winning passed pawn. It allows 32 ... axb5 33 axb5 ♗xe3 34 ♔xe3 c4! and the b5-pawn falls.

**32 ♘c4 cxb4 33 cxb4 ♗d4 34 b5! axb5 35 axb5 ♔d7 36 g4!**

White dodges another trap, 36 b6? ♔c6 37 ♔g4 ♗xb6 38 ♘xb6? ♔xb6 39 ♔h5 f5! and Black wins.

The text prepares ♔g3-h4 and is easier to calculate that 36 ♔g4 ♗f2. Black must play 36 ... ♗c3 (37 ♔g3 ♗e1+) and await events.

**36 ... ♔e7? 37 ♔g3 ♔d7 38 ♔h4 ♔e7 39 ♔h5 f5**

Otherwise 40 ♔xh6 followed by ♔g6 and h3-h4-h5 etc.

**40 gxf5 exf5 41 exf5 ♔f6 42 b6 ♔xf5 43 b7 ♗a7 44 ♘a5 ♗b8 45 ♘c6 ♗d6 46 b8(♕) ♗xb8 47 ♘xb8 ♔e6**

Black's last hope is that White will have to give up his knight for the e-pawn and allow a drawn pawn ending. The direct 47 ... e4 48 ♘c6 e3 49 h4 e2? fails to 50 ♘d4+ and ♘xe2.

**48 ♘c6 ♔d5! 49 ♘b4+**

Another trap: 49 ♘xe5?? ♔xe5 50 ♔xh6 is premature because 50 ... ♔f6! 51 ♔h7 ♔g5 or 51 h4 ♔f7 52 ♔h7 ♔f8 is a draw.

White has to find one last good move to win.



*Black to move*

**49 ... ♔c4 50 ♘a2! e4**

His idea was 50 ... ♔b3 51 ♔xh6! ♔xa2 52 ♔g5 and the king stops Black's pawn. In contrast was 50 ♘c2? ♔d3 51 ♘e1+ ♔e2 52 ♘g2 ♔f2 53 ♘h4 ♔g3, drawing. Or 52 ♔xh6 ♔xe1 53 ♔g5 e4.

**51 ♘c1 ♔c3 52 ♘e2+ ♔d2 53 ♘g3! ♔e3 54 ♔xh6 Black resigned.**

## *21*

# Walter Browne – Abdul-Razzaq Ahmed Taha

## Olympiad, Skopje 1972

### *French Defense, Classical Variation C14*

One of the strengths of masters is their intense drive to find the very best move. This can also be a vulnerability.

GM Walter Browne knew a lot of opening theory. He just didn't believe a lot of it. When he reached a position that seemed interesting he would calculate as far as he could. He did this even if he knew the position had been tested in dozens of other games.

Critics said he was trying to "invent the bicycle," attempting to find something that had eluded everyone else. In many cases, he did just that – brilliantly.

In this game, against an unknown Iraqi opponent, Browne tried to refute a major opening variation that had been declared unbreakable for a century. He was quickly met by a vicious Black attack. But he threw himself into an inspired and tenacious defense. All three outcomes – win, draw or loss – were possible until the game's final move.

**1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ♘c3 ♘f6 4 ♗g5 ♗e7 5 e5 ♘fd7 6 ♗xe7 ♕xe7 7 ♘b5**

The standard continuations here are 7 ♕d2 and 7 f4. White seems to be going in a different direction: He can now reinforce his center with c2-c3 and later reposition his knight at c2 via a3.

**7 ... ♘b6 8 a4**



*Black to move*

But Browne was executing quite a different, long-forgotten plan.

**8 ... a6**

In *The Hypermodern Game of Chess* Savielly Tartakower wrote that White's seventh move had made a sensation back in 1885 when it was new. But the antidote, "7 ... ♘b6!," was quickly found, he added. Then "8 a4 is answered by 8 ... a6, etc. resulting in equality."

**9 a5 axb5 10 axb6 ♖xa1 11 ♕xa1 c6**

Here 11 ... 0-0 is a reasonable alternative in view of 12 ♗d3 ♘c6 13 c3 b4 or 13 ♘f3 ♘b4. And not 12 ♗xb5? ♕b4+.

With 11 ... c6 Black declares his intent to win the b6-pawn with ... ♘d7. But he is offering a piece sacrifice, which Browne jumps at.

**12 ♕a8 0-0**

Annotators said Black's moves were easy to find. But here 12 ... ♕b4+ 13 c3 ♕a4 was a worthy alternative.

Then 14 ♕xa4 bxa4 would give Black a good endgame. A Goliath would much prefer 14 ♕xb8 ♕a1+ 15 ♔e2 and decide, after 15 ... ♕xb2+, whether to acquiesce to perpetual check (16 ♔d1 or 16 ♔d3).

To play for a win, he would have to grant Black four passed pawns for his piece, 16 ♔f3 ♕xc3+ 17 ♔g4 ♕xd4+ 18 f4 0-0 19 ♘f3 ♕xb6.

**13 ♕xb8 ♕b4+**



*White to move*

**14 c3?!**

Black would have enough material compensation for his lost piece if White safeguarded his king, 14 ♔d1 ♕xd4+ 15 ♔c1 ♕xb6.

But once White coordinates his forces he would have the better game, e.g. 16 ♘f3 ♕xf2 17 ♕c7 and now 17 ... b4 18 ♗d3! ♕xg2 19 ♖f1, for example.

Black's problem in lines like this is that he can't easily get his bishop or rook into play, e.g. 19 ... f6 20 exf6 ♖xf6? 21 ♕xc8+.

More accurate may be 15 ... ♕xf2 (instead of 15 ... ♕xb6). Then 16 ♘f3 c5 17 ♗xb5? ♗d7 loses. But 17 ♕d6 is nice for White.

**14 ... ♕xb2 15 ♘e2 b4 16 cxb4 ♕xb4+ 17 ♔d1 ♕b3+ 18 ♔d2 ♕b4+ 19 ♔d3**

The previous four moves were more or less forced. White's last was wrongly labeled a losing move and 19 ♔d1, which would have led to perpetual check, was recommended. So once again we can blame a Goliath's loss on his fear of drawing.

But that's too cliche: A king march with 19 ♔d3 isn't bad, as we'll see. In fact, 19 ♔e3 was a worthy alternative (19 ... ♕b3+ 20 ♔f4 f6 21 ♔g4! with good winning chances).



*Black to move*

**19 ... c5!**

Black disdains the draw of 19 ... ♕b3+ 20 ♔d2 – which White might have taken because of 20 ♘c3? c5! (21 dxc5 d4! 22 ♔xd4 ♖d8+).

**20 ♕c7!**

There was no reason to allow 20 dxc5 ♗d7 and ... ♗b5+.

**20 ... c4+ 21 ♔e3**

No choice: 21 ♔c2 ♗d7! 22 ♕xd7 ♕b3+ 23 ♔d2 ♖a8 and wins.

**21 ... ♕b3+ 22 ♔f4 ♕d3**

"White is completely lost-- he has no good moves," said the tournament book. Wrong.

**23 f3! ♕d2+ 24 ♔g3 ♕e1+ 25 ♔h3!**

If White wanted a draw, 25 ♔f4 was the way. Black would likely conclude he had nothing better than 25 ... ♕d2+ 26 ♔g3 ♕e1+.

**25 ... ♕f2!**

White is one or two moves from safeguarding his king, 25 ... g5 26 g3 or 26 g4, with good winning chances.

Black's 25 ... ♕f2! threatened ... g5 followed by ... ♕h4 mate. For instance 26 ♕d6 g5! 27 g3 ♕xf3 28 ♖g1 f6! and wins. Or 27 ♘g3 f5! 28 exf6?? e5+!.

**26 ♔g4! f6! 27 exf6**

Much safer is 27 h4! so that the king can hide at h3 and h2.

**27 ... e5+ 28 ♔h5 gxf6**



*White to move*

White's king looks doomed on h5. But it would turn into a hero after, say, 29 h4 exd4?? (29 ... ♕e3) 30 ♔h6! with a winning threat of ♕g7 mate.

The outcome remains unclear, and a difficult endgame - yes, an endgame - might have arisen after 29 ♕d6 ♕e3! 30 f4!? ♕e4 31 ♔h4 exd4 32 ♘g3 ♕e6 33 ♕xe6+ ♗xe6.

Or it could have been a perpetual check after 30 ♕xd5+ ♔h8 31 f4 ♖g8 32 ♕d6 ♖g5+! 33 ♔h4 (33 fxg5?? ♕xg5 mate) ♖g4+ 34 ♔h5 ♖g5+.

**29 dxe5 fxe5**

To stop 30 ... ♖f5+ (31 ♔h6 ♕h4 mate or 31 ♔g4 ♖f4+), White can try 30 ♘g3 and concede a perpetual check after 30 ... ♕e3 31 ♕e7 ♗f5! 32 ♘xf5 ♖xf5+ 33 ♔h4.

More adventurous is 31 ♕d6 but 31 ... ♕f4! 32 ♕h6 ♕xh6+! 33 ♔xh6 ♖f6+ and ... ♖xb6 is not an endgame White wants to play.

**30 ♕e7?? ♖f5+ White resigned.**

In view of mate following 31 ♔h6 ♕xb6+. White was not lost until the very end and it took moves like 25 ... ♕f2! and 26 ... f6! to keep Black in the game.

## *22*

# Davorin Komljenovic – Albin Planinc

### Yugoslav Championship, Umag 1972

### *Pirc Defense, Geller System B07*

In this game White was an unrated amateur facing the dreaded super-tactician of Yugoslav chess. Play follows a predictable course: Mr. Unknown gets a good position out of the opening with ultra-caution. But by move 18 he is headed steadily downhill.

Then, during the phase when grandmasters usually star, something strange begins to happen. Strange is good for Davids.

**1 e4 g6 2 d4 ♗g7 3 ♘f3 d6 4 ♗e2 ♘f6 5 ♘bd2**

Once again we see a conservative White setup against a sharp defense. He will play quiet moves such as c2-c3, ♖e1 and ♗f1 before deciding how to handle the middlegame.

Black may assert himself in the center with ... e5 and hope for a double-edged position after d4-d5. But if White trades pawns (dxe5) it will be very difficult for a superior player, as Black, to create winning chances. That makes this a good anti-Goliath weapon.

**5 ... 0-0 6 0-0 ♘bd7**

If Black was playing an equal, he might choose the book-endorsed 6 ... ♘c6 and 7 ... e5 in order to trade knights (7 c3 e5 8 dxe5 ♘xe5! 9 ♘xe5 dxe5). But the resulting position offers him little hope for an edge. Why should it? It is nearly symmetrical.

More ambitious is 7 ... ♖e8 with the idea of retaking on e5 with pieces and creating an unbalanced center. For instance, 8 ♖e1 e5 9 dxe5 ♘xe5 10 ♘xe5

♖xe5! exposes the e4-pawn to pressure (11 f4 ♖e7 12 ♗f3 ♕e8 or 11 ♗f3 ♕e8 and ... ♗d7-c6).

**7 ♖e1 e5 8 c3 ♖e8**

But now 9 dxe5 dxe5! could be followed by ... ♘c5-d3.

**9 ♕b3 c6 10 ♗c4 ♕e7**



*White to move*

The drawback to ... ♘bd7 is the cramped middlegame Black has if the center isn't changed.

**11 a4 ♖b8 12 dxe5 dxe5?!**

Once again Black had the possibility of easing his congestion with the swap of knights, 12 ... ♘xe5! 13 ♘xe5 dxe5 (13 ... ♕xe5?? 14 ♗xf7+).

However, each piece trade is one step closer to a colorless middlegame (14 ♘f3 ♗e6 15 a5 ♗xc4 16 ♕xc4) in which White has a slightly better bishop and no real weaknesses.

**13 a5! b5**

Black's last move is weakening but offers more winning chances than 13 ... ♘c5 14 ♕c2 and 15 b4!.

**14 axb6 axb6 15 ♘g5 ♖f8 16 ♖a7 ♘e8!**

White's initiative is approaching a natural limit since ... ♘d6 (with ... ♘xc4 in mind) is coming up.

**17 ♘df3 ♘d6 18 ♖d1**

Or 18 ♗f1 h6! and White has to admit his knights are overextended.

**18 ... ♘xc4 19 ♕xc4 h6!**



*White to move*

The trend is in Black's favor. Trying to change it with 20 ♘h4 would have worked well after 20 ... hxg5? 21 ♘xg6.

But 20 ... b5! 21 ♘xg6 ♕xg5! or 21 ♕a2 ♕f6 favors Black.

**20 ♘h3 g5!**

The primitive threat is 21 ... g4. If Planinc, then one of the world's most feared tacticians, had been White he would foreseen the bleak future and might have complicated with 21 ♘hxg5!?.

**21 g4? ♕f6 22 ♘e1 ♘c5 23 f3 ♗e6 24 ♕e2 ♗b3! 25 ♖d2 ♖a8!**

At last this looks like an Amateur-vs.-Grandmaster game. White didn't like 26 ♖xa8 ♖xa8 because of the impending ... ♖a1!. So he allowed the closing of the a-file at the cost of weakened queenside pawns.

**26 ♖a3 ♖xa3 27 bxa3 ♖a8 28 ♘f2 ♗f8 29 ♘d1 b5 30 ♘e3**



*Black to move*

Black has a substantial positional edge and can soon start pillaging the queenside with ... ♘a4. But a bit of precaution – such as ... ♗e6 – was in order so that he can capture the White knight when it lands on f5.

**30 ... ♕e6?! 31 h4 ♘a4?!**

White bid for randomness with his last move. But 31 ... gxh4 would have been safer than allowing a trade on g5.

**32 ♘f5 ♗c5+? 33 ♔h1 ♘xc3 34 ♕h2!**



*Black to move*

The steady improvement of Black's position in moves 18-29 was halted. But he didn't seem to notice.

Now, however, he must have seen that 34 ... ♘b1 – followed by 35 ... ♘xd2 or 35 ... ♘xa3 – runs into the buzz-saw of 35 ♖b2 ♘xa3 36 ♖xb3! ♕xb3?? 37 ♕xe5 ♗f8 38 ♗b2 and White wins.

Black could avoid that fate with the remarkable 36 ... ♕c4! (instead of 36 ... ♕xb3). Then his mating threat of 37 ... ♕f1+ would draw (38 ♗e3! ♕f1+ 39 ♕g1 ♕h3+ or 38 ... ♗xe3 39 ♖xe3 ♕f1+).

**34 ... ♗f8 35 hxg5 hxg5 36 ♖d3!**

Something has gone very wrong. Both ♖xc3 and ♗xg5 are threatened.

**36 ... ♘a4 37 ♗xg5 ♘c5 38 ♖d2**



*Black to move*

It's getting hard to recommend moves for Black. White is readying a shift of the rook to h2, to support ♕h8 or ♕h7 mate. And 38 ... ♖xa3? 39 ♖d8! threatens 40 ♖xf8+! ♔xf8 41 ♕h8 mate and wins.

**38 ... f6 39 ♗e3 ♕c4**

This queen can't defend the kingside for long, e.g. 39 ... ♕e8 40 g5 or 40 ♗xc5 ♗xc5 41 ♕h6 ♗f8 42 ♕xf6. Black's desperate counterattack shortens the game.

**40 ♕h3 ♕c1 41 ♕h4 ♕c4 42 ♕xf6 Black resigned.**

The threat was ♖h2-h8 mate and 42 ... ♕f7 43 ♕g5+ is curtains.

## *23*

# Lodewijk Prins – Jacob Muilwijk

### Dutch Championship 1938

### *Colle System D12*

If you search for information about Jacob Muilwijk you may find that he was known as "Jaap", that he played in only one major event that is recorded in databases, and that he scored only 3-8 in it. That's about it.

His opponent was one of the best players in Western Europe, later an honorary grandmaster. You can blame his loss in this game on familiar factors: fear of allowing perpetual check and overconfidence.

But inaccurate calculation – first in overlooking a possible winning line, then in overlooking Black's winning moves – is also at fault. Black exploits this wonderfully.

**1 d4 ♘f6 2 ♘f3 d5 3 e3 ♗f5**

This is a good defense against Edgard Colle's attacking system, which was based on a quick ♗d3. Now an exchange of bishops (4 ♗d3 ♗xd3) is quite even.

**4 c4 c6**

There are two ways to try to punish Black's early ... ♗f5. One is to attack the undefended b7-pawn. But 5 cxd5 cxd5 6 ♕b3 ♕c7 is unimpressive.

White takes the other route, to trade off Black's bishop for a knight and then seize the b1-h7 diagonal with ♗d3. There are many move orders to do this but White chose:

**5 ♘h4 ♗xb1 6 ♖xb1 e6 7 a3**

This was played to avoid 7 ... ♗b4+ and another piece trade.

**7 ... ♘bd7 8 ♘f3 ♗d6 9 ♘d2**

White tries to discourage ... ♘e4 followed by ... f5, which would give Black a nice version of a Dutch Defense.

**9 ... 0-0 10 ♗e2 ♘e4**



*White to move*

Black expected that the pawn structure after 11 ♘xe4 dxe4 would give him attacking chances. But an easier road to equality begins with 10 ... e5.

**11 ♘xe4 dxe4 12 f4**

The safer bid for kingside space is 12 0-0 ♕h4 13 g3 followed by f2-f4.

**12 ... exf3 13 ♗xf3 e5 14 0-0 e4!**

White probably overlooked this move (15 ♗xe4 ♕h4! wins material).

Worse, he could see that 15 ♗e2 allows 15 ... ♕h4 16 g3 ♗xg3, with a perpetual check – if Black wants to draw.

That's a taste of what's to come. White will try to rule out a perpetual by making some moves that may be objectively second best. That destabilizing factor raises the risk level for both players.

**15 ♗g4 ♕h4 16 ♗h3!**

Of course, not 16 h3 ♕g3!. But what about 16 g3?

Then on 16 ... ♗xg3 17 hxg3 ♕xg3+ 18 ♔h1 ♕h4+? White can play to win with 19 ♔g2!.

However, to do this White would have to gamble that Black would not find 18 ... f5!.



*White to move*

Then 19 ♗xf5? ♖xf5 20 ♖xf5 ♕h3+ and 21 ... ♕xf5 clearly favors Black. And 19 ♗e2? or 19 ♗h5? lose after 19 ... ♖f6 and 20 ... ♖h6(+).

The key line is 19 ♖xf5. Then 19 ... ♕h4+ 20 ♔g2 ♖xf5 21 ♗xf5 ♖f8 fails to 22 ♕g4!.

But instead of 20 ... ♖xf5 Black has a remarkable resource in 20 ... h5!.

Then 21 ♖xh5 ♖f2+ is a mate. And 21 ♗h3 ♖xf5 22 ♗xf5 ♖f8 is strong. (There's no 23 ♕g4 defense now.)

Of course, White could avoid this with 20 ♔g1! (instead of 20 ♔g2). Then 20 ... h5?? loses to 21 ♖xh5 because 21 ... ♖f2?? is not a check.

But 20 ... ♕g3+! 21 ♔h1 ♕h4+ would be another perpetual check.

White's choice of 16 ♗h3 is fine. After 16 ... ♘f6 followed by ... h5 and ... ♘g4 the game would go on.

**16 ... f5!? 17 c5! ♗b8 18 ♕b3+ ♔h8**



*White to move*

**19 ♕e6**

White's move looked strong and also easier to calculate than 19 ♕xb7 ♘f6 20 ♔h1! (not 20 ♕xa8 ♗xh2+ and 21 ... ♖xa8).

The crucial lines require seeing far beyond that, beginning with 20 ... ♘g4 21 ♕xa8 ♘f2+ 22 ♖xf2 ♕xf2.

Then 23 g3? ♕e1+ 24 ♔g2 suddenly favors Black after 24 ... f4! (25 exf4 ♕e2+ 26 ♔g1 e3 or 25 gxf4 g5).

After 23 ♗d2 ♕xd2 24 ♕xc6 ♕xe3 there is still a lot of play left (25 d5 ♗e5 26 d6 ♕f4 27 g3 ♕h6 or 25 ♕d7 ♕f4 26 g3 ♕f3+ 27 ♗g2 ♕h5). It's understandable that White took what looked like a much clearer course.

**19 ... ♘f6**

Now 20 ♗xf5?? ♕xh2+ and 20 ♖xf5?? ♕e1+ 21 ♖f1 ♗xh2+ would lose. But White must have thought he was winning until he realized that 20 ♕xf5 would allow a powerful 20 ... g5!.

Then 21 g3? ♗xg3 22 hxg3 ♕xg3+ 23 ♔h1? ♘g4! loses and 23 ♗g2 ♘g4 is dangerous.

Moreover 21 ♕e6 g4 22 g3 ♗xg3 23 hxg3 ♕xh3 could lead to another perpetual check. White found the best way to keep the game going:

**20 ♗d2 ♘g4! 21 ♖xf5! ♗xh2+ 22 ♔h1**

Now 22 ... ♖xf5 23 ♕xf5 ♘h6 favors White's better pieces after 24 ♕d7 and 25 ♖f1.

**22 ... ♗c7! 23 ♖xf8+ ♖xf8 24 ♕xg4 ♕f2!**



*White to move*

The threat of 25 ... ♕f1+! 26 ♖xf1 ♖xf1 mate regains the piece.

White would retain some winning chances after 25 g3 ♕xd2 26 ♖f1!.

For example, 26 ... ♖g8 27 ♕e6 ( threatening 28 ♕xg8+! ♔xg8 29 ♗e6+ and mates) h6 28 ♕g6. But White cracks:

**25 ♕d1?? ♖f3! 26 ♕g1**

The threat was 26 ... ♖xh3+. There was no defense.

**26 ... ♕h4! 27 ♕f1 ♕g3 28 ♕g1 ♕h4 29 ♕f1 ♖xf1+ 30 ♖xf1 g5 31 ♖f7 ♕g3 32 ♔g1 g4 33 ♗xg4 ♕xg4 34 ♖xc7 ♕d1+ 35 ♔h2 ♕xd2 36 ♖xb7 ♕xe3 37 ♖d7 ♕f4+ White resigned.**

And now for an instructive page out of chess history (which many of today's players would consider ancient history).

## *24*

## Jacques Mieses – Sven Svensson

### Stockholm 1906

### *Vienna Game C25*

Sven O. Svensson enters those history pages in the 1905 Nordic Congress. He departs at another Nordic Congress 12 years later, leaving fewer than 20 games in databases. Jacques Mieses, on the other hand, was the Methuselah of his era. His career lasted nearly 60 years, roughly half of them as one of the world's top 30 players.

In this game Mieses is victimized by his opening knowledge. We've seen this before, such as when a Goliath as Black avoided the best moves in Game 15. This time it is White's turn. He knew the position so well after move five that he was trying to find something new. It backfired.

**1 e4 e5 2 ♘c3 ♗c5 3 ♗c4 ♘f6 4 d3 d6 5 f4 ♗g4 6 ♘ge2?!**



*Black to move*

The 2 ♘c3 opening could be renamed the Mieses Game because of the many ideas he contributed to it.

Here he tries to sidestep the book line, 6 ♘f3!. He had put that move to good use two years before in an impressive win over Paul Saladin Leonhardt (6 ... ♘c6 7 h3 ♗xf3 8 ♕xf3 ♘d4 9 ♕g3! ♕e7 – rather than 6 ... ♘xc2+ 7 ♔d1 ♘xa1 8 ♕xg7 – 10 fxe5 dxe5 11 ♔d1! with an excellent game).

**6 ... ♘h5!**

White is already in trouble. On 7 fxe5 ♕h4+ he cannot allow 8 g3? ♘xg3!.

After 8 ♔d2 Black could get a promising position from 8 ... dxe5. But Mieses may have been more afraid of 8 ... ♕g5+ because it repeats the position, 9 ♔e1 ♕h4+!. To play for a win, he raises the stakes.

**7 ♕d2? exf4! 8 d4**

Not 8 ♘xf4 ♕h4+ 9 g3 ♘xg3! when Black could refuse to repeat the position (10 ♘g2 ♕h3 11 ♘f4) and win with 11 ... ♕h6!.

**8 ... ♕h4+ 9 ♔d1**

If the king goes to f1 Black will have two tactical resources later. They are ... f3 and (if ♘xf4, then) ... ♘g3+.

**9 ... ♗b4 10 ♕e1 ♕e7?**



*White to move*

Now with 11 ♘d5 ♗xe1 12 ♘xe7 White could have escaped into an endgame only slightly in Black's favor.

This is why 10 ... ♕f6! (which deters 11 ♘d5? ♕xd4+) or 10 ... ♕g5 would have won faster.

**11 ♕f2?**

Mieses stays in the middlegame where he apparently still dreamed of a swindle.

**11 ... ♗xc3 12 bxc3 ♕xe4 13 h3 ♗e6 14 ♖e1!**

And this keeps the dreams alive (14 ... ♗xc4? 15 ♘xf4 costs the queen).

**14 ... ♕c6 15 ♗d3 0-0 16 ♕h4 g6 17 ♗xf4 ♘xf4 18 ♕xf4**



*Black to move*

White is a pawn down and has many more weaknesses than Black. But he can still find scary moves. They can frighten a David into passive play – instead of looking for the knockout blow he deserves. Now 18...♕xg2? 19 ♗e4! loses.

**18 ... ♘d7 19 g4 ♖ae8 20 h4 ♗c4**

Black can dominate the e-file after a swap of bishops.

**21 ♔d2 ♗xd3 22 cxd3 ♕g2 23 ♖ab1 ♖e6!**

He will double rooks and work on the pinned e2-knight.

**24 ♖b2 ♖fe8 25 ♔d1**



*Black to move*

**25 ... ♖f6**

Black misses a number of faster wins from here on, such as 25 ... ♖e3 26 ♖d2 ♖f3! 27 ♕g5 ♖f1!.

**26 ♕g3 ♕c6!**

This avoids a trap, 26 ... ♕xg3 27 ♘xg3 ♖xe1+ 28 ♔xe1 ♖f3 29 ♘e4 ♖xd3?, when White is alive after 30 ♔e2.

**27 ♖d2 ♖f3 28 ♕g1 ♖ee3! 29 ♔c2 ♕a4+ 30 ♔b2 ♖xd3 31 ♖c2 ♘b6! 32 ♖ec1 ♘c4+ 33 ♔a1 ♘e3 34 ♖b2 ♖d1**

A bit faster was 34 ... ♖f1 35 ♖xf1 ♘xf1 and ... ♖d1+.

**35 ♖xd1 ♘xd1 36 ♖b3 ♖d3 37 ♔b1 ♖d2 38 ♘c1 ♕c4**

A threatened check on e4, after 38 ... ♕c6 or 38 ... ♕e8, was also punishing.

**39 ♕g3 a5! 40 h5 a4 41 ♖a3 ♕b5+ 42 ♘b3 ♖b2+ 43 ♔a1 ♕e2 White resigned.**

Because of 44 ♖xa4 ♖b1+ and 45 ... ♕b2 mate.

## *25*

# Gudmundur Sigurjonsson – Piet Kroon

### Olympiad, Nice 1974

### *Sicilian Defense, Rossolimo Variation B31*

This was played in a tournament's first round. As we'll see in Chapter Five, that is when major upsets are most common.

Black was virtually unknown outside his country, South Africa. His young Icelandic opponent was rated nearly 300 points above him and about to become a grandmaster. As White he offered a then-trendy gambit.

Black grabbed two pawns and adopted another sound David strategy: He offered to give up some material, either a pawn or the Exchange, to kill White's initiative.

This placed the grandmaster in an uncomfortable position. Should he take the material and inch closer to a draw? That would be best against another GM. But against a David ... ?

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 ♗b5 g6 4 0-0 ♗g7 5 ♖e1 e5 6 b4!?**



*Black to move*

A Sicilian version of the Evans Gambit! Among White's ideas is to open the a3-f8 diagonal that Black weakened with his last move (6 ... cxb4 7 a3 bxa3 8 ♗xa3). This looks so dangerous that Black often returns the pawn with 7 ... ♘ge7 8 axb4.

**6 ... ♘xb4 7 c3**

This gambit was very young. Within a few years 7 ♗b2! proved to be more accurate since the attacked e5-pawn cannot be defended by 7 ... d6.

If White regains the pawn (7 ... ♘c6 8 ♗xc6 dxc6 9 ♘xe5) he is slightly better. And 7 ... ♕c7 8 c3 ♘c6 9 d4 is a better edition of the gambit that we see in the game.

**7 ... ♘c6 8 d4 exd4 9 e5!**

White shuts out the g7-bishop and clears e4 for his QN. It would get there quickly after 9 ... dxc3? 10 ♘xc3.

**9 ... ♘ge7 10 cxd4 cxd4**

One of the few "book" lines at the time was 10 ... a6 and then 11 ♗xc6 dxc6 12 ♘bd2 0-0 13 ♘e4 with unclear play.

**11 ♗a3 0-0 12 ♘bd2 a6!**

An early demonstration of this gambit went 12 ... ♕a5? 13 ♕b3 a6? 14 ♗xc6 ♘xc6 15 ♘c4! (better than 15 ♗xf8 ♗xf8) ♕c3 16 ♘b6! ♖b8 17 ♗d6 and wins.

**13 ♗d3**

After 13 ♗xc6 dxc6 14 ♘e4 b6 Black would be primed to shut the a3-bishop out of play with 15 ... c5!.

By giving back some of his extra material he would be safe and have all the winning chances – 15 ♘f6+ ♚h8 16 ♘g5 h6 17 ♘gh7 c5! 18 ♘xf8 ♝xf8.

**13 ... b5 14 ♗d6 ♜e8 15 a4**



*Black to move*

**15 ... ♝b7!**

Trying to keep both pawns, even temporarily, is risky against a superior player, e.g. 15 ... bxa4 16 ♗e4 ♘f5 17 ♗xf5 gxf5 18 ♕xa4 or 16 ... f5 17 ♗d3 and ♗c4+/♘g5.

Similar is 15 ... b4 16 ♗e4 and then 16 ... ♝b7 17 ♘xd4 ♜c8 18 ♘2f3 or 18 a5!? ♘xa5 19 ♗xb4.

A good defender might win as Black after 16 ... bxa4 or 16 ... b4. But if a draw is good result, why take those risks? That's how an opportunistic David thinks.

**16 ♕b3**

After 16 axb5 axb5 17 ♗xb5 ♘f5! Black has broken the bind and stands much better (18 ♘e4 ♜xa1 19 ♕xa1 ♘xe5 or 18 ♘c4 ♜xa1 19 ♕xa1 d3).

**16 ... ♘a5 17 ♕a3 ♝xf3!? 18 ♘xf3 ♘c4**

A skilled defender might have gotten away with an extra pawn or two by playing ... ♘c8 at move 16 or 17. But Black's choice is more forcing and easier to calculate.

In dubious positions, a David wants to make it harder to calculate moves. But when ahead in material, he generally wants to clarify matters.

**19 ♗xc4 bxc4 20 ♘xd4 ♘c8! 21 ♖ac1 ♘xd6 22 ♕xd6 ♕b8?**

Black could have crowned his give-back strategy with 22 ... ♕a5!.

Then he would either get to keep two extra pawns (23 ♘f3 ♕xa4) or obtain the much better pieces in a pawn-up late middlegame (23 ♕xd7 ♖ad8 24 ♕c6 ♖xe5). He would be winning in either case – and it's easier after 23 f4? ♗f8.

**23 ♕xd7 ♖xe5**



*White to move*

**24 ♖ed1**

White could have made it more difficult with 24 ♘c6! ♖xe1+ 25 ♖xe1.

In time pressure, both players would be taking risks after, say, 25 ... ♕b3 26 ♘e7+ ♔h8 27 ♘c8 h6!.

Then could come 28 ♘d6 c3! 29 ♘xf7+ ♔h7 30 ♘xh6! ♖f8 (not 30 ... ♔xh6?? 31 ♕h3+ ♔g5 when 32 ♕e3+ ♔h5 33 f4! wins).

But instead of this fantasy variation, Black can eliminate tricks with 25 ... ♕f8! and empower his passer with ... c3.

**24 ... ♕d8 25 ♕g4 h5 26 ♕f3 ♕e8!**

Everything is protected (27 ♖xc4?? ♖e1+ mates) and Black is ready to exert decisive pressure with ... ♖d8. The rest of the game was marred by time pressure:

**27 ♘c6 ♖e4?** (27 ... ♖e6!) **28 ♘d8? ♖a7?** (28 ... ♗b2!) **29 g3 ♖ae7 30 ♔g2 c3 31 ♖d6 ♔h7 32 a5 f5 33 ♕d3 ♕b5! 34 ♕xb5 axb5 35 a6 ♖a4 36 ♘c6 ♖xa6 White resigned.**

## *26*

## Lewis Eisen – Josh Waitzkin

### US High School Championship, Lexington 1992

### *Sicilian Defense, Closed Variation B26*

Josh Waitzkin was a youth-chess Goliath. He won six national scholastic and junior championships and became world famous when he was featured in his father's book *Searching for Bobby Fischer* and depicted in the movie of that name.

His opponent in this game was rated some 300 points below him. He also upset two other higher-rated players en route to winning the US High School Championship with a 7-0 score.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘c3 ♘c6 3 g3 g6 4 ♗g2 ♗g7 5 d3 e6 6 ♗e3 d6 7 ♕d2**

White's opening moves are no bid to refute the Sicilian Defense. But they are a good choice against a Goliath. It is hard to get an advantage as White but almost impossible to lose quickly.

Note how Black delays developing his KN, to avoid 7 ... ♘ge7 8 ♗h6 0-0 9 h4, for example.

**7 ... ♖b8 8 f4 ♘ge7 9 ♘f3 ♘d4 10 0-0 0-0 11 ♖ae1**



*Black to move*

The middlegame plans for both sides are clear-cut: White will play on the kingside, possibly with g3-g4 and f4-f5, while Black seizes the greater share of the queenside with ... b5-b4.

**11 ... f5 12 ♘d1**

With his last move Black can exert pressure on the center, in connection with ... ♗b7.

**12 ... b5 13 c3 ♘xf3+ 14 ♗xf3 b4!**

Textbook play. Black seeks a target at c3 (after ... bxc3/bxc3) or at b2 (after ... bxc3/ ♘xc3). At worst, he creates an outpost at d4 (after 15 c4).

**15 c4 ♕c7 16 ♕g2 ♗b7 17 g4! ♖be8!**

We are in a waiting game in which neither side wants to change the pawn structure. Black passes up ... fxe4/dxe4 as well as ... fxg4 because that helps White.

White, on the other hand, declines to capture on f5 because it will give away control of that square.

For example, 18 exf5? ♗xf3 19 ♕xf3 exf5 gives Black a bit of an edge after 20 ♖e2 fxg4 21 ♕xg4 ♘f5!.

**18 ♖f2 ♗a8 19 h4! ♘c6 20 h5**



*Black to move*

But now White is beginning to make threats, such as 21 exf5.

For example, 21 ... exf5? 22 hxg6 hxg6 23 ♗d5+ ♔h7? 24 ♕h3+. Or 21 ... gxf5 22 gxf5 and 23 h6.

The downside to 20 h5 is that opening the g-file will also endanger White's king.

**20 ... gxh5! 21 gxf5 exf5 22 ♗xh5 ♖e7 23 ♗f3 ♔h8!**

Black is in a familiar middlegame situation for the higher-rated player. He has outplayed his opponent and has a choice of good moves. But if he settles for what turns out to be second best moves, his winning chances plummet.

Here 23 ... ♘d4 looks good until you see that 24 ♗xd4 ♗xd4 is illegal.

Instead, 24 ... cxd4 may favor him but 25 ♖fe2 fxe4 26 ♗xe4 ♗xe4 27 ♖xe4 ♖xe4 28 ♖xe4 ♔h8 is double-edged because he has made his bishop slightly bad.

The move he chose is better because now 24 ... ♘d4 and 25 ... ♘xf3 would put the e4-pawn under strong pressure.

**24 exf5**



*Black to move*

**24 ... ♗f6?**

Your computer may light up when it begins to analyze 24 ... ♗xb2. Like 24 ... ♗f6, it threatens to win the queen with 25 ... ♖g8.

If you give it some time to look at 25 ♖xb2 ♖g8 26 f6! it may not like the looks of 26 ... ♖xg2+ 27 ♖xg2.

For example, 27 ... ♖f7 28 ♗d5 and 27 ... ♖e8 28 ♗d5 (threat of f6-f7) ♘d8 29 f7 ♘xf7 30 ♗d4+.

But point it toward 25 ... ♖g7! (rather than 25 ... ♖g8?) and Black is close to winning. His failure to calculate accurately here is a turning point.

**25 ♕h1! ♖g8+ 26 ♔f1 ♖eg7 27 ♖h2!**

The e3-bishop stops ... ♖g1+. The nature of the position has changed:

The most important feature is that it is easier for White to find good moves, such as ♗e4, ♖h6 and ♘f2, than it is for Black.

For example, 27 ... ♕c8 28 ♘f2 ♖g1+ 29 ♕xg1 ♖xg1+ 30 ♔xg1 ♕xf5 31 ♗e4 (and 30 ... ♘e7 31 ♗xa8 ♕xa8 32 ♘e4!).

**27 ... ♗b7 28 ♖h6**



*Black to move*

This is the second turning point. With his last move Black prepared 28 ... ♘d4 29 ♗xb7 ♘xf5 followed by ... ♘g3+ or ... ♕xb7.

But after 28 ♖h6 White can meet that with 30 ♖xf6! ♘g3+ 31 ♔f2 ♘xh1+ 32 ♗xh1. He would have three minor pieces for the queen. Once his forces coordinate (♗e4 and ♖eh1) their superiority will be obvious.

**28 ... ♗d4? 29 f6! ♖f7 30 ♗d5 ♘d8 31 ♗xd4 cxd4**



*White to move*

**32 ♕h4!**

There was no reason to calculate 32 ♗xf7! ♗xh1 33 ♗xg8 when this move was available. White foresees a ♖e7 killer.

**32 ... ♗xd5 33 ♖e7! ♗e4**

This keeps the game going for a while (compared with 33 ... ♕c6 34 ♖xh7+ or 33 ... ♖xe7 34 fxe7). Now 34 dxe4 or 34 ♖xc7 would win. White preferred:

**34 ♘f2 ♖xe7 35 fxe7 ♘e6 36 ♘xe4 Resigns**

## *27*

# Craig Hilby – Bartlomiej Macieja

### Millionaire Open, Las Vegas 2015

### *Sicilian Defense, Taimanov Variation B47*

An improving 16-year-old takes on a veteran grandmaster in a big-bucks Swiss System open. A Sicilian Defense should make for a double-edged battle in which experience counts more. But the grandmaster finds himself making positional concessions by move 11 and fails to find a path to a playable middlegame. How is that possible?

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♘xd4 e6 5 ♘c3 ♕c7 6 ♗e3 a6 7 ♕d2 ♘f6 8 0-0-0 ♗e7 9 f3 h5**

Black's last move is the kind that grandmasters use to confuse the inexperienced. He wants to thwart the attacking plan of 10 g4 and 11 g5 that has been as dangerous as it is easy to play.

Some lower-rateds would try to find a way to engineer g2-g4 now, even if it means sacrificing a pawn. But this David shifts to a middlegame plan that works much better once Black has made ... 0-0 unlikely.

**10 ♘xc6! bxc6**

If 10 ... dxc6 White can force Black to choose between concessions:

(a) 11 ♕f2 would be followed by the restricting 12 ♗b6.

If Black stops that with 11 ... ♘d7 White continues 12 f4 – and 13 e5!, if allowed.

(b) 11 ♘a4 eyes 12 ♘b6.

Then 11 ... c5? doesn't work (12 ♗xc5 ♗xc5 13 ♘xc5 ♕xc5?? 14 ♕d8 mate). Black again loses time after 11 ... ♘d7 12 ♗g5 ♕d8 13 h4 or weakens his light squares with 12 ... f6 13 ♗f4 e5 14 ♗e3.

**11 ♗f4!**



*Black to move*

A grandmaster doesn't want to defend 11 ... ♕b7 12 ♗d6 ♗xd6 13 ♕xd6 against a lower-rated opponent.

For instance, 13 ... ♕b8 14 ♕xb8 ♖xb8 15 e5 ♘d5 16 ♘e4 gives him very few winning chances and many ways to lose in what promises to be a long grind.

**11 ... e5 12 ♗g5 a5**

Black would like to take advantage of his half-open file but 12 ... ♖b8 13 ♗c4 and 14 ♗b3 defends the queenside quite well.

Note that without the weakening of 11 ♗f4 e5 the White bishop would be just a defensive piece with little scope (11 ♗c4 d5! 12 ♗b3 ♗b7).

Black anticipates the bishop maneuver by preparing ... a4. However, the a-pawn would be seriously weak there.

Theory prefers 12 ... d6 so that Black can coordinate his forces after 13 ♗c4 ♗e6! and ... ♖d8. But this also invites 13 ♗xf6 gxf6 14 f4!, with play like the game.

**13 ♗c4 a4 14 a3 d6**

Black's last move is so natural that at first you don't notice how risky it is. Until now ♗xf6 could have been met by ... ♗xf6. But now that recapture drops the d-pawn (♕xd6).

Instead, Black could try to complete development with 14 ... 0-0 and 15 ... ♖d8/16 ... d6/17 ... ♗e6.

But castling also has its drawbacks – with 15 h3 and 16 g4! White's kingside initiative comes fast. Similarly, 14 ... ♕b6 15 f4.

**15 ♗xf6 gxf6**



*White to move*

**16 f4!**

All according to the positional recipe. Black can activate his pieces at further cost to his pawn structure with 16 ... exf4 17 ♕xf4 ♖g8 18 g3 ♗e6. But in the more open position White has the potential for a strong positional sacrifice, such as 19 ♗e2! ♕a5 20 ♖xd6! ♗xd6 21 ♕xd6.

**16 ... ♗e6 17 ♕d3!**

Black's king would be remarkably safe behind his pawn wall after 17 ♗xe6 fxe6 (18 fxe5 fxe5 19 ♖hf1 ♕b6).

After 17 ♕d3 White wants to force a trade on c4. For example, 18 f5 ♗xc4 19 ♕xc4 is not only positionally good for him. It would win either the pawn on a4 or on c6.

**17 ... exf4 18 ♘e2**



*Black to move*

**18...♗g4?**

With the possibility of ♘xa4 removed, Black could have tried 18 ... ♖b8.

Then 19 ♘xf4 d5! (threat of ... ♕xf4+) 20 ♘xe6 fxe6 gives him a bit of an edge.

The center pawn wall would also keep his king safe after 19 ♗xe6 fxe6 20 ♘xf4 ♕b7 21 ♕c3 e5.

If Black can get his KR into the game it may make up for his pawn weaknesses, e.g. 19 ♕c3 ♕b7 20 ♗d3 ♖g8 21 ♘xf4 ♖g5!.

**19 ♖d2 ♗xe2 20 ♖xe2**

Given time, White will regain his pawn (♖f1, ♖2f2 and ♖xf2). He could then go after the h5-pawn, target the f7-pawn (with ♗a2 and ♕c4) or even prepare an Exchange sacrifice on f6 or d6.

That means Black needs to activate his heavy pieces, such as with 20 ... ♖g8. He would be worse after 21 ♕f3 ♖g5 22 ♕xf4 ♖b8 and ... ♕b6.

**20 ... ♗f8?**

He has another idea, to reorganize his pieces, with ... ♔e7 and ... ♗h6. If *he* is given time for ... ♗g5 and ... h4, his position is quite solid – at least on the dark squares.

**21 ♔b1 ♔e7 22 ♕f3 ♖b8 23 ♕xf4 ♕b6 24 c3**



*Black to move*

But a crisis looms on the light squares, particularly f7, as well as – surprisingly – on e5.

He could complete his kingside plan with 24 ... ♗h6 25 ♕f5 h4 and ... ♗g5.

However, 26 e5! dxe5 27 ♖xe5+! is strong (27 ... fxe5 28 ♕xf7+).

Black's next move threatens the bishop and ... ♕xa3, while protecting d6. But it allows the same sacrifice.

**24 ... ♕c5 25 e5! dxe5 26 ♖he1!**



*Black to move*

The threat is ♖xe5+, e.g. 25 ... ♗g7 26 ♖xe5+! fxe5 27 ♕xf7+ and 28 ♖d1+.

**26 ... ♕d6 27 ♕f2!**

The threats begin with ♕a7+ and keep coming.

For example, 27 ... ♔e8 28 ♖d2 ♕e7 can be followed by 29 ♕f3 ♖c8 30 ♖ed1 and 31 ♖d6.

Or 31 ♗a6 ♖c7 32 ♕f2/33 ♕b6.

**27 ... ♗g7 28 ♖d2 ♕c7**



*White to move*

There was no defense. Now 29 ♕c5+ ♔e8 30 ♗d5 ♖c8 isn't as good as ...

**29 ♖xe5+! ♔f8 30 ♕c5+ ♔g8 31 ♖e7 Black resigned.**

## *28*

# Christian Tanaka – GM Merab Gagunashvili

### World Open, Philadelphia 2007

### *Pirc Defense B09*

Thirteen-year-old Christian Tanaka was outrated by more than 500 points when he faced a grandmaster at the 2007 World Open. Professor Elo's mathematics tells us he was a 20-to-1 longshot.

But when Black chose a dubious opening and followed it with routine moves, the odds plummeted. What turned a poor Black position into a lost one were White moves that looked simple but weren't.

**1 d4 d6 2 e4 ♘f6 3 ♘c3 ♘bd7**

Black has chosen a path to the Philidor's Defense (4 ♘f3 e5) without allowing White the complications of a more familiar move order, 1 e4 e5 2 ♘f3 d6 3 d4 ♘f6 4 dxe5!? or 3 ... ♘d7 4 ♗c4 c6 5 ♘g5.

The downside to his order is 4 f4!, since 5 e5 would be annoying. Black would have a solid endgame, similar to a line of the Old Indian Defense, after 4 ... e5 5 dxe5 dxe5 6 fxe5 ♘xe5 7 ♕xd8+ ♔xd8 8 ♘f3 ♗d6 9 ♗g5 c6 and ... ♔c7. However, 5 ♘f3 and 5 ... exd4 6 ♕xd4! is excellent for White.

**4 f3 e5 5 d5!**

This is also a good decision. Black must choose between a Benoni-like position (5 ... c5) and a slightly dubious Pirc Defense (5 ... g6) or Old Indian-like middlegame. Black is short on counterplay in each.

**5 ... ♘h5 6 ♘ge2 ♗e7**

Black chooses a good strategy in similar Old Indian positions: a trade of his bad bishop with ... ♗g5, followed by ... f5 supported by ... g6/... ♘g7.

**7 ♗e3**

But 7 ... ♗g5 8 ♗f2! and 9 h4 would make Black's kingside pieces look stupid.

**7 ... 0-0 8 ♕d2 h6?**

Black insists on a bishop trade. He should have had more of a sense of danger – after all, some 20-to-1 longshots *do* come in first.

With more caution he would have looked at the strange 8 ... ♘b6!?. The ideas behind it are 9 ... ♘c4, 9 ... f5 and 9 ... c6. Black would be in the game after 9 ♘g3 ♗h4! or 9 b3 c6.

**9 0-0-0 ♗g5**



*White to move*

Black knew he was setting a trap – 10 ♗xg5 ♕xg5 11 ♕xg5 hxg5 12 ♘b5 could be answered by 12 ... a6!. Then 13 ♘xc7? ♖a7 and the trapped knight is lost.

But did he see 12 h4 (instead of 12 ♘b5) ? Then 12 ... gxh4 13 ♖xh4 ♘hf6 14 g4 is a ready-made kingside initiative.

White's next move is more ambitious. He gets a kingside initiative anyway but retains queens.

**10 g4! ♗xe3 11 ♕xe3 ♘hf6 12 h4**

The trade of bishops has eased Black's game somewhat. But without a bishop to defend his d6-pawn, he can't play on the queenside with 12 ... c6 or 12 ... c5 because of 13 dxc6 bxc6 14 ♖xd6.

He can prepare that with 12 ... ♘e8. White can just ignore the queenside and continue the attack with 13 ♘g3 and 14 g5.

**12 ... ♘h7 13 ♘g3 ♖e8**

Black's position is becoming a Goliath's nightmare:

White can attack with simple moves. There is no way for Black to complicate the position. If he battens down the hatches with, say, 13 ... f6 14 ♘f5 ♖f7, White has a variety of ways of slowly building up the kingside pressure without any risk, such as 15 ♗e2 and 16 ♖dg1.

**14 ♘f5 ♘df8?**


*White to move*

**15 ♗b5!**

This alert move is virtually decisive.

After a trade of bishops (15 ... ♗d7 16 ♗xd7) Black has no way to fight White's kingside knights, as we'll find.

But if he refuses to trade, 15 ... ♘d7, he loses too much time, e.g. 16 g5! hxg5 17 ♖dg1! g6 18 hxg5! gxf5? 19 g6! and wins. Or 16 ... h5 17 f4!.

**15 ... ♗d7 16 ♗xd7 ♕xd7 17 ♘e2 ♘g6!**

This sets a kind of positional trap designed to provoke 18 h5?. After 18 ... ♘e7 19 ♘eg3 ♘g5 Black has stopped g4-g5 and earned some survival chances.

Instead, 18 g5! is good (18 ... h5 19 ♘eg3). And there is another winning idea.

**18 ♘eg3! ♘f4**


*White to move*

**19 ♘h5!**

This last move would have been the answer as well to 18 ... ♘e7, e.g. 19 ♘h5 ♘xf5 20 gxf5 ♔h8 21 f6 (although 19 ♘xh6+ gxh6 20 ♕xh6 is faster).

**19 ... ♘xh5 20 gxh5**

Black can resign with a clear conscience: He can't defend g7.

**20 ... ♔h8 21 ♖hg1 ♖g8 22 ♖g2**



*Black to move*

Simple chess: 23 ♖dg1 and 24 ♖xg7 must win.

Perhaps Black should have set a desperation trap with 22 ... ♘f6 – and prayed for 23 ♖dg1?? ♘xd5!.

Unfortunately, it's not hard to find 23 ♖xg7!, which wins outright.

**22 ... f6 23 ♖dg1 ♕f7 24 ♖xg7 ♖xg7 25 ♖xg7**

And since 25 ... ♕xh5 allows 26 ♕g1! with a killing threat of 27 ♖xh7+! the finish was:

**25 ... ♕xg7 26 ♘xg7 ♔xg7 27 ♕b3 Black resigned.**

Pawns begin to fall after 27 ... ♖b8 28 ♕a4 or 27 ... b6 28 ♕c4 ♖c8 29 ♕c6.

## *29*

# Hiong Liong Tan – Vasya Pirc

## Beverwijk 1963

## *Pirc Defense B09*

Imagine sitting down to play against a major opening – and against an opponent after whom the opening is named. That's what faced a young Indonesian when he was paired with Vasya Pirc.

Hiong Liong Tan was virtually unknown in international chess until the 1960 Olympiad when he played fourth board for his national team. The outcome of this game was shocking. But the length was more so.

**1 e4 d6 2 d4 ♘f6 3 ♘c3 g6 4 f4 ♗g7 5 ♘f3 0-0 6 ♗d3 c5?**



*White to move*

Black was literally "Mr. Pirc Defense." But the theory of his opening was evolving quickly.

The ... c5 idea works well in similar variations. Black could play it instead of 5 ... 0-0, e.g. 5 ... c5 6 dxc5 ♛a5! 7 cxd6? ♘xe4 or 7 ♗d3 ♛xc5.

Or he could play it after 5 ... 0-0 6 ♗e2, that is, 6 ... c5 7 dxc5 ♛a5! 8 cxd6? ♘xe4!.

But 5 ... 0-0 6 ♗d3 changes matters because the bishop protects e4. It took years for Pirc players to realize that Black should try 6 ... ♘c6 or 6 ... ♘a6 instead of 6 ... c5?.

**7 dxc5! dxc5**

The difference is that 6 ... c5 7 dxc5 ♛a5? 8 cxd6! ♘xe4? fails to 9 ♗xe4. Now Black ends up with a poor pawn structure.

**8 ♕e2**

White should exploit that structure with 8 e5! ♘d5 9 ♘xd5 ♕xd5 10 ♕e2 followed by ♗e4 or ♗c4.

**8 ... ♘c6 9 e5**

If Black had appreciated how bad his position will get – and how quickly it will get there – he would have looked for a tactical life vest.

Then he would have found 9 ... ♘d4!. The main point is 10 ♘xd4 cxd4 11 exf6? does not win material after 11 ... exf6! because Black threatens both 12 ... dxc3 and 12 ... ♖e8 13 ♘e4 f5.

Like Black's failure to look for 8 ... ♘b6!? in the previous game, this is a lost opportunity that stems from complacency. Thanks to White's active play, he never gets another chance.

**9 ... ♘d5? 10 ♘xd5 ♕xd5 11 ♗e4 ♕d7**

The queen looks odd on d7 but it defends the c6-knight so that Black can play ... b6. White would have a clearer edge after 11 ... ♕d8 12 ♗e3 ♕a5+ 13 c3 and 0-0.

**12 ♗e3 b6 13 h4!**



*Black to move*

In the 1960 Olympiad, Tan tied for best score on fourth board – ahead of Viktor Korchnoi, Vlastimil Hort and others – with an aggressive style. He is true to it here ("Be yourself").

Black's kingside is defended by one minor piece and is vulnerable to h4-h5xg6 followed by ♘g5. The natural defense is 13 ... h5 but it invites 14 ♘g5! with the powerful ideas of 15 e6, 15 f5 or 15 g4 hxg4 16 h5!.

**13 ... ♗b7 14 ♖d1**

More exact is 14 h5 since the attack rolls on after 14 ... ♖fd8 15 hxg6 hxg6 16 ♘g5 (16 ... ♘d4? 17 ♗xd4 cxd4 18 e6! and wins).

**14 ... ♕g4 15 h5! ♖ad8**

After 15 ... gxh5 16 ♖h4 ♕g3+? 17 ♔f1 Black seems to have stifled the kingside attack.

In fact, his queen is on the verge of being trapped by 18 ♗f2.

Black can save it with 17 ... f5 but 18 ♗d5+ ♔h8 19 ♖xh5 provides a winning attack. Or 17 ... ♘d4 18 ♖xd4! ♗xe4 19 ♖xe4.

With 15 ... ♖ad8 Black hoped to exploit White's 14th move by trading rooks and obtaining counterplay.

**16 ♖h4 ♕e6**

The consistent move is 16 ... ♖xd1+ so that 17 ♔xd1 ♕e6 when the threat of ... ♕xa2 has more bite.

However, the superior recapture is 18 ♕xd1! because 18 ... ♕xg2?? loses the queen to 19 ♘d2! ♕g3+ 20 ♗f2.

**17 hxg6 hxg6**

Black must keep the a2-g8 diagonal closed (17 ... fxg6 18 ♘g5 ♕xa2 19 ♖xh7 and ♗d3-c4+ or ♕f3/♗d5+).

After 17 ... hxg6 some computers recommend 18 ♖a1?, to defend a2 and preserve rooks.

**18 ♘g5! ♕xa2**



*White to move*

**19 ♔f2!**

White's intent seems obvious: He wants to double rooks with ♖dh1.

But no, his main idea is to play 20 ♕g4!. That would threaten 21 ♖h8+! and mate after 22 ♕h4(+).

By moving his king he does not allow 20 ... ♖xd1 *with check*. Because of that the end can come quickly, e.g. 19 ... ♘d4 20 ♕g4 ♗c8? 21 ♖h8+! .

After the game 19 ... ♘a5 and 19 ... e6 were recommended as adequate defenses. However, 20 ♕g4! still wins.

So if ♕g4 is so strong, why didn't White play it at move 19?

The answer is 19 ♕g4 ♖xd1+ 20 ♕xd1 ♖d8 21 ♕g4 e6 with a defensible kingside.

**19 ... f5**

There were two other points to admire. One is that 19 ... ♖xd1 20 ♕xd1 ♖d8 does not transpose into the safer 21 ♕g4 e6.

White would win with 21 ♕h1! because 22 ♖h8+ is coming up.

**20 ♖a1! Black resigned.**

The pretty final point: On 20 ... ♕xa1 21 ♕c4+ White mates. He pockets a piece with 21 ♖xa2 after 20 ... ♗a6 or 20 ... ♘d4.

### *30*

## Giovanni Mejia – Oliver Barbosa

### Philippines Championship, Boracay 2012

### *Caro-Kann Defense, Classical Variation B18*

Here's another extreme longshot. White was a 1932-rated player when he upset a grandmaster rated more than 600 points above him. Black makes a basic kind of Goliath error: He never gives White a good enough chance to play badly.

**1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ♘c3 dxe4 4 ♘xe4 ♗f5 5 ♘g3 ♗g6 6 h4 h6 7 h5 ♗h7 8 ♘f3 ♘d7 9 ♗d3 ♗xd3 10 ♕xd3 e6**

Grandmasters used to say that you receive "a free ride" when your opponent doesn't try to test you in the opening. That's what happened to White here.

Black chose a super-solid opening whose chief drawback is that after 4 ... ♗f5 White can play his next eight or so moves with virtually no thinking. They are all easy-to-grasp "book" moves and there is little choice if he is seeking an advantage.

**11 ♗d2 ♘gf6 12 0-0-0 ♗e7 13 ♘e4 0-0**

Black reveals a more aggressive intent. Before the 1990s, he usually castled queenside (12 ... ♕c7 and 13 ... 0-0-0).

**14 ♘xf6+ ♘xf6 15 g4**



*Black to move*

White knew enough about the opening to aim for g4-g5. That limits him to the slow method and the quick.

Slow is the preparatory 15 ♖dg1. Black can act first (15 ... ♕d5 16 c4 ♕e4 or 15 ... ♘g4).

So White opts for the fast way, a gambit. It had scored well after 15 ... ♘xg4 16 ♖hg1.

The critical variation runs 16 ... ♘xf2 17 ♕e2 ♘xd1 18 ♗xh6 and White wins. This game was played before the superior 16 ... f5! was found to offer mixed chances.

**15 ... ♕d5? 16 g5! ♕xa2**

Both players may have been aware that 16 ... hxg5 17 ♗xg5 had been played before 17 ... ♕xa2 in a previous game.

White continued 18 h6 g6 19 ♖dg1. Black tried for a draw with 19 ... ♕a1+ 20 ♔d2 ♕a5+ 21 ♔d1 ♕a1+ 22 ♔d2 ♕a5+.

But White went for 23 ♔e2 and after 23 ... ♕f5? 24 h7+ ♔h8 25 ♕xf5 exf5 26 ♘e5 he won the Exchange with 27 ♗h6 and the game.

In this game, Black immediately threatens 17 ... ♕a1 mate. Computers regarded that as a major improvement over 17 ... hxg5 – until they spent more time on the position.

**17 c4**

This denies d5 to the knight or queen. But it also creates a target for ... b5 (or ... ♕xc4+ if the White queen allows it).

**17 ... ♘g4**

The most difficult task for a young player is not calculating long variations (more than three moves into the future). It is figuring *which* candidate moves to calculate.

Here White could quickly conclude he had a choice of slow and fast. That is, between defending against 18 ... ♘xf2 or going for mate.

Once he looks at 18 ♕e2 and sees 18 ... b5! it would soon be apparent that Black's attack is arriving before he can do anything on the kingside. For example, 19 ♖hg1 ♗a3! 20 bxa3 bxc4! and 20 ... ♖fb8.

So, White might look for an aggressive way to ignore the ... ♘xf2 threat. He evidently knew about the Exchange sacrifice in the 15 ... ♘xg4 16 ♖dg1! ♘xf2 line that Black dodged earlier.

Once White focused on 18 ♖dg1 here it wasn't that hard to visualize the next diagram.

**18 ♖dg1! ♘xf2**

And it wasn't hard for Black to see that 18 ... f5 would allow 19 gxf6 ♘xf6? 20 ♗xh6.

Better is 19 ... ♖xf6 20 ♖xg4 ♕a1+ 21 ♕b1 ♕xb1+ 22 ♔xb1 ♖xf3. But 23 ♗xh6 is a superior endgame for White.

**19 ♕e2 ♘xh1 20 gxh6**



*Black to move*

Black underestimated the attack. So do some computers. For example, 20 ... ♖fd8 21 ♖xg7+ ♔f8 looks good to engines until they consider 22 ♘e5!.

Then 22 ... ♖xd4 23 ♖xf7+ ♔g8 24 h7+ allows mate. And 23 ... ♔e8 loses to 24 h7.

**20 ... ♗f6! 21 hxg7 ♖fd8 22 h6!**



*Black to move*

Once again, there were very few ways for White to go wrong. He was down a rook so he had to look for ways to make threats. His move prepares 23 h7+ ♔xh7 24 ♕h2+ and mates.

Black should throw material back with 22 ... ♖xd4! 23 h7+ ♔xh7 because the rook can be used to block, 24 ♕h2+ ♖h4! 25 ♘xh4 ♕xb2+ with a powerful counterattack (26 ♔d1 ♕b3+ 27 ♔e1 ♗e5! 28 ♕xe5 ♕b1+ 29 ♔e2 ♕xg1 or 28 ♕xh1 ♗g3+).

Black would win after 24 ♖xh1+? ♔g8 25 ♕h2 ♖xc4+.

But White comes out ahead after 24 g8(♕)+! ♖xg8 25 ♖xh1+ and now:

(a) 25 ... ♖h4 26 ♖xh4+ ♗xh4 27 ♕e4+ and 28 ♕xh4(+),

(b) 25 ... ♗h4? 26 ♘xd4 (26 ... ♕a1+ 27 ♔c2 ♕xh1? 28 ♕h5+ and mates), or

(c) 25 ... ♔g7 26 ♗h6+ ♔h7 27 ♗f8+ ♖h4 28 ♖xh4+ ♗xh4 29 ♕d3+!.

But that's a lot better than what happened.

**22 ... ♘f2?**

This may have been the hardest point in the game for White. He must have looked at 23 ♕xf2 and realized after 23 ... ♕xc4+ 24 ♗c3 he threatens 25 h7+ ♔xh7 26 ♕h2+.

There is only one defense, 24 ... ♕d3. White would still have fuel for his attack, 25 ♘e1 ♕f5 26 h7+!.

But rather than try to work that line further, it makes more sense to look at an alternative at move 23. There was only one.

**23 h7+! ♔xh7 24 ♕xf2 ♕xc4+ 25 ♗c3**



*Black to move*

White's threats include 26 ♕h2+ and 26 ♘d2.

**25 ... ♔g8 26 ♕h2 ♗xg7 27 ♕g2 ♔f8 28 ♕xg7+ ♔e7 29 ♘e5 ♕a4 30 ♕xf7+ ♔d6**

White could finish off with 31 ♘c4+ ♕xc4 32 ♕f4+ and a rook check. A second, but longer, forced mate begins with 31 ♖g5. White found the prettiest finish.

**31 ♖g7 ♖ac8 32 ♕d7+! Black resigned.**

# *Chapter Four:*
# One, But A Lion

This chapter's title was inspired by a story the great annotator Hans Kmoch recalled when he analyzed Game 31. Kmoch cited the tale handed down from Aesop of how the lioness was confronted by the lesser animals.

If you are truly the queen of beasts, why do you have so few children, she was asked.

It is true, she said, that I have only one child at a time. But that one is a lion.

The rabbits who find themselves at or near the bottom of a tournament crosstable may win only one game. But if that victory is against the tournament winner, a rabbit can be as proud as a lioness.

## *31*

## Herbert Seidman – William Lombardy

### US Championship, New York 1968

### *Sicilian Defense, Najdorf Variation B90*

Herbert Seidman played well in eight previous US Championships. But in 1968, at age 48, he was headed for last place in his final championship. He managed only one draw and one win out of 11 games. Two of his losses didn't reach move 24.

But his one victim was William Lombardy, who had been among the world's top two dozen players just a few years before. He outrated Seidman by more than 200 points.

As you play over the moves you might feel that Seidman didn't just want to win. He wanted to play the brilliancy of his career. Unfortunately, Black didn't allow him to demonstrate the prettiest possibilities. We'll have to appreciate the might-have-been mates in the notes.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♘xd4 ♘f6 5 ♘c3 a6 6 ♗d3**

White's last move is very rare. Black's crafty reply transposes – temporarily – into a Dragon Variation, an opening in which White's bishop is usually misplaced on d3.

**6 ... g6 7 0-0 ♗g7 8 ♔h1 ♕c7 9 f4**

This transposes back into the Najdorf Variation, to a position more commonly reached via 6 f4 ♕c7 7 ♗d3 g6 8 0-0 ♗g7 9 ♔h1.

White's usual plan, after 9 ... 0-0, is to mass his forces on the kingside with ♕e1-h4 and perhaps f4-f5/♗h6.

**9 ... e5 10 fxe5 dxe5**



*White to move*

Black often plays ... e5 in the 6 f4 variation and White responds with ♘f3. The pawn exchange on e5 is unusual and based on tactics.

**11 ♗g5!**

Now 11 ... exd4? 12 ♗xf6 ♗xf6? 13 ♘d5 loses quickly and 12 ... dxc3 13 ♗xg7 favors White.

**11 ... ♘bd7 12 ♘b3**

White's plan is ♕e2 followed by doubling rooks on the f-file.

**12 ... h6 13 ♗h4 b6**

But Black must have feared 13 ... b5 14 a4! b4 and now 15 ♘a2 ♖b8 16 c3 – or 15 ♘d5!, as in the game.

For example, 15 ♘d5! ♘xd5 16 exd5 0-0 allows 17 ♗e7 ♖e8 18 d6 to place a powerful vice deep in Black's camp.

If 16 ... ♕d6 (instead of 16 ... 0-0), then 17 ♘d2 works better than in the game (17 ... ♕xd5? 18 ♗e4 or 17 ... 0-0 18 ♘e4 ♕xd5 19 ♗e7 ♖e8 20 ♗xb4 with good play).

Another hint of how much tactical energy lies below the surface is 16 ... ♗b7 17 d6 ♕xd6? 18 ♗c4! (18 ... ♕xd1 19 ♗xf7+ ♔f8 20 ♖axd1, winning).

Or 17 ♕f3 f5 (17 ... 0-0? 18 ♗e7) 18 ♗xf5!.

**14 ♘d5! ♘xd5 15 exd5**

White might have been thinking about a brilliancy prize when he spotted 15 ... 0-0 16 ♗e7! ♖e8 17 d6. Then 17 ... ♕b7? 18 ♗c4 loses quickly.

But what about 17 ... ♕c6 ?



*White to move*

The answer is the stunning 18 ♖xf7!! ♔xf7 19 ♕f3+! ♕xf3 20 ♗c4+ and mate next.

If Black tries 18 ... ♗b7 instead of 18 ... ♔xf7, White replies 19 ♕g4!. Then 19 ... ♕xg2+ 20 ♕xg2 ♗xg2+ 21 ♔xg2 ♔xf7 is once again 22 ♗c4 mate.

It gets better: If Black plays 18 ... e4, he would win against any move – except 18 ♕g4!.

For example, 19 ... exd3 20 ♕xg6 is a mate and 19 ... ♘f8 loses to either 20 ♕xe4 or 20 ♗xe4.

The crucial test of 18 ... e4 19 ♕g4 is 19 ... ♘e5. Then comes 20 ♕xe4! (20 ... ♔xf7 21 ♕xc6 ♘xc6 22 ♗c4+ ♗e6 23 ♖f1+ ♔g8 24 ♗xe6+ and 25 ♗d5 or 25 ♗d7).

**15 ... ♕d6**



*White to move*

**16 ♘d2?**

White saw 16 ♕f3! with its threat of ♕xf7 mate.

And he was a good enough tactician to figure out some of the spectacular consequences, such as 16 ... f5 17 ♗xf5! ♖f8 18 ♘d4! and wins (18 ... exd4 19 ♗xg6+ or 19 ♕a3 followed by 20 ♖ae1+).

Another brilliancy prize finish would have been 16 ... ♖f8 17 ♘d2! ♗b7 (17 ... f5 18 ♘c4 ♕b8 19 ♕g3) 18 ♘e4 ♕xd5? 19 ♗c4! and White wins the queen or mates.

So why did he reject 16 ♕f3 ? Probably because 16 ... 0-0 17 ♗e7 ♕xe7 18 d6 ♕xd6 19 ♕xa8 ♘c5 wouldn't be easy to win. This allows Goliath to start turning the tables.

**16 ... 0-0 17 ♕e2 f5!**



*White to move*

If White runs out of tactics, Black will take over the center with ... e4. For example, 18 c4 e4! or 18 ♗c4 ♔h8 19 ♗b3 b5 and ... ♗b7.

White's reply is a pawn sacrifice. It's not quite sound but the alternatives are worse.

**18 ♘c4! ♕xd5 19 ♘e3**

White gets the use of the b3-g8 diagonal for his bishop, the d-file for his rooks and d5 for his knight. But it might not be enough after 19 ... ♕c5!.

For example, 20 ♗f2 e4 21 ♘d5! ♕d6 22 ♗c4 ♔h7 23 ♖ad1 ♕b8 and his compensation is skimpy.

**19 ... ♕d6 20 ♖ad1 ♕b8 21 ♗e7 ♖e8 22 ♗d6! ♕a7**

Of course, 22 ... ♕xd6?? 23 ♗c4+ and 24 ♖xd6 ends the game.

**23 ♗c4+ ♔h7**



*White to move*

**24 ♗f7**

White could also have won the Exchange with 24 ♘d5 and 25 ♘c7 because 24 ... ♖h8 25 ♘c7 ♖b8 26 ♘e6 ♖a8 would allow 27 ♘xg7 and wins.

But White would probably prefer the the brilliancy prize finish, 27 ♖xf5! gxf5? 28 ♘g5+! and mates.

**24 ... ♘f6**

And the reason he chose 24 ♗f7 was probably because 24 ... ♖h8? would have another pretty killer, 25 ♗xg6+! ♔xg6 26 ♘xf5 and wins.

**25 ♗xe8 ♘xe8 26 ♗xe5!**

If it weren't for this shot, Black might have escaped with some compensation for the lost Exchange.

**26 ... ♗xe5 27 ♘c4 ♗g7 28 ♕xe8 ♕c7 29 ♘xb6!?**

With 28 ♖d6! he could have forced quick resignation (29 ... ♕xc4 30 ♕xg6+ or 29 ... g5 30 ♖fd1 ♕xc4? 31 ♕g6+ and ♖d8+). The rest was uneventful:

**29 ... ♕xb6 30 ♖d8 ♗e6 31 ♖xa8 h5 32 ♖d8 ♗c4 33 ♖e1 ♕xb2 34 ♖d6 ♗f6 35 ♕f8 ♗g7 36 ♕e8 ♗f6 37 h4 ♔g7? 38 ♖d7+! ♔h6 39 ♕e3+ Black resigned.**

There was nothing left after 39 ... g5 40 hxg5+ ♗xg5 41 ♖d6+.

## *32*

# Anatoly Karpov – Wolfram Hartmann

## Hannover 1983

### *Sicilian Defense, Keres Attack B81*

World Champion Anatoly Karpov outrated his opponent by more than 400 points in this game. He finished clear first in the tournament while Wolfram Hartmann tied for last. But you wouldn't be able to tell that from this first-round enounter.

How did Black manage this upset? By dragging his opponent out of his comfort zone.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♘xd4 ♘f6 5 ♘c3 e6 6 g4**

Karpov had a remarkably solid opening repertoire. But one quirk was his fondness for the super-sharp Keres Attack, rather than the more Karpovian ♗e2. Yet it was hard to argue with his success.

**6 ... a6 7 g5 ♘fd7 8 ♗g2 ♘c6 9 a4**

White's last move was original. It restrained Black on the queenside (no ... b5) compared with the more mate-minded approaches, such as 8 f4 followed by ♗e3, h2-h4 and ♕g4.

**9 ... ♗e7 10 h4 h6!?**

Black comes up with his own novel approach. He will try to prove, with a temporary pawn sacrifice, that White is over-extended on the kingside.

For example, 11 g6? ♘xd4 12 ♕xd4 0-0! 13 gxf7+ ♖xf7 and Black is better.

Neither player could have guessed at this point how big a role the h-pawns would play.

**11 gxh6 g6**

Not 11 ... gxh6? 12 ♘xe6! fxe6 13 ♕h5+ with a ferocious attack.



*White to move*

**12 ♘f3**

Some computers love White's position after 12 h5 g5 and then 13 ♘xc6 bxc6 14 f4. Other engines prefer Black following 14 ... gxf4 15 ♗xf4 e5, with ... ♗h4+ and ... ♖b8 on tap.

Karpov plays conservatively, or at least as conservatively as the position will permit. He protects the h4-pawn and may be planning ♗g5.

**12 ... ♘de5! 13 ♘g5!?**

We are heading into a middlegame in which neither king will castle quickly, if at all.

Black might be happy to play 13 ♘xe5 ♘xe5 14 ♕e2 ♗d7 15 ♗e3 ♖c8 followed by ... ♘c4. Then he can pick off the h4-pawn and perhaps the h6-pawn as well. Karpov avoids that with the kind of little maneuver he was famous for.

**13 ... f6 14 ♘h3 ♗f8 15 f4 ♘f7 16 ♗e3 ♕a5 17 ♕d2**

White's middlegame goal is to attack the pawns at g6 and e6.

**17 ... ♘xh6 18 ♘f2 ♗d7 19 ♗f3 0-0-0 20 0-0-0**

He is preparing ♖dg1 or h4-h5. For example, 20 ... ♔b8 21 h5 gxh5 22 ♖xh5 ♕c7 allows 23 f5!, threatening ♗xh6.

White would be clearly better after 23 ... ♘f7 24 ♖xh8 ♘xh8 25 ♗g4 because ... exf5 or ... e5 will allow a strong ♘d5.

**20 ... ♗e8**

Black said after the game that his plan was ... ♖h7 followed by ... b5 and ... ♖b7! to attack the queenside – a remarkable conception.

**21 h5!**



*Black to move*

But White comes first, with a threat of 22 hxg6 ♗xg6 23 f5!.

He would regain the pawn after 21 ... gxh5 22 ♕e2 with f4-f5 again in mind, e.g. 22 ... ♗e7 23 f5! exf5 24 ♘d5! with a growing edge.

Black can stop that with 21 ... gxh5 22 ♕e2 f5 and 23 ♗xh5 ♗g7. But he opts for something even more likely to take Karpov out of his comfort zone.

**21 ... d5!? 22 exd5 ♘f5 23 ♕e1?!**

And it works. White calculated 23 hxg6 ♖xh1 but underestimated 24 ♘xh1!.

That point is that 24 ... ♗xg6 25 ♕f2! is possible, with a threat of ♗b6. Then comes 25 ... ♘xe3 26 ♕xe3 exd5 27 ♕e6+ with advantage.

**23 ... ♘b4 24 dxe6 ♖xd1+ 25 ♗xd1?!**

This time he misjudged another recapture by that knight, 25 ♘fxd1!, which allows the f3-bishop to keep control of the h1-a8 diagonal.



*Black to move*

**25 ... ♗c6! 26 ♖g1**

Karpov discovered that staying on the h-file (26 ♖h3) would allow 26 ... ♘a2+! since 27 ♘xa2 hangs the queen.

He would have to play 27 ♔b1 ♘xc3+ 28 ♕xc3 ♕xc3 29 bxc3 and try to defend after 29 ... ♘xe3 30 ♖xe3 ♗c5 31 ♖e2 gxh5. Amazingly, it is the Black h-pawn that wins many of the potential endgames.

But 26 ♘fe4! (instead of 26 ♖h3) would have avoided all trouble. Was Karpov having a blind spot about this knight?

More likely, he was just finding it hard to deal with the increasing instability in his position. He will have at least three opportunities to create chaos when he needs it. But to take advantage of them he will have to play like a David.

**26 ... gxh5 27 ♔b1 ♘xe3 28 ♕xe3 ♗c5 29 ♕e1 ♕b6 30 ♖f1**

It was time for desperate measures, such as 30 a5!. It's based on 30 ... ♕a7?! 31 ♘ce4 ♗xe4 32 ♘xe4 ♗xg1 33 ♕xb4 when White is suddenly better.

**30 ... f5 31 ♘d3?**

And here 32 e7! was necessary (32 ... ♖e8 33 ♕e6+).

**32 ... ♘xd3 32 cxd3 ♗g2**



*White to move*

White could resign with good conscience after 33 ♕e5? ♗d4.

Instead, he had one last throw of the tactical dice, 33 ♘d5! ♗xd5 34 ♕c3. That would threaten both 35 ♕xh8+ and 35 d4.

White would be worse after 35 ... ♖h7 36 d4 ♕b4 37 ♕xc5+ ♕xc5 38 dxc5 ♗xe6 but not clearly lost.

**33 a5? ♕d6! 34 ♖f2 ♗xf2 35 ♕xf2 ♗c6 36 ♗b3 h4!**

White is lost because he can't blockade the h-pawn for long (37 ♔c2 h3 38 ♕h2 ♖h4 39 ♘e2 ♗b5). The rest:

**37 ♕a7 h3 38 e7 h2! 39 ♗e6+ ♕xe6 40 ♕a8+ ♔d7 41 ♕xh8 h1(♕)+ White resigned.**

## *33*

# Jan Fabian – Lubomir Kavalek

### Czechoslovakian Championship, Jablonec 1962

### *Pirc Defense, Fianchetto Variation B06*

This tournament was one of Lubomir ("Lubos" pronounced Lubosh) Kavalek's first successes, at age 18. He scored 12½-4½ – or 9½ points more than Jan Fabian, who finished in last place.

In four other games they played over the years, Fabian only managed one draw. What made this game different? Let's see.

**1 e4 g6 2 d4 ♗g7 3 ♘c3 d6 4 ♘ge2 ♘f6 5 g3**

The Modern Defense move order (1 ... g6) was still being labeled "Irregular Opening" in theoretical journals when this game was played. White adopts a cautious-looking approach by overprotecting his e4-pawn.

**5 ... 0-0 6 ♗g2 e5 7 h3 ♘c6 8 ♗e3 ♗d7**

White's development has taken away almost every active plan for Black.

Bent Larsen later played 8 ... ♖e8, which discourages 9 ♕d2 by means of 9 ... exd4 10 ♘xd4 ♘xd4 11 ♗xd4 ♗f5 12 f3 d5.

But 9 d5! would be more problematic for Black than it is in the game. For example, 9 ... ♘e7 10 ♕d2 c6 11 dxc6 bxc6 and then 12 0-0-0 d5 13 exd5 cxd5 14 g4!.

**9 d5! ♘e7 10 ♕d2**



*Black to move*

Suddenly White isn't playing conservatively at all. After he castles queenside he will have a choice of two ambitious middlegame plans: He can go for mate (with g3-g4, ♘g3 and g4-g5) or blast open the center with f2-f4.

Where does that leave Black? In early trouble. He could try to justify ... ♗d7 with 10 ... b5 and shoot for ... b4/... a5. For example, 11 0-0 b4 12 ♘d1 c5.

**10 ... c6? 11 dxc6 ♗xc6**

Black prepares to equalize with 12 ... d5 or to activate his poorly placed e7-knight with 12 ... ♘f5 (13 exf5 ♗xg2).

**12 0-0-0 ♘f5**

The opening has granted White a choice of middlegame policies. He can play in the center or the kingside. The passive defense against 13 ♕xd6 is 12 ... ♘e8 but then 13 g4 or 13 h4 grow stronger.

The move he chose is more in the spirit of the opening but it means that White will be looking for a favorable moment for exf5.



*White to move*

**13 ♗g5**

Black would like to play 13 ... h6 and prompt 14 ♗xf6 ♕xf6 followed by 15 ... ♘d4!.

But that would give White his moment for 14 exf5!. For instance, 14 ... hxg5 15 ♗xc6 bxc6 16 fxg6 (16 ... fxg6 17 ♕xd6) or 14 ... ♗xg2 15 ♖h2 ♗f3 16 ♗xh6 costs a pawn.

Better, in the last variation, is 15 ... hxg5, although Black is plainly worse after 16 ♖xg2 (16 ... gxf5 17 ♕xg5).

**13 ... ♕a5 14 ♔b1 ♕a6**

Black had to do something about 15 ♗xf6 ♗xf6 16 ♘d5.

**15 ♖he1 ♖fd8**

He was looking for a chance to play ... ♘d4. For example, 15 ... ♘d4 16 ♘xd4 exd4 17 ♕xd4? ♘xe4!.

But 17 ♘d5! (instead of 17 ♕xd4?) leads to a position that is easy for a David to play. A favorable continuation is 17 ... ♘xd5 18 exd5 ♗a4 and now not 19 ♗h6? d3! but 19 b3 followed by ♗h6.

**16 h4 b5**



*White to move*

Black had to act before White made kingside progress with 17 h5 or prompted a favorable endgame with 17 ♕d3.

In fact, 17 ♕d3 is still good. But White has a more forcing alternative.

**17 exf5!? ♗xg2 18 fxg6 hxg6 19 ♗xf6! ♗xf6 20 ♘d5 ♗xd5**

Black couldn't allow 21 ♘xf6+ or 21 ♘c7. After White's next move he threatened to dominate the center with 22 ♘c3 and 23 ♘e4.

**21 ♕xd5 b4!**

White's knight is kept out of the center for the time being and his kingside attack is slow (22 ♕f3 ♗g7 23 h5 gxh5 24 ♕xh5 ♖ac8 and ... d5).

**22 h5!**



*Black to move*

**22 ... ♔g7?**

For better or worse, 22 ... gxh5! had to be played. Black's pieces would come alive after 23 ♕f3 d5! 24 ♖xd5 ♖xd5 25 ♕xd5 ♖d8 or 24 ♕xh5 ♕c4 and ... ♖ac8.

More dangerous – from a Goliath's point of view – would be 23 g4 and 23 ... hxg4 24 ♘g3. For instance, 24 ... ♕c8 25 ♘e4 ♗e7 26 ♖h1 ♕e6 27 ♖dg1!.

He certainly wouldn't want to have to calculate 23 ... h4 24 g5! ♗xg5 25 ♖g1 (25 ... ♕xe2?? 26 ♖xg5+ ♔f8 27 ♖f5).

**23 h6+! ♔g8**

It seems like the point of White's last move was 23 ... ♔xh6?? 24 ♕xf7 resigns. After 23 ... ♔g8 White can no longer open the h-file. But the possibility of h6-h7+ creates tactics later down the road.

**24 g4 ♖ac8 25 ♘g3 ♖c5 26 ♕b3**

More accurate is 26 ♕f3! because 26 ... d5 would be refuted by 27 ♘e4.

**26 ... d5**



*White to move*

**27 ♘e4?**

As strong as this looks, it could have been improved by the insertion of 27 g5!.

Then 27 ... ♗xg5 28 ♘e4! would fork the bishop and rook (28 ... dxe4 29 ♖xd8+ ♗xd8 30 h7+! ♔g7 31 h8(♕)+! ♔xh8 32 ♕xf7 is lost).

Black could try 27 ... ♗h8 (instead of 27 ... ♗xg5). But again White would win with 28 ♘e4! because of the h-pawn, e.g. 28 ... ♖c4 29 h7+ ♔xh7 30 ♖h1+ ♔g8 31 ♖xh8+! ♔xh8 32 ♕h3+ ♔g8 33 ♕h6!.

Another pretty finish would have been 29 ... ♔f8 30 ♘f6! ♗xf6 31 gxf6 ♕xf6 32 ♕xc4! dxc4 33 ♖xd8+ ♕xd8 34 h8(♕)+.

**27 ... ♖c4 28 ♘f6+ ♕xf6 29 ♖xd5! ♖xg4 30 a3? bxa3?**

Time pressure leaves fingerprints. White should have traded rooks first (30 ♖xd8+ and 31 a3) because he allowed Black to seize the upper hand with 30 ... ♖xd5! 31 ♕xd5 bxa3.

**31 ♖xd8+ ♕xd8 32 ♕xa3**



*Black to move*

White figures his queenside pawns will win after 33 ♕xa7.

Now 32 ... ♕c7?? loses quickly to 33 h7+! ♔xh7 34 ♕h3+. Also lost is 32 ... ♕d4 33 ♖h1 with a threat of 34 h7+.

But 32 ... ♖e4! was a better try (33 ♖xe4 ♕d1+ 34 ♔a2 ♕d5+).

**32 ... ♕d2 33 ♖xe5**

White misses one last chance to make the h-pawn a hero, 33 h7+! ♔xh7 34 ♕h3+ ♔g8 35 ♖h1! followed by mate or ♕xg4.

**33 ... ♖g1+ 34 ♔a2 ♕xc2? 35 ♖e8+ Resigns**

It's mate after 35 ... ♔h7 36 ♖h8+! ♔xh8 38 ♕f8+. Black could have put up resistance with 34 ... ♕xh6!.

## *34*

# Tadeuzs Drelinkiewicz – Jiri Fichtl

### Wroclaw 1971

### *Orangutan Opening A00*

This David only managed one draw in his other ten games in this tournament. Black, on the hand, won six games and drew four en route to first prize. In this game he is a victim of rising expectations.

He had little trouble equalizing in the opening and had good reason to expect that his position would get better and better. His optimism was tested – and betrayed him – when he had to decide whether to eliminate his only weakness, a backward c-pawn.

**1 b4**

This was jokingly dubbed the Orangutan Opening after Savielly Tartakower played it at New York 1924 and explained that he had been inspired by a visit to the simian house at the Bronx Zoo.

In the Soviet era, chess authorities in the USSR renamed many openings after Russian and Soviet players. When a master named Alexey Sokolsky wrote a monograph about 1 b4 in 1963, his countrymen began to name it after him.

Shortly after that, Grandmaster Alexander Kotov spotted Sokolsky at a tournament and told him a joke:

"Two apes are sitting in a zoo and playing chess. One of them opens 1 b4 and wins. The other says, 'It doesn't matter. It will be still called the Sokolsky Opening.'"

**1 ... d5 2 ♗b2 ♘f6 3 e3 e6 4 b5**

In fact, this could be called the Drelinkiewicz Opening – because he is the most successful 1 b4 player on record. Databases give six of his 1 b4 games in tournaments: He won all six.



*Black to move*

In the 1976 Polish Championship, Drelinkiewicz tried it against the much stronger Zbigniew Doda, who responded 4 ... ♗e7 5 ♘f3 0-0.

Black was a bit worse after 6 c4 c6 7 ♘c3 cxb5 8 cxb5 ♘bd7 9 ♗e2 ♘e4 10 ♖c1 because of the cramping effect of the b5-pawn.

**4 ... ♗d6 5 c4 ♘bd7 6 ♘f3 0-0 7 ♘c3 ♕e7**

Black adopts pragmatism in an unfamiliar opening: Develop solidly, put your pieces and pawns on good squares and you're bound to be OK. This time pragmatism succeeds.

**8 cxd5? exd5 9 ♕b3 c6 10 ♗e2 ♘c5**

White provoked ... c6 to create a backward pawn on a half-open file that must be weak. But the pawn trade on d5 has eased Black's game considerably.

**11 ♕c2 ♗d7 12 a4 ♖fe8 13 0-0 ♖ac8 14 bxc6 bxc6**

Black had equalized by move 12. He could have bid for more with 14 ... ♖xc6! and ... ♘ce4.

That's a good anti-David strategy because it denies White an obvious middlegame plan. By recapturing on c6 with a pawn, he gave White a target.

**15 ♗a3! ♗g4 16 d4 ♘ce4 17 ♗xd6 ♕xd6 18 ♖fc1**



*Black to move*

Black is in a familiar predicament for Goliaths. He should eliminate his only weakness with 18 ... c5! in view of 19 ♘b5 ♕b6 20 dxc5 ♖xc5.

But that would almost certainly lead to trades of rooks and increase the possibility of a draw. Instead, he prepares a ... ♘xf2 sacrifice.

**18 ... ♕e7? 19 ♗a6! ♖c7 20 ♘e5 ♗c8**

Once again, there was a safer alternative. Black would be a bit worse after 20 ... ♘xc3 21 ♕xc3 c5! (22 ♘xg4 ♘xg4 23 dxc5? ♕h4 or 23 ♗e2 ♘f6 24 dxc5 ♘e4 and ... ♖xc5).

**21 ♘xe4 ♗xa6?**

This lands Black in serious trouble. He had to play 21 ... ♘xe4 since 22 ♗xc8 ♖exc8 or 22 ♗b5 ♗b7 23 ♖ab1 ♖ec8 is solid. Solid, but offering no winning chances.

**22 ♘g5!**

A good alternative is 22 ♘c5 when Black has a problem bishop and a problem c-pawn. However, White can force matters now with the threat of 23 ♘gxf7.

Black apparently counted on 22 ... h6 23 ♘gxf7 ♖f8 followed by ... ♖xf7. What he overlooked was 24 ♘h8! and the knight escapes (24 ... ♔xh8?? 25 ♘g6+).

**22 ... ♕d6 23 ♘gxf7 ♖xf7 24 ♘xf7 ♔xf7 25 ♕xc6 ♕xc6 26 ♖xc6 ♗c4**

This is generally what White had in mind when he chose 22 ♘g5. The rook and two pawns should be better than the two minor pieces, particularly since White can create a passed a-pawn or d-pawn (after f2-f3 and e3-e4).

He should try to trade rooks, e.g. 27 ♖c7+ ♖e7 28 ♖xe7+ ♔xe7 29 ♖b1 a6 30 ♖b7+ ♘d7 31 f3. The minor pieces have difficulty fighting the passers.

**27 ♖b1 ♖e7 28 f3!?**



*Black to move*

Now this move is a throw of the dice. White threatens 29 e4 and 30 e5 (29 ... dxe4? 30 ♖xc4). But it's a risky throw because he is letting Black's rook become very active.

**28 ... ♖xe3! 29 ♖b7+? ♔g6 30 ♖xa7 ♖d3?**

Black gambles, too. Thanks to White's using the wrong rook (29 ♖c7+!), Black could have played 30 ... ♖e1+! 31 ♔f2 ♖e2+.

Then White would have nothing better than allowing a perpetual check (32 ♔g1 ♖e1+) because 32 ♔g3 ♖d2 or 32 ... ♖a2 gives Black dangerous play (... ♗f1 or ... ♔f5/... g5/... ♘h5+).

Instead, Black wants his own passed pawn (... ♖xd4) and a way to trade off kingside pawns.

**31 h4 h5 32 ♖cc7 ♖xd4 33 ♖g7+ ♔h6 34 ♖gc7 ♖xh4**

Here's Black's new problem. He needed to capture on h4 to enable him to push his h-pawn. But now his rook is offside and can't stop the a-pawn.

**35 ♖c6 ♔g6 36 ♖e7 ♖f4**

The rook has to defend the knight (36 ... ♔g5? 37 ♖g7+ ♔h6 38 ♖f7 wins).

**37 a5! h4 38 a6 ♗xa6 39 ♖xa6 h3**

The Exchange-up endgame is not an easy win.

**40 ♖d6 hxg2 41 ♔xg2 ♔f5 42 ♖d8 ♖a4 43 ♖f8 ♖a6 44 ♔g3 ♖d6 45 f4 ♔g6 46 ♔f3**



*Black to move*

White has three ways to win. One is to trade rooks because then his king can advance with impunity. A second way is to tempt Black to push his pawn too far.

The third way is checkmate. For example, 46 ... ♔f5 47 ♖e5+ ♔g6 48 ♖g5+ ♔h6? 49 ♖h8+ ♘h7 50 ♖g1! ♖d7 (else 51 ♖h1+ wins the knight) 51 ♖hg8! threatens 52 ♖h1 mate.

**46 ... d4 47 ♖ff7 ♖d5 48 ♖g7+ ♔h6 49 ♖g1 d3 50 ♖e5!**

Now 50 ... ♖d6 51 ♖eg5! and mates.

**50 ... d2 51 ♖xd5 ♘xd5 52 ♖d1 Black resigned.**

## *35*

# Alexander Kuindzhy – Derek Thomson

### World Junior Championship, The Hague 1961

### *King's Gambit Accepted C34*

Almost no one outside of the Soviet Union had heard of Alexander Kuindzhy before he arrived in The Hague to represent the USSR in the 1961 World Junior.

Few fans expected him to win. No Soviet player had won the under-20 championship since Boris Spassky in 1955 (and none would do it until Anatoly Karpov in 1969). But Kuindzhy looked like a champion when he beat the tournament's better known contenders Bruno Parma, Florin Gheorghiu and Vlastimil Jansa.

His downfall was this game, when he lost to the Scottish entrant, Derek Thomson, who managed only two draws and this win in the finals.

**1 e4 e5 2 f4 exf4 3 ♘f3 ♘f6 4 e5 ♘h5 5 ♕e2**

The last moves by each player look odd but make sense:

Black hopes to hold onto the f4-pawn in a better way than 4 ... ♘d5 (5 c4 ♘b6 6 d4 d6 7 exd6).

White's queen move, an idea of Paul Keres', is the sharpest test of 4 ... ♘h5. One reason is that it discourages 5 ... d5? (6 exd6+).

**5 ... g5 6 g4!**



*Black to move*

The other reason for 5 ♕e2 is to prepare this bayonet thrust.

After 6 ... fxg3 7 d4 White would threaten 8 ♗xg5 and have good chances – against a David – following 7 ... ♗e7 8 ♘c3.

Computers want to look at 7 ... g4 8 ♘g5 h6 instead. But after some additional implausible moves, 9 ♘e4 ♕h4 10 ♔d1! ♘c6 11 ♕g2! and hxg3, White's play would be vindicated.

**6 ... ♘g7! 7 h4 ♗e7 8 d4 d6**

Black threatens ... ♗xg4 and can meet 9 ♗h3 with 9 ... h5!.

**9 hxg5 ♗xg4**

Black finds repeated ways in this game to remind White that he, too, has a king. For instance, a natural continuation is 10 ♖g1 ♗xf3 11 ♕xf3. After 11 ... ♘e6! someone who plays the King's Gambit as White may feel uncomfortable pawn-grabbing.

That is, he would have to find an alternative to 12 ♕xb7 ♘xd4! 13 ♕xa8 ♘xc2+ 14 ♔f2 dxe5! and 13 ... ♗c5+. Or 14 ♔d1 ♘xa1 15 ♗b5+ ♔f8.

**10 ♕e4 ♗f5**

Here again 10 ... ♘e6 may be best because 10 ... ♗f5 11 ♕xb7! ♘d7 12 ♘bc3 would have offered White better chances than in the game.

**11 ♕xf4 ♗xc2!**

Black doesn't just want an extra pawn. This capture helps discourage 0-0-0.

**12 ♘c3 d5 13 ♗h3 ♘c6**



*White to move*

Black has a solid position, with ... ♘e6 and ... ♗g6 coming up. The onus is on White to prove he has compensation.

In a similar situation, a celebrated Spassky-Fischer game, also a King's Gambit, White played as if being a pawn down was irrelevant. This sometimes works against timid Davids. (See Black's 17th move.)

**14 0-0 ♘e6 15 ♕h2 ♗g6 16 ♗xe6 fxe6 17 ♘h4**

White had to act before Black's king flees, after ... ♕d7 and ... 0-0-0.

The threat of 18 ♘xg6 is designed to tempt Black into complications such as 17 ... ♗d3! 18 ♖f6!? ♗xf6 19 exf6.

That Exchange sacrifice isn't sound – but something like it was necessary. Routine moves would doom White.

**17 ... ♗f7? 18 ♕f4 0-0 19 ♕g4!**

White's bluff is beginning to pay off. He would still be lost after 19 ... ♕e8 20 ♖f6!? ♔h8 21 ♖h6 ♖g8 but with more hope than a few moves ago.

**19 ... ♔h8? 20 g6!**

Black underestimated this. He would lose after 20 ... hxg6?? 21 ♖xf7! ♖xf7 22 ♘xg6+ ♔h7? 23 ♕h5+. Or 21 ... ♗xh4 22 ♖xf8+ ♕xf8 23 ♕xh4+.

**20 ... ♗xg6 21 ♘xg6+ hxg6**



*White to move*

White can complete a remarkable comeback with 22 ♕h3+! ♔g8 23 ♕xe6+ ♔g7 24 ♘xd5.

Black has 24 ... ♖xf1+ 25 ♔xf1+ ♕h8 with a threat of ... ♕h1+ followed by the entrance of a rook at f8 or h8.

That would lead to a perpetual check after 26 ♔g2 ♕h5! and then ... ♕e2+.

If White tries for more with 26 ♔g1? he allows a powerful 26 ... ♕h4!.

The best winning try is to head into an endgame with 24 ♖xf8 ♕xf8 25 ♕h3 – not 25 ♘xd5? ♕f3! – ♕f5 26 ♕xf5 gxf5. That's an even endgame at best.

Of course, a draw had to be a moral victory for White considering what he faced after 11 ... ♗xc2!.

However, the tournament leader can't afford moral victories. Not if he wants to be a world champion.

**22 ♗h6 ♖f5! 23 ♔g2?**

Now the endgame, 23 ♖xf5 exf5 24 ♕xg6 ♕g8! 25 ♕xg8 ♖xg8+, would favor Black slightly after 26 ♔f1 ♘xd4 27 ♘xd5 ♗g5.

When he rejected the draw, White may have thought he would be winning now with 24 ♘e2 followed by 25 ♘g3 or 25 ♘f4.

**23 ... ♕g8 24 ♘e2 ♖h5 25 ♖h1 ♕h7 26 ♘f4?**

But he overlooked:

**26 ... ♖g8!**



*White to move*

The White bishop is trapped since a capture on h5 loses the queen after 27 ... gxh5.

White should have retreated, 26 ♗d2 or 26 ♗e3, with the idea of 27 ♕xe6. Black would have somewhat the better winning chances after 26 ... ♗h4 27 ♕xe6 ♘e7. But the outcome would be very much in doubt.

The rest is a massacre, presumably played out because of time pressure momentum:

**27 ♘xe6 ♕xh6 28 ♘f4 ♘xd4 29 ♖ad1 c5 30 ♘xd5 ♖h4 31 ♕g3 ♘e2 32 ♕f3 ♕g5+ 33 ♔f2 ♖f8! 34 ♘f6 ♗xf6 35 ♔xe2 ♕xe5+ 36 ♔f1 ♔g7 37 ♖d7+ ♗e7 38 ♕xf8+ ♔xf8 39 ♖xh4 ♗xh4 White resigned.**

## *36*

# Reuben Fine – Arthur Reynolds

### Ostend 1937

### *Nimzo-Indian Defense, Classical Variation E33*

At Ostend 1937 Arthur Reynolds finished last with two draws and one win in his nine games. Reuben Fine tied for first prize and would soon be recognized as one of the world's two or three best players. Yet, rarely had Fine been positionally outplayed as badly as he was by Reynolds.

Six years after this game, Fine was working as a World War II military analyst for the US armed forces. On the other side of the world, Reynolds was a volunteer in the Royal Air Force when he was captured by the

Japanese. He perished when the Japanese transport ship "Suez Maru," heading for Java with him and other British POWs on board, as well as Japanese sailors, was torpedoed by a US submarine.

**1 d4 ♘f6 2 c4 e6 3 ♘c3 ♗b4 4 ♕c2 ♘c6 5 ♘f3 0-0 6 ♗d2 d6 7 a3**

When White goes for the two-bishop advantage, Black's default strategy is to build a pawn center on dark squares, at d6 and e5.

**7 ... ♗xc3 8 ♗xc3 ♖e8**

GM Mikhail Gurevich revived this variation more than half a century later with the idea of a kingside fianchetto by White. He won a quick game from GM Jan Timman at Rotterdam 1990 after 8 ... ♕e7 9 g3 e5 10 d5 ♘d8? 11 ♗g2 ♗g4 12 ♘h4.

**9 ♖d1 ♕e7 10 e3 e5 11 d5**



*Black to move*

Opening the position, 11 dxe5 dxe5, is the knee-jerk option when you have the "2Bs." But 12 ♗e2 ♗g4! and ... e4 would force a trade of bishops that minimizes White's edge.

**11 ... ♘b8 12 ♘d2 ♘bd7 13 e4**

An appealing alternative is 13 b4 to discourage ... ♘c5 and gain space on the side of the board where White has his best chance for an initiative.

But he is falling behind in development. Black would get excellent play from 13 ... a5! 14 bxa5 ♘c5.

For example, 15 ♗e2 ♗d7 (threat of ... ♗a4) 16 ♖c1 ♘g4 17 0-0 ♕h4.

**13 ... ♘h5 14 g3**

Fine's 12th and 13th moves indicated he was expecting a solid positional edge once he castled. But he saw that Black's pieces would be too active after 14 ♗e2 ♘f4 15 ♗f3 ♕g5.

**14 ... f5! 15 exf5 e4!**

This is the kind of position Fine was trying to avoid. If Black gets to play ... ♗xf5 he will have a favorable pawn structure. But it is risky for White to avoid that with 16 ♗h3? ♕g5.

For example, 17 ♘xe4 ♘c5 18 f3 ♘xe4 19 fxe4 ♗xf5 20 ♗xf5 ♕xf5. Black would regain his pawn and have the upper hand after 21 ♖d4 ♘f6 22 ♖f1 ♕g6 23 ♖f4 ♖e7 and ... ♖ae8/... ♘xe4.

**16 ♗e2 ♘df6**

Not 16 ... e3? 17 0-0!.

**17 0-0 ♗xf5**



*White to move*

White can upset the trend with 18 ♗xh5! ♘xh5 19 ♖de1!. His plan would be to double rooks (♖e3 and ♖fe1) and pick off the e-pawn.

If Black defends it with ... ♘f6, White plays ♗xf6. Once White plays ♘xe4 he can protect his knight with f2-f3.

That's the line of thinking Fine would probably have taken against a fellow Goliath. But against a David he relies too long on quiet moves.

**18 ♖fe1? ♕f7 19 ♘f1**

Routine – and bad. It was too risky to go after the pawn now (19 ♗xh5 ♕xh5 20 ♗xf6 gxf6 22 ♖e3 ♗g4 23 ♖de1 f5). But as the game goes, White has very little play, while Black steadily builds up on the kingside.

Black's next move threatens 20 ... e3! and forces another favorable change in the pawn structure.

**19 ... ♘g4! 20 ♘e3 ♘xe3 21 fxe3 ♕g6**

Black's knight is better than the e2-bishop, so 22 ♗xh5 ♕xh5 seems indicated. But that trade is positional bankruptcy because Black would be able to double rooks on the f-file and push his h–pawn (after ... ♕g4 or ... ♕g6). White's remaining bishop just looks like a good piece then.

**22 ♗f1 ♗g4 23 ♖d4**

The rook would be well-placed on d4 only if White can win the e4-pawn. It is misplaced now because it prevents White from trading off Black's knight if it goes to f6 or, as in the game, to e5.

That said, it is getting harder, if not impossible, to suggest any moves that are significantly better than the ones White chooses.

**23 ... ♗f5 24 ♗g2 ♘f6 25 ♖f1 ♘g4! 26 ♗d2 ♘e5**



*White to move*

**27 ♖f4**

When Fine played 19 ♘f1 he probably thought he would have crashed through on the queenside by now with c4-c5. But 27 c5 ♘f3+! shows that the kingside is more important.

For example, 28 ♗xf3 exf3 29 ♕c4 ♗e4 30 cxd6 cxd6 31 ♕c7 h5! 32 ♕xb7 h4 33 ♗e1 ♖ab8 and ... ♖xb2 with a strong initiative.

**27 ... ♘d3 28 ♖f1 h5! 29 ♗c3 ♖e7 30 ♕e2 ♖f8 31 ♕d2 ♖ef7**

You don't have to look at the board to get a sense of what is happening: You can just read White's moves (♕c2-e2-d2, ♗c3-d2-c3, ♖f1-f4-f1) and compare these passes with Black's progress-making moves.

At this point Fine becomes suitably desperate. He had to stop 32 ... h4, e.g. 33 gxh4 ♗h3 34 ♖xf7 ♖xf7 and ... ♖f2.

**32 ♖f4 ♘xf4 33 exf4 h4 34 ♕e3 hxg3 35 hxg3 ♖e7 36 ♖d2 ♗g4 37 ♖f2 ♖fe8 38 ♔h2 ♕f5 39 ♗d4**



*Black to move*

**39 ... g6**

Black's basic winning plan is to trade bishops with ... ♗f3 and invade with his heavy pieces on the h- and/or e-files.

The immediate 39 ... ♗f3 would have worked: 40 ♗xf3 exf3 41 ♕xf3 ♕h7+ 42 ♔g2 ♖e1 43 ♖f1 ♖8e2+ 44 ♗f2 ♖xf1 45 ♔xf1 ♖xb2 and wins.

**40 ♗c3 ♖h7+ 41 ♔g1 ♔f7 42 c5 ♗f3! 43 ♗xf3 exf3 44 ♕xf3 ♕h3**

The threat is 45 ... ♖e3! (46 ♕xe3 ♕h1 mate).

**45 ♗d2 ♖eh8 46 f5**

This makes it easy but the threat was 46 ... ♕f5 and 47 ... ♕b1+.

**46 ... ♕h1+ 47 ♕xh1 ♖xh1+ 48 ♔g2 ♖8h2+ 49 ♔f3 ♖xf2+ 50 ♔xf2 gxf5 51 c6 bxc6 White resigned.**

## *37*

# Ignaz von Popiel – H.E. Atkins

### 13th German Chess Congress, Hannover 1902

### *Sicilian Defense, Four Knights Variation B45*

In the early 20th century, there were times when a last-place finisher beat one of the prize winners in a major event. But it wasn't always a true upset.

For example, Alexander Alekhine lost to the last-placer of Carlsbad 1923. But his opponent was Rudolf Spielmann. Spielmann won five games in the tournament, more than seven players who finished above him in the crosstable. He finished last because he lost 12 games, without a single draw.

What happened at Hannover 1902 was more of a David-vs.-Goliath story.

The relatively obscure Ignaz von Popiel ended up in last place. His opponent in this game finished third, losing only one other game, to Harry Pillsbury.

Black plays some mysterious moves en route to losing. Let's see if we can step into a Goliath's mind and figure out what he was thinking.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 e6 3 ♘c3 ♘c6 4 d4 cxd4 5 ♘xd4 ♘f6 6 ♗e3 ♗b4 7 ♗d3 d5!**



*White to move*

Black has won the battle of the opening: Compare this with the final game of the 1972 Spassky-Fischer match, in which Black had played ... a6 in place of ... ♗b4. Then 7 ... d5! 8 exd5 exd5 gave Black good piece play.

**8 exd5 ♘xd5! 9 ♘xc6 bxc6 10 ♗d2**

This last move looks like a cowardly acceptance of an inferior game (10 ... ♘xc3 11 bxc3 ♗e7). Why didn't White take a risk with 10 0-0 ♘xc3 11 bxc3 ♗xc3 12 ♖b1, you might wonder?

But hold on. After 10 ♗d2 ♘xc3 White can offer a gambit, 11 ♕g4!, based on 11 ... ♘xa2! 12 ♗xb4 ♘xb4 13 ♕xb4. Then he has some compensation in Black's weak pawns and limited bishop.

**10 ... ♗e7**

Fundamental Goliath thinking: Keep as many pieces on the board as you can against Davids. Yes, Black lost a tempo with this retreat. But 10 ♗d2 was also a tempo-losing retreat.

**11 0-0 0-0 12 ♖b1!?**

This looks very cautious but Black was preparing to attack the b2-pawn with 12 ... ♖b8 or 12 ... ♗f6.

For example, 12 ... ♖b8 13 b3? ♗f6 14 ♕e1 ♘b4 15 ♗e4? ♗a6 and Black wins.

**12 ... f5**

Let's step into a Goliath's mind and imagine what prompted him to make such a positionally suspicious move:

"I have good reason to play for a win. After all, I outplayed him by the seventh move," he might say. "His last move stopped one of my ideas, 12 ... ♗f6 and ... ♗xb2, because 13 ♘e4 and ♘xf6+ would deprive me of my better bishop."

"I could play 12 ... e5 instead. But then 13 ♖e1 puts my e-pawn under pressure and I don't like 13 ... ♗d6 14 ♘e4," he might add.

"Hmm, that ♘e4 is a nuisance. Maybe ♗e4 would be, too. What if I play ... f5 ? Then I can play ... ♗f6 or ... ♗d6 or even ... e5-e4."

**13 f4! ♗c5+ 14 ♔h1**



*Black to move*

**14 ... ♖f6**

"Well, White stopped my ... e5 idea. He gave me a chance for 14 ... ♘e3 15 ♗xe3 ♗xe3 and I get the two bishops," he'd be thinking here.

"But then comes 16 ♕f3. To avoid losing material I have to play something like 16 ... ♕b6 17 ♘a4 ♕d4 18 b3 or 17 ... ♕a5 18 ♕xc6. That's bad."

However, Black may have had another thought:

"Ahh! But he also handed me a mating idea. I can play 15 ... ♖h6 and threaten 16 ... ♖xh2+ 17 ♔xh2 ♕h4 mate. Even if White stops that, with my rook on h6 I can continue ... ♗d7-e8-h5 and find a use for that bishop."

**15 ♖f3 ♖h6 16 ♕e2 ♗d7 17 ♖bf1 ♗e8 18 ♖g3 ♕d7 19 ♗c4**

Now or on the last move Black should play the consistent ... ♗h5!. Let's step into Goliath's mind one more time:

"I'd be more or less equal after 19 ... ♗h5. But how do I make progress then? Maybe I should get my QR into the game. The way to do that is ... ♖e8, ... ♗d6 and ... e5!."

"But White will play ♕f3. Then ... e5 with allow ♘xd5!. So I'll post the bishop temporarily at f7."

**19 ... ♗f7 20 ♘d1! ♖e8 21 ♘f2**

Now Black sees that 21 ... ♗d6 22 ♘d3 stops his ... e5 plan indefinitely. White would be the one making progress with 22 ... ♕c7 23 ♕e1 followed by 24 ♗c3 and 25 ♗e5.

Black goes for a new plan, planting a knight on e4.

**21 ... ♗xf2?! 22 ♖xf2 ♘f6 23 ♖f1 ♘e4 24 ♖d3 ♕c7 25 ♗e1?**

The queen is the piece that belonged on e1. White would have the upper hand after 25 ♕e1 e5 26 ♗xf7+ ♕xf7 27 fxe5 ♖he6 28 ♗f4.

**25 ... g5?**

Black could have exploited White's miscue with 25 ... e5! and get a slight edge, 26 ♗xf7+ ♕xf7 27 fxe5 ♖he6! and ... ♖xe5.

**26 ♗g3 g4 27 ♖e3 ♕e7**



*White to move*

Now the threat is 28 ... ♘xg3+ 29 ♖xg3 ♕h4!. But Black has been so focused on his own attacking ideas that he failed to appreciate White's reply.

**28 ♖xe4! fxe4 29 ♕xe4**

The sacrifice must be sound: White threatens to control the board's best diagonal after ♗e1-c3 and create mating ideas with ♕e5.

**29 ... ♕d7 30 ♗e1 ♗g6?**

Black's last chance was to try to close the long diagonal with 30 ... e5 and 31 fxe5 ♗xc4 32 ♕xc4+ ♕e6.

White would have the winning chances after 33 ♕f4, e.g. 33 ... ♖g6 34 ♗h4 and ♗f6 or 33 ... ♕g6 34 ♗b4 and ♗d6.

**31 f5! ♕d6 32 g3 ♗f7 33 ♕xg4+ ♔f8 34 fxe6 ♖exe6 35 ♗xe6 ♖xe6 36 ♗b4 c5 37 ♗xc5! Resigns**

# *Chapter Five:*

# First Round Fearless

Goliaths should fear first rounds. Davids should be fearless in them.

The opening game of a tournament is often a minefield for higher-rated players. Rustiness, over-confidence and other factors – even jet lag – result in big upsets more often than at any other time in tournaments.

There are simply more David-vs.-Goliath pairings on opening day. That's due to the predominance of the Swiss System in open tournaments. The first round is when the stronger half of the players is paired against the weaker half. Ratings differences of 300, 400 or 500 points are possible in opens – and even common in many large events.

Davids have less to lose than at any other time in the tournament. They are expected to be defeated – so they can play without fear. Their attitude – and a Goliath's complacency – are the recipe for upsets.

In short, history isn't always made in the last round. It can happen in the first round, as it did in this game:

## *38*

## Nurlan Ibraev – Hetul Shah

### New Delhi 2009

### *Ruy Lopez, Tchigorin Defense C99*

A grandmaster meets a nine-year-old rated 1807 in the first round and has the White pieces to boot. Can't last long, right?

**1 e4 e5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 ♗b5 a6 4 ♗a4 ♘f6 5 0-0 ♗e7 6 ♖e1 b5 7 ♗b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3 ♘a5**

This is the old main line of the Ruy Lopez, often called the Mikhail Tchigorin Variation.

**10 ♗c2 c5 11 d4 ♕c7 12 ♘bd2 cxd4 13 cxd4 ♗d7**

The open c-file is literally a two-way street. Black temporarily benefits from ... cxd4 because he will control the file for several moves.

On the other hand, Black gives up the option of advancing pawns on the queenside (... c4, ... a5 and ... b4). And the open c-file can be quickly neutralized by b2-b3, ♗b2 and ♖c1 and even become controlled by White.

**14 ♘f1 ♖fc8 15 ♘e3**



*Black to move*

White's knight gets in the way of the c1-bishop when it's on e3. But the other ways of meeting the threat of 15 ... ♕xc2 – that is, 16 ♗d3 and 16 ♖e2 – have not been particularly successful.

**15 ... ♘c6 16 a3**

All of these moves had been played before many times and White usually gets a slight edge after 16 ... ♘xd4 17 ♘xd4 exd4 18 ♕xd4.

**16 ... ♗f8**

Here's another problem for Goliaths, even when they are playing fellow Goliaths:

They know openings so well that they can play the first dozen-plus moves almost without thinking. They can "sleep-walk" into the middlegame, in Walter Browne's words.

In the main lines of the Ruy Lopez, for instance, White will almost always play c2-c3, withdraw his bishop to c2 at some point, maneuver his b1-knight to g3 or e3, and so on.

But players tend to forget about the *order* of moves. A game between two Goliaths, J. Polgar – Spassky, Budapest 1993, began:

**1 e4 e5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 ♗b5 a6 4 ♗a4 ♘f6 5 0-0 ♗e7 6 ♖e1 b5 7 ♗b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3 ♘b8 10 d4 ♘bd7 11 ♘bd2 ♖e8**



*White to move*

The game went **12 ♘f1 ♗b7 13 ♗c2 ♗f8** and Black eventually won. After it was over, puzzled spectators wondered why Black's 11th and White's 12th moves weren't blunders.

They were right. The two players overlooked that 12 ♗xf7+! wins because 12 ... ♔xf7 13 ♘g5+ and 14 ♘e6 would trap Black's queen.

Something similar happens in our game. White plays a "sleep-walk" move, rather than 17 ♖b1 followed by 18 b3 and 19 ♗b2.

**17 b3? ♘xd4! 18 ♘xd4 ♕c3!**

This is what White missed. His rook and knight are attacked and he must lose one of them.

He would have little compensation for a pawn after 19 ♖b1 ♕xd4 20 ♕f3 – although the only other database game to get that far, Szily-Bisguier, Helsinki 1952, ended in a hard-fought draw.

Facing an inexperienced young opponent, White goes for a bigger sacrifice but one that offers better swindling chances.

**19 ♘e2??! ♕xa1 20 ♕d2**



*Black to move*

White threatens to lock up the queen with 21 ♘d1! and 22 ♗b2. Then, after ... ♕a2, he can win it with ♘c1.

For example, 20 ... ♗c6 21 ♘c3 prepares ♗b1 and ♗b2. Black has a material edge after 21 ... a5 22 ♗b1 b4 23 ♗b2 bxc3 (24 ♕xc3 ♕xb1 25 ♖xb1 ♗xe4 26 ♕e1 ♗xb1). But White has a fighting chance.

**20 ... d5!**



*White to move*

**21 b4**

Black's idea was 21 exd5 ♗xa3 and the queen escapes with her booty, an extra pawn and the Exchange. If 22 ♕a5, then 22 ... ♗b2!.

After 21 b4 he has to avoid traps like 21 ... ♘xe4? 22 ♗xe4 dxe4 23 ♕xd7.

But he can play 21 ... dxe4 safely since 22 ♗b3 does not threaten to trap the queen (23 ♗b2 ♖c2! since 24 ♗xc2 or 24 ♘xc2 allow 24 ... ♕xb2).

Or he can just try to extricate the queen (21 ... d4 22 ♘d1 ♕a2 and defend after 23 ♗b2 ♕e6 24 f4).

Instead, Black makes the choice that many a grandmaster would: He gives back some material in return for an initiative.

**21 ... d4 22 ♘d1 ♖xc2!? 23 ♕xc2 ♖c8 24 ♕d2**

Black would have a winning endgame after 24 ♕b2 ♕xb2 and 25 ... ♘xe4.

After the text, he could have finished off with the smothering 24 ... ♕b1! and 25 ... ♖c2 or 25 ... ♘xe4.

**24 ... ♘xe4 25 ♕d3 ♘d6 26 ♗b2 ♕a2**

But this is also good for Black. The immediate threat is 27 ... ♗f5 28 ♕f3 ♗c2!, winning one of the hamstrung pieces. White tries anti-David desperation.

**27 f4! ♕c4**

Black avoided 27 ... ♗f5 28 ♕f3 ♗c2?! because 29 fxe5 would complicate what should now be simple (29 ... ♗xd1 30 exd6).

With 27 ... ♕c4 Black breaks the blockade of his d-pawn and would win after 28 ♕xc4 ♘xc4 29 fxe5 d3.

**28 ♕b1 d3!**



*White to move*

Also good was 29 ... f6. Black's biggest asset is not his extra material but the poor coordination of White's pieces, which makes winning tactics inevitable.

**29 ♘e3 ♕e4 30 ♘c3 ♕xf4 31 ♘cd5 ♕g3 32 ♘f1 ♕g6 33 ♗xe5 ♘c4!**

Black prepares to push his d-pawn (34 ♗g3 ♗f5 and 35 ... d2!). His queen watches g2 (34 ♗b2? ♘xb2 35 ♕xb2 ♖c2! threatens mate and the queen).

**34 ♘f4 ♕b6+ 35 ♔h1 ♘xe5! 36 ♖xe5**

Now 36 ... ♕d4! 37 ♘xd3 ♖c3 would have prompted resignation.

Black likely saw that 36 ... ♗d6 37 ♖d5 ♗xf4 would win (38 ♖xd7 d2 and ... ♖c1).

**36 ... ♗d6 37 ♖e4 ♗c6 38 ♕c1 ♕b7!**

Yes, 38 ... ♗xe4 39 ♕xc8+ ♗f8 wins in the long run. So do 38 ... d2! and 38 ... ♕b8!. Black's position was that good. The rest was:

**39 ♖e1 ♗xg2+ 40 ♘xg2 ♖xc1 41 ♖xc1 ♗f4 42 ♖c3 d2 43 ♖d3 h6 44 ♔g1 ♕b6+ White resigned.**

This game set a world record: Black was the youngest-ever player to defeat a grandmaster in a standard time control game. The record stood until 2012.

## 39

## Sergey Fedorchuk – Andreas Kelires

### Vrachati 2013

### *Sicilian Defense, Najdorf Variation B90*

Many of the upsets in this book feature a David, with White, winning because of the way he attacked. In this game a young Cypriot player – who was rated under 1800 just two years before – knocks off a grandmaster by defending as Black.

The two players castled on opposite wings and the GM's attack gains traction first. But as experienced players know: An attack on a king may sometimes fail. The ensuing counterattack rarely does.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♘xd4 ♘f6 5 ♘c3 a6 6 ♗e3 e5 7 ♘b3 ♗e6 8 h3 ♗e7 9 f4**

White saves some time by pushing his kingside pawns in this way, compared with 8 f3 and g2-g4. On the minus side, Black is granted the fine e5-outpost for a knight after an exchange of pawns.

**9 ... exf4 10 ♗xf4 ♘c6 11 ♕e2 ♕c7 12 0-0-0 ♘e5 13 g4 0-0**

"Castling into it!" annotators used to write disparagingly in positions like this. But Black's king was no safer on the queenside or left in the center.

White can take his time in launching an attack because 14 ♘d4 and ♘f5 is a solid alternative to pushing the kingside pawns further. After 14 ... b5 15 g5 ♘fd7 16 ♘f5 he would have a nice game.

**14 g5 ♘fd7 15 ♘d5 ♗xd5 16 exd5 ♖fe8 17 h4 ♖ac8**



*White to move*

The position has clarified and seems to favor White. He can make good use of his f1-bishop on h3. His knight can head to f5. Black will be slow in making serious queenside threats.

But there are tactical nuances: White's queen currently is the only piece that protects against ... ♕xc2 mate. The queen also lies on the same file as the Black rook.

The two factors can meld together: 18 ♗h3? allows the surprising 18 ... ♘g6!.

That knight threatens the f4-bishop and the h4-pawn. But it also prepares to meet 19 ♗e3 with 19 ... ♗xg5! 20 hxg5 ♖xe3! (21 ♕xe3?? ♕xc2 mate).

**18 ♕g2 ♘b6**

Some computers think Black's move is an error because of 19 ♗xe5 dxe5 20 ♗d3 followed by 21 ♕e4.

But humans are suspicious of trading away White's dark bishop. They nudge their machines to confirm that 20 ... a5! is fine for Black (21 ♘xa5 ♖a8 or 21 ♔b1 a4 22 ♘d2 a3).

**19 h5 ♘bc4**



*White to move*

Black has saved time by avoiding ... b5. That's a common move in similar positions but it's not necessary here. In fact, it is harmful if Black wants to threaten b2 with ... ♕b6 if the b3-knight moves.

Note how the lack of protection of the f4-bishop keeps making tactics possible. After 20 ♗xc4? ♕xc4 Black threatens 21 ... ♕xf4+ as well as 21 ... ♘d3+, e.g. 22 ♗xe5 ♗xg5+! 23 ♔b1 ♖xe5.

And on 20 ♘d4 Black can force a draw with 20 ... ♘xb2 21 ♔xb2 ♕c3+ (22 ♔c1?? ♕a1+ 23 ♔d2 ♕xd4+). The key point is 22 ♔b1 ♕b4+ 23 ♘b3? ♕xf4.

**20 ♖h2?**

Wasn't White's attack running faster than Black's a few moves ago? Yes, and he should be looking for a kingside breakthrough. The leading candidate is 20 g6.

It looks dubious after 20 ... fxg6 21 hxg6 ♘xg6 – until you spot 22 ♖xh7! ♔xh7 23 ♗d3 followed by ♕xg6+. More testing is 21 ... hxg6! and 22 ♕h2 ♗f6.



*Black to move*

**20 ... a5!**

This forces White to act before 21 ... a4 steals the initiative.

**21 g6!?**

Now 21 ... hxg6? allows a strong 22 ♗xc4! ♕xc4 23 ♗xe5! dxe5 24 hxg6 or 24 d6. The point of White's 20th move is revealed by 22 ... ♘xc4 (instead of 22 ... ♕xc4) 23 hxg6 ♗f6 24 ♖dh1!.

Taking on g6 with the other pawn is much better: 21 ... fxg6 22 ♗xc4 ♘xc4 23 hxg6 h6!, because White doesn't have enough time for a sacrifice on h6 or the maneuver ♘d4-e6. But Black had another idea.

**21 ... ♗f6 22 gxh7+ ♔h8!**

The "dead" pawn on h7 helps Black seal the kingside. If Black can catch his breath and resume making his own threats, the tide turns quickly. For example:

(a) 23 ♔b1 ♘xb2! 24 ♔xb2 ♘d3+,

(b) 23 ♘d4 ♘xb2! 24 ♔xb2 ♕c3+ 25 ♔b1 ♘c4,

(c) 23 ♗xc4 ♕xc4 and 24 ... a4,

(d) 23 c3 a4 24 ♘d4 a3 (25 b3? ♘e3! 26 ♗xe3 ♕xc3+ 27 ♘c2? ♕b2+). On 27 ♔b1 Black can take on e3. But 27 ... ♘f3! is murderous.

**23 h6**



*Black to move*

**23 ... ♘g6!**

The usual way of defending in similar positions is 23 ... g6. But there is some danger lingering on dark squares (24 ♕g3 ♘xb2 25 ♗g5!).

Black's move speeds up the counterattack since both 24 ... ♘xf4 and 24 ... ♗xb2+ are threatened.

**24 ♗g5 ♗xb2+ 25 ♔b1 ♗e5 26 hxg7+ ♗xg7**

Black's threats include 27 ... ♘a3+ and 27 ... a4 28 ♘d4 ♕b6+. White won't survive long after 27 a4 ♘b2.

**27 ♗xc4 ♕xc4**



*White to move*

**28 ♗h6?**

A blunder in a bad position (28 ♕f1 ♕c3 29 ♗c1 a4). Relatively best is the losing endgame of 28 ♕d2 a4 29 ♘d4 ♖e4 30 c3 ♕xc3.

**28 ... ♗xh6 29 ♖xh6 ♖e2! 30 ♖xg6?! ♕xc2+ White resigned.**

## *40*

# Thomas Clarke – Istvan Csom

### Olympiad, Thessaloniki 1988

### *Sicilian Defense, O'Kelly Variation B28*

The first round of the biennial Olympiad team tournament is like the first round of any large Swiss System tournament. It has the biggest ratings mismatches and the greatest potential for upsets.

Of course, by tournament's end, the higher-rated players and national teams will prevail. In this 107-team Olympiad, Hungary eventually tied for fourth place. Ireland tied for 50th. When they met in the first round, the Irish first reserve player was just holding on against a veteran Hungarian grandmaster for the first 30 moves.

But he lasted into the final moves of a time scramble when he managed to raise the level of randomness.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 a6 3 c4**

Black was looking to test his opponent in the off-beat O'Kelly Variation, whose main line runs 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♘xd4 ♘f6 5 ♘c3 e5! (6 ♘b3 ♗b4).

**3 ... d6 4 ♘c3**

Against a stronger opponent, Black would be content to play 4 ... e5!. Then both sides can exploit a center outpost.

White would eventually play ♘d5 and Black would play ... ♘d4. A series of knight trades would be likely, leading to rough equality. Equality is acceptable when a Goliath has Black – against another Goliath.

**4 ... ♗g4!**

The more ambitious text move gives Black the option of ... ♗xf3 so that his knight has a chance to occupy d4 unmolested.

**5 ♕b3 b6 6 ♘d5 ♘d7 7 ♗e2 e6 8 ♘e3 ♗h5**



*White to move*

There was nothing wrong with 8 ... ♗xf3 9 ♗xf3 ♘e5 10 ♗e2 ♘e7 followed by ... ♘7c6 and the eventual occupation of d4.

**9 d3 ♘e7 10 g4!? ♗g6 11 ♗d2 ♘c6 12 ♗c3 ♖b8**

Both players can claim some success. By ruling out ... ♗xf3 White has taken the sting out of a quick ... ♘d4. With ... e6 instead of ... e5, Black has denied ♘d5 to White.

Both players also face a problem of where to put their king. After 13 0-0-0?!, for example, Black would get the upper hand with 13 ... b5!, e.g.14 cxb5 axb5 15 h4 c4! with the initiative (16 dxc4? ♘c5).

**13 a4 ♘de5!**



*White to move*

Black wants to trade knights to gain access to d4, e.g. 14 ♘xe5 dxe5!, and then ... ♘d4 at the right moment.

The position after 13 ... ♘de5! illustrates a grandmaster's superior insight. It looks like White's lead in development should matter. But Black can seize the initiative with just a few developed pieces because he controls the right squares.

For example, 14 0-0-0? ♘xf3 15 ♗xf3 ♘d4! 16 ♗xd4 cxd4 17 ♘c2 ♕f6 18 ♘e1 ♕h4 offers him a simple edge.

**14 h4 h5 15 g5**

White would be worse after 15 gxh5 ♗xh5 (16 ♘xe5 dxe5! or 16 ♘g5 ♕f6). After 15 g5 his king is getting ready to castle.

**15 ... ♗e7 16 ♘d2 ♘d4**

Black acts before White gets to kick the e5-knight back with 17 f4. Now 17 ♗xd4 cxd4 provides double-edged play, e.g. 18 ♘c2 (or 18 ♘g2) ♘c6 19 f4 ♕d7 20 0-0 f5.

**17 ♕d1! ♘ec6 18 f4 ♕d7 19 0-0 f5!**

Black couldn't castle (19 ... 0-0? 20 ♗xh5 or 19 ... ♘xe2+ 20 ♕xe2 0-0? 21 f5!). He has different plans for his king.

**20 exf5 ♗xf5!**



*White to move*

Black's idea is ... ♔d8-c7. With the center more or less closed, Black's king can turn out to be the safer one. For example, 21 ♗xh5+ ♔d8 22 ♘e4 g6! with advantage to Black.

Better is 22 ♘xf5 ♘xf5 23 ♖e1 ♔c7 24 ♕g4 ♘cd4 when anything can happen.

White declines the pawn offer with his next move but Black decides to speed up the tempo of play. That's good anti-David strategy under the circumstances.

**21 ♘e4 d5!? 22 cxd5 exd5 23 ♘g3 ♗h3 24 ♗xh5+ ♔d8 25 ♘g2?**

White could have pushed his way into a slightly worse endgame with 25 ♗g4! ♗xg4 26 ♕xg4 ♕xg4 27 ♘xg4 ♖xh4. Instead, he prepares to gamble on the queenside.

**25 ... ♔c7 26 a5 b5 27 ♔h2 g6! 28 ♗xg6 ♗xg2 29 ♔xg2 ♖xh4 30 f5!**

Outplayed in the last few moves, White had to stop ... ♕h3+. The alternative, 30 ♖h1, was going to be bad whether Black chose 30 ... ♖xf4 or 30 ... ♖bh8.

**30 ... ♖bh8 31 ♖h1? ♗xg5?**

Time pressure stumbles in. With 31 ... ♖xh1 32 ♘xh1 ♗d6! Black would have a decisive ... ♖h2+ coming, e.g. 33 ♘g3? ♗xg3 34 ♔xg3 ♕d6+. But he is still much better after 31 ... ♗xg5.

**32 ♖xh4 ♖xh4**



*White to move*

In bad but complex positions, Davids can use what Simon Webb called "controlled desperation." This means rejecting the moves that allow your opponent to win with relative ease, even if they are objectively best.

Instead, you should play the move that complicates the position but doesn't allow an obvious refutation. Don't analyze it in depth the way you would in a normal position. Computers may be able to prove it's bad – but drastic situations demand drastic measures.

White's next move, which tries to create a target on the c-file after 34 ♗xd4, fits the "controlled desperation" bill.

**33 ♖c1??! ♗xc1 34 ♕xc1**

With 34 ... ♕e7! Black would stop 35 f6 as well as 35 ♕g5 and win easily. Also good is 34 ... ♕d6! in view of 35 ♕g5 ♖h2+! (36 ♔xh2 ♘f3+ or 36 ♔f1 ♕e5).

**34 ... ♖g4? 35 ♗xd4! ♖xd4**

Black can safely escape checks after this, or 35 ... cxd4 36 ♕c5 and 37 ♕b6+, because he has the flight square at d6. But it's difficult when short of time to feel comfortable in such a position.

**36 ♕xc5 ♕e7? 37 ♕b6+ ♔d6? 38 f6!**

The king should have gone to d7 because now 39 ♘f5 will be with check.

**38 ... ♕xf6 39 ♘f5+**



*Black to move*

They could have shaken hands here since 39 ... ♔d7 40 ♕b7+ is the perpetual check White hoped for. Black has to accept (40 ... ♔d8 41 ♕b6+).

But this was the 39th move. He had to make two more moves to reach the time control.

**39 ... ♔e5?? 40 ♕c7+! Black resigned.**

It's mate on d6. White only won once in this 14-round tournament. He did it in this game, against the strongest opponent he faced.

Incidentally, White had a good alternative in 39 ♗e8 because ♕xc6(+) can't be stopped. He would not be losing after 39 ... ♖xd3 40 ♕xc6+ ♔e7 as long as he doesn't trade queens (41 ♕d7+ not 41 ♕xf6+? ♔xf6 and 42 ... ♖b3 or 42 ... ♖d2+).

### *41*

## Ismail Karim – Chanda Sandipan

### Olympiad, Turin 2006

### *Sicilian Defense, Scheveningen Variation B84*

Another first-round Olympiad upset, this time in a Morocco-vs.-India match. Black, a grandmaster, makes a fundamental Goliath error:

He gives a much weaker opponent the license to play several semi-automatic attacking moves. White didn't have to think much before move 15.

But that's not enough for an upset. When White was forced to find his own moves he chose splendid ones – with one exception. But Black failed to punish the one error and paid the price.

**1 e4 c5 2 ♘f3 e6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♘xd4 ♘f6 5 ♘c3 d6**

Black has chosen a good weapon against a lower-rated opponent because it may lure him into somewhat dubious lines such as 6 ♗c4 ♗e7 7 ♗b3 0-0 9 f4 ♘a6! and ... ♘c5.

**6 ♗e2 a6 7 0-0 ♗e7 8 f4 0-0 9 ♗e3 ♕c7 10 g4! ♘fd7**

The f6-knight was headed to d7 anyway after g4-g5.

**11 f5 ♘e5 12 g5**



*Black to move*

Now that knight does a nice job of discouraging g5-g6. But White can also open kingside lines with f5-f6.

Black can discourage that with a retreat, 12 ... ♕d8, which also threatens 13 ... ♗xg5.

For instance, 13 fxe6 ♗xg5!? 14 exf7+ ♘xf7 or 13 ♕d2 ♘bc6 14 fxe6 ♘xd4 and 13 g6 hxg6 aren't convincing.

A key point here is that White doesn't easily get his queen to h5 and threaten h7 as in the game.

**12 ... ♖e8 13 f6! ♗f8 14 fxg7 ♗xg7 15 ♗d3!**



*Black to move*

Black has the defensive formation he wanted – bishop on g7 and knight on e5, so that f7 and g7 are well-protected. But now White gets the attacking one that *he* wanted, with ♕h5 coming to take aim at h7.

An illustration of Black's difficulties is 15 ... ♘bd7 16 ♕h5 ♘c5. Some computers first look at 17 ♗e2 to avoid a double capture on d3.

But if you nudge them to consider 17 ♖f4 they find that 17 ... ♘cxd3 18 cxd3 ♘xd3 19 ♖h4 isn't pleasant.

For example, 19 ... ♘xb2 20 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 and now 21 ♖f1 threatens 22 g6. For example, 21 ... ♖e7 22 ♘f5 ♕xc3 23 ♘xg7 ♕xg7 24 g6 or 22 ... exf5 23 ♘d5 with a winning attack. Or 21...♕xc3 22 ♖xf7+ ♔xf7 23 g6+ and mates.

**15 ... ♘bc6 16 ♘xc6 bxc6 17 ♕h5**



*Black to move*

**17...c5!?**

A worthy alternative is 17 ... ♖b8, to punish White for opening half of the b-file.

The tactical benefit is that 18 b3? loses to 18 ... ♘xd3 and ... ♗xc3. Black wants White to spend a piece to defend b2 (18 ♖ab1 or 18 ♘d1).

The test of 17 ... ♖b8 is ignoring the threat, with 18 ♖f4, for example.

Then 18 ... ♖xb2 19 ♖h4 ♘xd3 20 cxd3 ♗xc3 is possible. But 21 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 22 g6! is deadly. Black loses following 22 ... ♔e7 23 ♗g5+ or 22 ... ♗g7 23 ♖f1 ♖e7 24 ♗h6!.

Black's knight can be put to better use with 18 ... ♘g6 and 19 ♖f3 ♖xb2 20 ♖h3 ♘f8. But then 21 e5! gets the bishop into the game (♗xh7+) and possibly the c3-knight (♘e4-f6+).

With 17 ... c5, Black makes ... c4 a potential threat.

**18 ♖f4! ♘g6**



*White to move*

**19 e5?!?**

This was White's most difficult moment because he had three tempting possibilities:

The first alternative is 19 ♖f3 c4 20 ♖h3!?, with play similar (but less clear) to that in the previous note.

The second candidate is 19 ♖af1! ♘xf4 20 ♖xf4. Then in addition to 21 ♖h4, White would threaten 21 e5!, e.g. 20 ... ♖a7 21 e5! ♗xe5 22 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 23 g6!.

**19 ... d5?**

But this was Black's biggest test as well. He could have tried to calculate the 19 ... ♘xf4 variations. Or he could stop 20 ♘e4 with 19 ... d5.

He went for the safest-looking option. But the risky-looking 19 ... ♗xe5! would have refuted 19 e5.

**20 ♖af1!**



*Black to move*

Now White is back in business. It's too late to take on e5 (or on f4, as we'll see).

If Black refuses the Exchange and stops ♖xf7 with 20 ... ♖e7, White wins with 21 ♖4f3 and ♖h3:

(a) 21 ... ♗xe5 22 ♖h3 ♔f8 23 ♕xh7 (23 ... ♔e8 24 ♖xf7 ♖xf7 25 ♗xg6),

(b) 21 ... ♕xe5 22 ♗xc5 and 23 ♖h3 (or 22 ... ♖c7? 23 ♖e3!, trapping the queen),

(c) 21 ... ♘xe5 22 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 23 g6! ♘xf3+ 24 ♖xf3 (24 ... f5 25 ♗h6 and wins), and

(d) 21 ... c4! 22 ♖h3 cxd3 23 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 24 ♕xg6 when White is a pawn up and still attacking (24 ... dxc2 25 ♕xc2 ♗xe5? 26 ♖f6! wins quickly).

**20 ... ♘xf4 21 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 22 ♗xf4 c4 23 g6!**

White will have his choice of wins now. The immediate threats include 24 ♗h6. For instance, 23 ... cxd3 24 ♗h6! ♕c5+ 25 ♔h1 ♔e7 26 ♖xf7+ ♔d8 27 ♗g5+.

**23 ... ♖a7 24 ♗e3**

Another win is 24 gxf7 ♕xf7 25 ♗g6.

**24 ... ♖e7 25 ♗h6**

This looks inconsistent. But with e7 occupied, 25 ... ♗xh6 26 ♕h8 is mate.

**25 ... ♔e8 26 gxf7+ ♖xf7 27 ♗g6**

And here 27 ♕g8+! wins more quickly.

**27 ... ♕c5+ 28 ♔g2 ♗xh6 29 ♗xf7+ ♔d8 30 ♕xh6**



*Black to move*

The game lasted until move 68 – players resign late in an Olympiad because they are playing for their country. But the outcome was clear. White won a piece-up endgame, after **30 ... d4 31 ♕f6+ ♔c7 32 ♘e2 ♗b7+ 33 ♔h3 d3 34 cxd3 ♕e3+ 35 ♘g3 cxd3 36 ♕f2 ♕xf2 37 ♖xf2**, rather than 36 ♕e7+ and mates.

## *42*

# Plinio Pazos – Zdenko Kozul

## Olympiad, Elista 1998

### *Sicilian Defense, Alapin Variation B22*

When you play over this first-round game for the first time, it seems to take a dramatic turn in the last seven moves. One bad move by Black, the first-board player for Croatia, was more important than several somewhat dubious moves by the Ecuadorian opponent he outrated by 250-plus points. Just an unlucky blunder, it appears.

But when you play it over again, you may appreciate how the game was really decided earlier, around move 25, when Black had won a pawn. White didn't despair but found strong moves (26-28) that raised the randomness level. In the end, Goliath relaxed. David didn't.

**1 e4 c5 2 c3 ♘f6 3 e5 ♘d5 4 d4 cxd4 5 ♘f3 ♘c6 6 ♗c4**

This is an invitation into a delayed Morra Gambit (6 ... ♘b6 7 ♗b3 dxc3 8 ♘xc3). Safer is 7 ... d6. Instead, Black heads towards a popular late-opening position.

**6 ... e6 7 cxd4 d6 8 0-0 ♗c7 9 ♕e2 0-0 10 ♖e1**

White has a number of ways of handling the position, including 10 ♕e4 followed by ♕g4/♗h6 and the immediate 10 ♘c3 ♘xc3 11 bxc3.

**10 ... ♗d7 11 ♘c3**

The alternative way of developing this knight, 11 ♘bd2, allows Black to swap off White's better bishop and obtain a fine middlegame with 11 ... dxe5 12 dxe5 ♘a5. For example, 13 ♗d3? ♘f4 or 13 ♗xd5 exd5 14 ♘d4 ♕b6.

**11 ... ♘xc3 12 bxc3 dxe5 13 dxe5!**



*Black to move*

To play this variation White has to be willing to accept an isolated pawn at c3. It can't be easily defended. But that pawn would have been lost quickly after 13 ♘xe5 ♘xe5 14 ♕xe5 ♖c8.

In this game, Black tries to improve on 13 ... ♘a5 which turned out badly the previous year in another game of his – 14 ♗d3 ♗c6 15 ♘d4 ♕d5 16 ♕g4 g6?! 17 ♗h6 ♖fc8 18 h4!.

**13 ... ♕c7 14 ♗d3**

Which matters more, the pawn at c3 – or the one at e5 that gives White kingside chances? The middlegame may depend on the answer.

Among White's options from now on is ♕e4, threatening ♕xh7 mate. Since ... f5 would allow a killing en passant capture, Black would have to play ... g6. Then White can work the kingside with h2-h4-h5 or ♗g5xe7/♘g5.

**14 ... ♖fd8 15 ♖b1**

But the immediate 15 ♕e4 g6 16 ♗g5 allows Black to simplify, 16 ... ♗xg5 17 ♘xg5 ♕xe5 18 ♕xe5 ♘xe5 19 ♖xe5 f6. Would a Goliath have done that – and risk going into an ending that would be hard to win?

**15 ... ♗e8! 16 h4?!**

Now 16 ♕e4 g6 17 ♗g5 loses a pawn (17 ... ♗xg5 18 ♘xg5 ♕xe5 19 ♕xe5 ♘xe5 20 ♖xe5 ♖xd3).

With his 16th move White bets that ♕e4/... g6 followed by h4-h5xg6 will set up a weakness at g6 that he can exploit.

But Black has already reinforced g6 with ... ♗e8. That emboldens him to go after the c3-pawn.

**16 ... ♖d5! 17 ♕e4 g6 18 ♗c4 ♖c5 19 ♗b3?!**

White is running out of kingside options. The ♗g5 idea is too slow (19 ♗g5 ♗xg5 20 ♘xg5? ♖xe5 or 20 hxg5 ♘a5).

The insertion of 19 ♗e3 ♖a5 makes 20 ♗g5 ♗xg5 21 hxg5 more playable. But it's not promising after, say, 21 ... ♖c8 or 21 ... ♖a4.

**19 ... ♖xc3 20 h5 ♖d8 21 ♗b2**



*Black to move*

One of the ironies of chess is that when you sacrifice – or just lose – a chronically weak pawn, your position seems to improve. That's what's happening to White.

**21 ... ♖cd3 22 ♕f4 ♘a5? 23 ♖ec1**

With no weak pawn to attack and no simple way to trade to an endgame. Black lacks a plan – while White, without a pawn to defend, gets an initiative. Now 23 ... ♗c6! 24 ♗c2 ♖3d5 25 ♘g5 is a bit better for Black than in the game.

**23 ... ♕b8 24 ♗c2 ♖3d5 25 ♘g5 ♖b5?**

The rook only gets into trouble on b5. But White was getting chances in any case.

For example, 25 ... ♘c6 would have allowed him to carry out an alternative kingside idea, e.g. 26 hxg6 hxg6 27 ♕h4 ♗xg5 28 ♕xg5.

Then 28 ... ♘xe5? 29 ♕f6! costs material after 30 ♖e1 (30 ... ♘-moves 31 ♕h8 mate). Even after 28 ... ♘d4 29 ♗xd4 ♖xd4 Black's extra pawn is offset by White's superior pieces following 30 ♖b3!.

**26 ♘e4!**



*Black to move*

White finally has a kingside threat, 27 ♕h6 and ♘f6+.

**26 ... f5 27 hxg6!**

White calculated 27 ... fxe4 28 gxh7+ ♔h8 29 ♗a3!, based on 29 ... ♗xa3? 30 ♕f6+ ♔xh7 30 ♗xe4+ or 29 ... ♕c7 30 ♗d6!.

Note that White could have taken on g6 at any point in the previous six moves. This is the right moment because Black has to weigh the natural 27 ... hxg6 against 27 ... ♗xg6.

The pawn recapture would require Black to look at 27 ... hxg6 28 ♘d6 ♗xd6 29 exd6 ♕xd6. The difference between that and the game is 30 ♕h4!, which threatens 31 ♕h8+ and mates as well as 31 ♖d1.

Black would have to sacrifice the Exchange. But it's a good sacrifice since 30 ... ♖xb2 31 ♖xb2 ♕d4! leads to a slightly favorable endgame.

**27 ... ♗xg6 28 ♘d6!**

Pitching a second pawn to open the b2-h8 diagonal.

**28 ... ♗xd6 29 exd6 ♕xd6**

Black could also retake with the rook, since 29 ... ♖xd6 30 ♗e5? loses to 30 ... ♖xe5 31 ♕xe5 ♖d1+!. However, White would still be in the game after 30 ♖e1.



*White to move*

Two pawns up, Black can cash in if he navigates safely through the next few moves. White has tactical chances because Black's rook is undefended at b5 (thanks to 27 ... ♗xg6).

Why does that matter? Because 30 ♕h6! ♕f8 allows 31 ♗g7! ♕xg7 (31 ... ♕e8 32 ♗f6) 32 ♕xg7+ ♔xg7 33 ♖xb5 with another Exchange-up ending but one that's roughly equal.

The queen would also be overloaded after 30 ... e5 31 ♗a3! because of 31 ... ♕xa3 32 ♖xb5 and 31 ... ♕d7 32 ♖xb5 ♕xb5 33 ♗b3+! ♘xb3 34 ♖c7!.

**30 ♕g5?**

This looks like it powerfully threatens 31 ♖d1 or 31 ♕f6. But Black has a choice of good moves, including 30 ... ♖d5.

**30 ... ♕f8??**

Black may have been hypnotized by the 30 ♕h6! ♕f8! variation and played this semi-automatically.

**31 ♗a3! ♖xb1 32 ♖xb1!**

White might be able to win after grabbing the queen, 32 ♗xf8 ♖xc1+ 33 ♕xc1 ♖xf8 because of 34 ♕e1. But the text is faster.

**32 ... ♕e8 33 ♗a4! ♘c6**

And here 33 ... ♖d7 34 ♗xd7 ♕xd7 would have held out longer (not 33 ... ♕xa4 34 ♕xd8+ and ♕f8 mate).

**34 ♖xb7 ♖d7 35 ♗xc6! ♖d1+ 36 ♔h2 ♕xc6 37 ♕e7! Black resigned.**

## *43*

# Michael Hennigan – Mikhail Gurevich

### World Open, Philadelphia 1989

### *French Defense, Tarrasch Variation C08*

Once again a David asks himself: What do I do in an opening that my opponent not only knows better than me – but he's the world's expert in it?

White was outrated by more than 300 points by a grandmaster in this first-round pairing. His answer to the question was to play solid opening moves and let nature take its course.

**1 e4 e6 2 d5 d5 3 ♘d2 a6 4 ♘gf3 c5 5 exd5 exd5 6 ♗e2 c4!?**

Black's last move stakes a claim to more space on the queenside. Mikhail Gurevich was the leading authority on the finesses of the 6 ... c4 variation. His opponents usually replied 7 0-0 ♗d6 and then 8 b3 cxb3 9 axb3 ♘e7 with a double-edged position.

**7 b3! cxb3**

Some computers rate 7 ... b5 8 a4? c3 9 ♘b1? b4 as good for White – but don't explain how he will ever develop his QN and QR.

**8 axb3 ♘c6 9 0-0 ♗d6**

If you are seeing this variation for the first time, you're likely to wonder why Black's last moves make sense. Why did he spend a tempo on 6 ... c4 if he was going to trade that pawn away on the next move?

Modern openings are not built entirely on logic. In this case, Black gets good piece coordination from ... ♘ge7 and ... ♗f5. White will need to spend a few tempi to use his misplaced d2-knight.

**10 ♖e1 ♘ge7 11 ♘f1 0-0 12 ♘e3!**



*Black to move*

The knight is better here than on g3 because it watches the isolated d-pawn and prepares c2-c4-c5, White's best middlegame plan.

On 12 ♘g3 ♘f5 13 c3 ♘xg3 14 hxg3 Black can equalize with 12 ... ♗f5, as Gurevich did in a later game.

After 12 ♘e3 Black can rid himself of a slight bad bishop with 12 ... ♗f5 13 ♘xf5 ♘xf5. But he would be worse after 14 c3 and 15 ♗d3.

**12 ... ♗b4**

In another Gurevich game, he improved marginally with 12 ... h6 13 c3 ♗e6. The coming trade of dark-squared bishops helps White more than Black.

**13 ♗d2 ♗xd2 14 ♕xd2 ♕d6 15 c4**

If Black allows White a mobile center, 15 ... dxc4? 16 bxc4, he can get into trouble (16 ... ♖d8 17 d5 ♘b4? 18 ♖eb1! or 17 ... ♘g6 18 ♕c3 ♘ce5 19 c5).

Yet another Gurevich game went 15 ... ♗d7 16 c5 ♕f6 17 ♗d3 with a clear edge for White. In this game he found a better use for his bishop and queen.

**15 ... ♗e6 16 c5! ♕f4! 17 b4 ♘f5**

The new pawn structure favors White. But he needs a few moves more to coordinate his pieces (18 ♘xf5 ♕xd2 drops a pawn).

**18 ♖ed1 ♘xe3 19 fxe3 ♕h6**



*White to move*

Black will try to hammer at e3. After 20 b5 axb5 21 ♗xb5 White may look for ♗xc6 and ♘e5, to create a good-N-vs.-bad-B endgame. But Black also has a good outpost, at e4 for his bishop (21 ... ♗f5 22 ♗xc6 bxc6 23 ♘e5 ♗e4).

**20 ♖a3! ♗g4 21 ♖da1 ♖ae8 22 b5 axb5 23 ♗xb5**

Now 23 ... ♖e7 is an inferior version of the line mentioned above – 24 ♗xc6 bxc6 25 ♘e5 ♗f5 (or 25 ... ♗c8) 26 ♖a7!.

**23 ... ♗xf3! 24 gxf3 ♖e6 25 ♗f1!**

White's idea is that 26 ♗g2 and 27 f4 will threaten ♗xd5 and put an end to attacks on his e-pawn.

**25 ... ♖fe8 26 ♗g2**



*Black to move*

The immediate 26 ... ♖xe3?? 27 ♖xe3 ♕xe3+ 28 ♕xe3 ♖xe3 loses to the last-rank mate, 29 ♖a8+.

That suggests luft, 26 ... g6, followed by 27 f4 ♕h5.

Then the daring 28 e4 would be unclear after 28 ... dxe4 29 d5 ♖d8 30 ♖a8 ♖ee8 – and perhaps much worse for White after the Exchange sacrifice 28 ... ♖xe4! 29 ♗xe4 ♖xe4.

Well, what if White repositions his rooks, at b6 and b3? Black can reposition also, e.g. 28 ♖b1 ♖6e7 29 ♖b6 ♔g7 30 ♖ab3 ♖a8!.

Tactics suddenly favor Black after 31 ♖xb7? ♖xb7 32 ♖xb7 ♖a1+ 33 ♗f1 ♘a5! and 34 ... ♘c4.

These variations are not exhaustive but give an indication of Black's resources. But instead of 26 ... g6!, he decides to activate his worst-placed piece.

**26 ... ♘e7 27 f4 ♘f5?**

A capture on e3 is coming. But luft, 27 ... g6!, was still the best try. Then White can easily become over-extended (28 ♖b3 ♘f5 29 ♖e1 g5 30 ♗xd5 ♖g6).

Or 29 ♗xd5 ♖xe3 30 ♖xb7? ♕xf4! 31 ♗xf7+ ♔h8 32 ♗xe8 ♖g3+.

But the more accurate 28 ♖b3 ♘f5 29 ♖aa3! might keep White on top (29 ... g5 30 ♗xd5 ♖g6 31 ♔f1 ♕h3+ 32 ♕g2).



*White to move*

Black may have avoided ... g6 because he wanted to keep that square free for the rook. For example, 28 ♗xd5 ♖g6+.

That doesn't win for Black, as was thought after the game, because of 29 ♔f1! ♕h3+ 30 ♔e2, when anything can happen.

White has two good alternatives, 28 ♖a8 and the dramatic:

**28 e4!? dxe4**

The Exchange sacrifice, 28 ... ♖xe4? 29 ♗xe4 dxe4, loses outright to 30 ♖a8 followed by pushing the d-pawn (30 ... ♕e6 31 d5 ♕e7 32 d6).

**29 d5 e3?**

Whose passed pawn is stronger? The answer is White's after 29 ... ♖6e7 30 d6 ♖d7 31 ♖a8.

The same goes for 29 ... ♖a6 30 ♖xa6 bxa6 31 d6 e3 32 d7! ♖d8 33 ♕a5 ♖xd7 34 c6.

However, Black can short-circuit this last variation with 31 ... ♕e6!. Then Black's passer becomes more important after 32 ♖xa6? e3!.

Instead, White can try win the endgame 32 d7 ♖d8 33 ♖d1 and a trade of queens (34 ♕d5).

**30 ♕d3! ♖a6 31 ♖xa6 bxa6 32 d6**

This is good enough to win. But White could have ended matters faster with 32 ♕xf5! because the last rank is still vulnerable to 32 ... e2 33 ♖e1 ♕h4 34 ♖xe2! ♖xe2 35 ♕c8+.

The text also wins (32 ... ♕xf4 33 d7 ♖d8 34 ♖f1 ♕d4 35 ♕xd4 ♘xd4 36 c6). The rest was anti-climax:

**32 ... e2 33 ♖e1 ♕xf4 34 d7 ♖d8 35 c6 ♘d4 36 ♕c3 ♘b5 37 ♖xe2! ♘c7** (37 ... ♘xc3 38 ♖e8+) **38 ♕c5 ♖b8 39 ♖e1 g6 40 ♖f1 ♕h4 41 ♕d6 ♕d8 42 ♗d5 ♘xd5 43 ♕xd5 ♕b6+ 44 ♔h1 ♖f8 45 ♖xf7! ♕b1+ 46 ♖f1+ Black resigned.**

## *44*

# Cindy Tsai – Walter Browne

### US Championship, Seattle 2002

### *King's Indian Defense, Saemisch Variation E81*

There were many experiments with the format of the US Championship in the first decade of the new century. One of the innovations was to combine it with the US Women's Championship, to form a Swiss System event of 56 players.

Skeptics said women – and in some cases girls – couldn't compete with grandmasters. They were proven wrong in the first round when 16-year-old Cindy Tsai upset six-time US Champion Walter Browne.

Once again, a Goliath sorts through favorable middlegame options, gets the upper hand and tries for a bigger advantage – only to miscalculate.

**1 d4 ♘f6 2 c4 g6 3 ♘c3 ♗g7 4 e4 d6 5 f3 0-0 6 ♗e3 c6 7 ♕d2 a6**

Browne was taking some liberties against an opponent he outrated by nearly 400 points. He rarely played the King's Indian Defense and here he avoids the more solid variations in favor of queenside pushes pioneered by Robert Byrne.

**8 ♗d3 b5 9 ♘ge2 ♘bd7 10 0-0**



*Black to move*

White's last move is not a mistake but it allows Black to get some positional mileage out of his pawn moves.

**10 ... bxc4 11 ♗xc4 d5!**

Now 12 exd5 ♘b6 13 ♗b3 cxd5 gives Black a slightly better pawn structure while White enjoys superior development. These factors would balance out after 14 ♖ac1 a5 15 ♘a4, for instance.

**12 ♗b3! dxe4 13 fxe4 ♘g4 14 ♗g5**

Thematic is 14 e5! and 14 ... ♘xe3 15 ♕xe3 e6, to stop 16 e6.

Then White's knights can salivate about occupying e4 and d6. Perhaps Browne felt he could out-calculate his young opponent with 16 ... c5!?.

As the game goes, Black threatens to get the two-bishop advantage and achieves ... c5 without risk.

**14 ... h6 15 ♗h4 ♘c5! 16 ♗c2 ♘e6 17 ♖ad1 c5**



*White to move*

Black has seized his own chunk of the center. After 18 ♘d5 g5! 19 ♗g3 cxd4 he would be at least equal.

He would also have good piece play after 18 d5 ♘d4, e.g. 19 ♗a4 ♘e5 20 ♘xd4 cxd4 21 ♘e2 (21 ♕xd4?? ♘f3+) d3.

**18 dxc5? ♕c7**

Now Black gains mastery of the dark squares by threatening 19 ... ♕xh2 mate.

**19 ♗g3 ♕xc5+ 20 ♗f2**

Or 20 ♔h1 ♘e3 21 ♗f2 ♘xf1!.

**20 ... ♘xf2 21 ♖xf2 ♖d8 22 ♘d5**

Now 22 ... a5!, with ... ♗a6 or ... a4 in mind, would secure a slight edge for Black, e.g. 23 ♗d3 ♗b7.

**22 ... ♗xb2? 23 ♕xh6**

The b2-pawn should have been kept as a target, not traded for the h6-pawn.

**23 ... ♗b7 24 ♗b3 a5 25 ♖d3 ♗g7 26 ♕h4 ♗xd5**

Black wasn't happy about this trade because it results in somewhat drawish bishops of opposite color. After 27 ♗xd5 ♖ab8 28 g3 he would retain some winning chances but they are not great.

**27 exd5!? ♗f6! 28 ♕e4**



*Black to move*

Now 28 ... ♘g5 gives Black a nice endgame (29 ♕e3 ♕xe3 30 ♖xe3 a4 31 ♗c4 ♖ab8). Or 29 ♕f4 ♖ab8 and ...♖b4.

**28 ... ♘c7??**

But Browne wanted more. He felt that White's recapture on d5 was a mistake because the d-pawn appears doomed. Black will attack it with ... ♖d6 and ... ♖ad8. What he overlooked was:

**29 d6! Black resigned.**

White threatens ♕xg6+. There was no point in playing out 29 ... ♖xd6 30 ♕xg6+ ♗g7 31 ♕xf7+ ♔h7 32 ♕xe7.

# *Chapter Six:*

# Show Time

Many Goliaths have fallen when they took part in special events, such as simultaneous exhibitions and blindfold displays. These are more of a show than a competition since they are designed to promote the game of chess.

Goliaths take these events less seriously than tournament games: There is less at stake – at least, to them. So they choose moves with less care, concern or accuracy than normal.

Or they suffer from the handicap of playing many other opponents and wanting to finish the exhibition quickly. In a three-hour simul against 30 opponents for example, a master would have six minutes for each game. If the games average 30 moves, that's 12 seconds a move.

Having the White pieces – as they usually do in a simul – isn't enough to offset that handicap. One of Jose Capablanca's shortest losses occurred in an exhibition, as we saw in Chapter One. Here's another.

**Jose Capablanca – Mary Bain**
Hollywood 1933
*Four Knights Game C48*

**1 e4 e5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 ♘c3 ♘f6 4 ♗b5 ♗c5**

This was played in a 23-board simultaneous exhibition. Capa's opponent, who later won a US Women's Championship, makes a less common fourth move, compared with 4 ... ♗b4 and 4 ... ♘d4.

An ancient Kurt Bardeleben analysis of 4 ... ♗c5 gave 5 ♘xe5 ♘xe5 6 d4 as leading to equality after 6 ... ♗d6 (7 dxe5 ♗xe5).

Bardeleben's main line still holds up, e.g. 7 f4 ♘c6 8 e5 and then 8 ... ♗b4 9 d5 ♘e4 10 ♕d3 ♘xc3 11 bxc3 ♗e7 12 dxc6 bxc6.

**5 0-0 0-0 6 ♘xe5**



*Black to move*

And here 6 ... ♘xe5 7 d4 ♗d6 7 f4 ♘c6 8 e5 ♗e7 9 d5 ♘b4! 10 exf6 ♗xf6 doesn't offer White much either (11 ♘e4 c6). Black had another idea.

**6 ... ♖e8 7 ♘d3?!**

White's knight retreat is in the style of Wilhelm Steinitz, who often grabbed center pawns at the cost of confusing his pieces – and then found ingenious ways to untangle them.

Much better is 7 ♘f3! and 7 ... ♘xe4 8 d4 ♘xc3 9 bxc3 or 8 ♘xe4 ♖xe4 9 d3 ♖e8 10 d4.

**7 ... ♗d4! 8 ♘e2?! ♖xe4**

White needs to smooth out his development, say with 9 c3 ♗b6 10 ♘g3 followed by 11 ♘f4 and 12 d4. But then he is only equal.

**9 ♘xd4? ♘xd4**

Amazingly, White is nearly lost. For example, 10 f3 ♖e8 11 ♗c4 d5 12 ♗b3 c5! (13 ♘xc5 ♘e2+ 14 ♔h1 ♘h5; 13 ♘f4 g5; 13 c3 ♘e2+ 14 ♔h1 c4; and 13 c4 ♗f5).

**10 ♗a4 ♘e2+ 11 ♔h1 ♘xc1**



*White to move*

Capablanca **resigned** in view of 12 ... ♖xa4 or 12 ... ♘xd3. According to some reports, his opponent offered a draw because she felt she didn't deserve to win. The result was scored as ½-½ but the reality is that it was 0-1.

Another remarkable upset occurred in a tandem simul: Bobby Fischer and Larry Evans alternated turns with the White pieces. This is trickier than it seems because the simul-givers not only have to seek good moves. They also have to figure out the reason for their colleague's last move.

**Bobby Fischer & Larry Evans – L.M. Gersch**
Tandem simul, New York 1960
*Queen's Gambit Declined, Cambridge Springs Variation D52*

**1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ♘c3 ♘f6 4 ♗g5 ♘bd7 5 ♘f3 c6 6 e3 ♕a5 7 ♘d2 ♗b4 8 ♕c2 ♘e4 9 ♘dxe4 dxe4 10 ♗f4**

It's not clear which grandmaster was making the odd-numbered moves and which was making the even ones. Evans was more at home in 1 d4 positions and would have known that the White bishop usually has a better retreat to h4 in this opening. Black gets a fine game now.

**10 ... 0-0 11 ♗e2 e5 12 dxe5 ♘xe5 13 0-0 ♗xc3! 14 bxc3 ♗f5**

An old trap runs 14 ... ♖e8 15 ♕xe4?? ♗f5! (16 ♕xf5 ♘f3+ and 16 ... ♕xf5, or 16 ♕d4 ♖ad8). Black's move is also good since he will be able to play ... ♘d3 when he wants.

**15 ♕b3 b6 16 ♖fd1?**



*Black to move*

Miscommunication may have doomed the allies because they made inconsistent moves. The main reason to play 15 ♕b3 was so that 16 ♕b4! could prompt 16 ... ♕xb4 17 cxb4 (although Black would still be better after 17 ... ♘d3).

**16 ... ♖fd8 17 ♖d4**

Now 17 ♕b4 is too late because of 17 ... ♖xd1+ 18 ♖xd1 ♕xa2 or 18 ♗xd1 ♕xb4 19 cxb4 ♘xc4.

**17 ... ♘d3 18 ♗g3 c5! 19 ♖d5**

The allies were on the same page here. They intend to sacrifice the Exchange on d5 so they can undouble the c-pawns and create a passed d-pawn.

But 19 ♖xd8+ ♖xd8 20 f3 and 21 ♖d1, to exploit the knight, would have offered better chances, e.g. 20 ... ♕a6 21 ♖d1 ♕b7 22 ♕b1.

**19 ... ♗e6 20 f3 ♗xd5 21 cxd5**



*Black to move*

**21 ... c4! 22 ♕xc4 ♕xd5 23 ♕xd5 ♖xd5 24 fxe4 ♖dd8 25 e5 ♖ac8? 26 ♖d1?**

Another miscommunication: 25 e5 set the table for 26 ♗h4!, which regains the Exchange (26 ... ♖d5 27 e4 ♖d7 28 ♗g4).

**26 ... ♖xc3 27 ♗h4 ♖d7 28 ♗e1 ♖c1! 29 ♖xc1 ♘xc1 30 ♗c4 ♖c7 31 ♗d5 ♘d3 32 ♗d2 ♖c2 33 e6 ♖xd2 34 e7 ♖d1 mate**

The best techniques for an amateur in a simul are similar to the ones we've seen earlier in this book. But there are some additions we can make based on the simul-giver's special vulnerabilities.

For instance, he will make more of his moves than usual based on intuition. His goal is to get a move down on this board and get on to the next board. He doesn't want to calculate unless he has to.

The Dutch grandmaster J. H. Donner offered some advice in *The King*:

(1) Play an opening you know well and play it carefully. "The simul-giver will be very unpleasantly surprised to find that after 20 moves he has achieved nothing at your board."

(2) "Play aggressively. Ninety five percent of all victims in simultaneous displays owe their defeat to passivity."

Both of these suggestions are consistent with the ones outlined in Chapter One. But Donner's third suggestion runs counter to traditional advice to Davids.

(3) Don't be afraid of trading pieces and heading to an endgame. The simul-giver will have better endgame technique – but endgames also require a lot of calculation "and that is precisely what he has no time for."

Other authorities advise against swapping pieces. GM Alex Yermolinsky called "simplification ... probably the second worst sin" for weaker players. (That is, second to choosing a less familiar opening.)

One other point is worth remembering. A simul-giver wants to reduce the number of games he actually has to think about. He may go for the kill in the opening to get a game over quickly, for example. Or, as in Game 46, he may try to resolve a complex position with extreme measures. These situations may give a David a golden opportunity.

Let's see how these and other strategies have worked.

## *45*

## Bobby Fischer – Charles Powell

### Simultaneous exhibition, Richmond, Va. 1964

### *French Defense, Winawer Variation C18*

Charlie Powell was a talented youngster when he took a board against Bobby Fischer in the latter's celebrated 1964 simul tour of North America. Powell later became a strong West Coast master. A Charles Powell memorial has been held annually at the Mechanics Chess Club in San Francisco since his untimely death, at age 46.

**1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ♘c3 ♗b4 4 e5 c5 5 a3 ♗xc3+ 6 bxc3 ♕a5**

Black's last move, in connection with his next, is now considered dubious. However, it has the desired effect of forcing Fischer to calculate more than he wanted this early in a game.

**7 ♗d2 ♕a4**

The Black queen has a powerful cramping effect on a4. White often plays a3-a4 in the main lines of the Winawer Variation, even if it means sacrificing the a-pawn, to stop ... ♕a4.



*White to move*

**8 ♖b1**

White's basic choice in those main lines is between the pawn-raiding ♕g4 and the positional ♘f3. Fischer scored many sparkling wins with the latter but was not particularly successful with the queen move.

However, six years later, at Siegen 1970, he won a nice game with 8 ♕g4 and then 8 ... ♔f8 9 ♕d1!. The loss of time was more than compensated by Black's loss of castling: 9 ... b6 (9 ... cxd4 10 cxd4 ♕xd4?? 11 ♗b4+! and ♕xd4) 10 h4 ♘e7 11 h5 h6 12 ♖h4! ♗a6 13 ♗xa6 ♘xa6 14 ♖f4 ♕d7? 11 ♕f3.

The move Fischer chose in this game threatens 9 ♗b5+ but ...

**8 ... c4 9 ♕g4? ♕xc2!**

The possibility that Black would sacrifice his KR – and pick off White's QR – must have eluded Fischer. Now 10 ♖a1 or 10 ♖d1 would leave White, after 10 ... ♕g6, with nothing for his missing button, as Fischer might say.

**10 ♕xg7 ♕xb1+ 11 ♔e2 ♗d7!**



*White to move*

How many other players would disdain a perpetual check (11 ... ♕d3+ 12 ♔e1 ♕b1+) against Bobby Fischer?

**12 f3!**

This creates an escape route for the king, compared with 12 ♕xh8 ♕d3+ 13 ♔e1 ♕g6!, when White's queen is bottled up and Black is readying to castle.

For example, 14 ♘h3 ♘c6 15 ♘f4 ♕b1+ 16 ♔e2 0-0-0 with advantage from ... ♘a5-b3.

**12 ... ♗a4!**

Black adopts a scorched-earth policy: He will give up the g8-knight in addition to the h8-rook in order to maintain his initiative.

**13 ♕xh8 ♕d1+ 14 ♔e3**

Not 14 ♔f2 ♕xd2+ 15 ♘e2 ♔f8 when White is just a piece down.

Now on 14 ... ♔f8? 15 ♘h3 and 16 ♘g5 or 16 ♕xh7 he would suddenly have the upper hand.

**14 ... ♕xf1! 15 ♕xg8+ ♔e7 16 ♔f4!**

After 16 ♕g5+? ♔d7 White is out of bullets.

But now 16 ... ♕f2 17 ♗e3 ♕h4+ 18 ♕g4 or 18 g4 (and ♕g5+) leads to an even endgame, while 16 ... ♗e8 17 ♔g3! and ♗g5+ is risky.

**16 ... ♘d7!**

Black throws in another rook. Now if White tries to get queens off with 17 ♕g5+ ♔f8 18 ♔g3 followed by 19 ♕e3 and 20 ♕e1, the endgame is better for Black. Fischer finds the only way to play to win.

**17 ♕xa8?! ♕xg2 18 ♗e1! ♕xh1 19 ♗h4+ f6 20 exf6+ ♔f7!**

The outcome would have remained in doubt after 20 ... ♘xf6 21 ♗xf6+! ♔xf6 22 ♕f8+ ♔g6 23 ♔e5! and ♔xe6 (23 ... ♕xg1?? 24 ♕g8+).



*White to move*

With 21 ♘h3! White would threaten ♘g5+ and be able to answer 21 ... h6? with 22 ♕h8! and win.

The crucial continuation is 21 ... ♕xh2+ 22 ♔e3. Then 22 ... ♕xh3 23 ♕h8! would threaten ♕g7+ and mates. Black would have to allow a perpetual check, 23 ... ♘xf6 24 ♕xf6+.

But Fischer had to be concerned about 22 ... ♕b8! (instead of 22 ... ♕xh3). That brings about a bishops-of-opposite-color endgame. 23 ♕xb8 ♘xb8 24 ♘g5+ ♔xf6.

White would have some drawing chances. But masters hate to have games like that remaining when they are headed for the third hour of a simul.

**21 ♕h8??**

Based on 21 ... ♕xg1 22 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 23 ♕e7+ and mates.

**21 ... ♕xh2+! White resigned.**

Fischer overlooked this finesse: 22 ♔e3 ♕xg1+ or 22 ♗g3 ♕h6+! 23 ♔g4 ♘xf6+.

## *46*

# Tigran Petrosian – Leonid Zaid

### Team simul/tournament, Moscow 1972

### *Nimzo-Indian Defense, Huebner Variation E41*

This was played in an unusual exhibition/tournament: Soviet grandmasters played a simul each round against teams of juniors from various cities. For example, when Vasily Smyslov was playing each of six young Riga players, Anatoly Karpov was facing six young Muscovites and Mikhail Tal was taking on six juniors from Chelyabinsk and so on. In the next round, Smyslov would play the Chelyabinsk juniors, Tal faced the Muscovites, and so on.

In this game, Black was a 14-year-old Kiev schoolboy, who was having the tournament of his life. In other rounds he registered draws with Smyslov, Karpov and Boris Spassky and lost only to Tal. This was the best performance of his career –- even though he later beat Garry Kasparov twice in a single year.

**1 d4 ♘f6 2 c4 e6 3 ♘c3 ♗b4 4 e3 c5 5 ♗d3 ♘c6 6 ♘f3 ♗xc3+! 7 bxc3 d6**

Black adopts what was (at the time) a relatively unexplored variation. Its main feature is that Black gives up the two bishops without being provoked by a2-a3 and tries to form a central blockade on dark squares.

Tigran Petrosian often avoided the Nimzo-Indian Defense by playing 3 ♘f3. "But this time I agreed to it in order to see how my young opponent conducted himself in a trendy variation," he said afterwards.

**8 ♕c2 e5 9 d5 ♘e7 10 0-0 0-0 11 ♘e1 g6!?**

This became known as the Huebner Variation after GM Robert Huebner demonstrated how Black can neutralize White's bishops with 11 ♘d2 g6 12 f4 exf4 13 exf4 ♗f5!. After ... ♗xd3 White would be left with a bad, dark-squared bishop.

**12 e4!**

Petrosian felt he had tricked Black with 11 ♘e1 because now his c1-bishop is not blocked by a d2-knight and he can exploit 11 ... g6 with ♗h6.

**12 ... ♘h5**

Black can't easily stop ♗h6 but he should do something to deter f2-f4.

**13 ♗h6 ♖e8 14 ♕d2 f5!**



*White to move*

Black's last move was courageous because textbooks always warn students not to open the position when their opponent has the two bishops.

It's true that White would have opened the position himself after 15 ♗e2 ♘g7? 16 f4!. However, 15 ... ♘f6! would have been fine for Black.

**15 ♗g5**

Black would have been pleased by 15 exf5 ♗xf5! 16 ♗xf5 ♘xf5. Then his kingside looks porous after 17 ♗g5. But it is fairly solid following 17 ... ♘f6 18 f3 (to avoid 18 ... ♘e4!) ♖f8. For example, 19 ♘d3 ♕-moves and 20 ... ♖ae8.

Instead of that, Petrosian eyes ♗e2 and ♗xh5.

**15 ... f4! 16 ♗e2**

White can try to exploit Black's last move with 17 g3, because the enemy kingside is weaker after 17 ... ♗h3 18 ♘g2, with a threat of ♗xh5 and gxf4. But Petrosian saves the g2-g3 idea for later.

For example, if Black avoids the disruption of his pawns with 16 ... ♘g7?, then 17 g3! ♗h3 18 ♘g2 fxg3 19 fxg3 is stronger.

**16 ... ♖f8**

But now 17 g3? walks into 17 ... ♗h3 18 ♘g2? f3.

**17 ♗xh5 gxh5 18 ♕e2!**



*Black to move*

**18 ... ♕e8!**

Petrosian loved to provoke his opponents. Here he wanted Black to try 18 ... ♗g4 19 f3 ♗d7.

That looks like White has deprived himself of ♕xh5. But 20 ♕f2! and 21 ♕h4 would have been strong.

His next is a typical "Petrosian move." He anticipates a potential attack on the g-file – five moves in the future – by sticking his king in the corner. He can grab the h-pawn when he's ready.

**19 ♔h1!? ♗d7 20 ♖b1 b6 21 ♗xe7**

White has gone as far as he can with preparatory moves. In fact, some computers suggest silly moves such as 21 a3?.

Goliaths know they should take action in positions like this. But what kind?

If Mikhail Tal were sitting in White's chair he would likely have preferred 21 ♖g1 and 22 g3. Petrosian goes for a material edge instead.

**21 ... ♕xe7 22 ♕xh5 ♖f6!**

But he underestimated this move. Black will play ... ♕g7 and ... ♖h6, with or without ... ♔h8.

For example, 23 ♘f3 ♕g7 24 h3 seems to stop both ... ♗g4 and the attack on g2. Then 24 ... ♖h6 25 ♕g5 ♖g6 26 ♕h5 ♖xg2? 27 ♖g1! and Black's king is the one in trouble.

However, 26 ... ♗g4! is strong (27 hxg4 ♖h6 or 27 ♕h4 ♖h6) – and so is 26 ... ♔h8!.

**23 ♖b2 ♔h8**



*White to move*

Black has splendid compensation for his sacrificed pawn: He controls key kingside squares and has potential threats against h2, g2 and the White queen.

Quiet moves like 24 ♕h4 ♖g8 25 f3 can turn out badly because of 25 ... ♕f8 followed by ... ♖h6.

Another defense is 24 ♕e2 ♖g8 25 ♖g1. Then g2 is secure but 25 ... ♖h6 threatens 26 ... ♖xh2+ and mates.

For example, 26 ♘f3 ♗g4 followed by ... ♕f7-h5 or 26 g3 ♕f6 with a threat of 27 ... ♖xh2+ 28 ♔xh2 ♕h6+ 29 ♔g2 ♕h3+ and mates.

Petrosian explained his next move by saying that when complicated positions arise on several boards in a simul, a grandmaster wants to clarify the position in some of them. Then he knows which remaining boards to worry about.

**24 g4? fxg3 25 hxg3 ♕g7! 26 ♔g1**

But the clarity reveals that White has no defense, e.g. 26 ♕e2 ♕h6+ 27 ♔g1 ♕h3 and ... ♖h6 or ... ♖g8 wins.

**26 ... ♗g4 27 ♕h1 ♖h6 28 ♕g2 ♗h3 29 ♕f3 ♖f8 30 ♕e3 ♗xf1**

Black's position is so good that 30 ... ♕g6 and 31 ... ♕h5 was a good, winning alternative.

**31 ♔xf1 ♖ff6!**



White to move

Now that the rook is protected on h6, there's a threat of 32 ... ♕g4 and 33 ... ♖h1+. White's king can't run far (32 ♔e2 ♖h2 33 ♔d3 ♕f7 and ... ♖fxf2).

**32 ♘f3 ♕g4 33 ♘g1 ♖h1 White resigned.**

To stop the immediate threat of 34 ... ♕d1+ or 34 ... ♕h3+ White can try 35 ♖b1. But then 35 ... ♕h5 followed by ... ♖f3 and ... ♕h2 must win.

## *47*

# Reuben Fine – Jakob Ekelund & Einar Petterson

### Simultaneous exhibition, Orebro 1937

### *Slav Defense D17*

The opposite of a tandem simul is an exhibition in which the amateurs work as a team. Reuben Fine knew this kind of display well. When he was 16 he and three other young New Yorkers collaborated on a game in a simul given by Jose Capablanca. But after the allies lost a pawn by move 12, the others deserted Fine (he said) and he managed to outplay the Cuban single-handedly in an endgame.

Six years later Fine was giving his own simuls against consulting teams. Against two strong Swedish amateurs, he was lost after 12 moves. This time there was no salvation in an endgame.

**1 d4 ♘f6 2 c4 c6 3 ♘c3 d5 4 ♘f3**

Black's move order is a harmless transposition to the Slav Defense, rather than the more usual 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 ♘f3 ♘f6 4 ♘c3.

**4 ... dxc4 5 a4 ♗f5 6 ♘e5 ♘bd7 7 ♘xc4 ♕c7 8 g3 e5 9 dxe5 ♘xe5 10 ♗f4 ♘fd7**

This position must have made a strange impression when it began appearing on the boards of masters in the 1930s. Black allows his e5-knight to be pinned and has to retreat the other knight. But his position is fairly solid.

At the time this was played, 11 ♗g2 f6 12 0-0 ♗e6 was common, with a slight edge to White. Later Black claimed equality with 10 ... ♖d8.



*White to move*

A pinned knight will prove fatal in this game. But it's *not* the one on e5.

**11 ♕b3? ♗e6!**

Fine was recognized as one of the world's opening experts two years later when he revised *Modern Chess Openings*. But here he is already in deep trouble.

White must play 12 0-0-0 so that he threatens 13 ♖xd7 and can support the c4-knight with e2-e3.

He would escape after 12 ... ♘c5 13 ♕a2 ♗xc4? 14 ♕xc4 ♘xc4 15 ♗xc7.

**12 e3? ♘f3+**

Now 13 ♔e2 ♘de5 would give Black a winning initiative (14 ♗xe5 ♘xe5 15 ♔e1 0-0-0).

**13 ♔d1 ♕d8!**

White would be barely breathing after 13 ... ♘de5 14 ♔c1, e.g. 14 ... 0-0-0 15 ♕c2.

By getting out of the pin on his own knight with 13 ... ♕d8!, Black can deliver a winning discovery (14 ... ♘c5+) or some other tactic.

**14 ♔c1**



*Black to move*

**14 ... ♘c5**

Black could have won a piece with the surprising 14 ... ♘d2 (15 ♔xd2? ♘c5+). The allies either overlooked that or didn't want to deal with 15 ♕xb7 ♘xc4 16 ♗xc4 ♗xc4 17 ♖d1.

After 14 ... ♘c5 White would lose his queen with 15 ♕a2 ♘d3+ 16 ♔c2 ♘b4+ or 16 ♔b1 ♗xc4 17 ♕xc4 ♘d2+. Relatively best is 16 ♗xd3 ♕xd3, when the c4-knight is finally lost.

**15 ♕d1 ♕xd1+ 16 ♔xd1 0-0-0+!**

Black pockets at least the Exchange after 16 ... ♘b3. The text is better because it maintains the initiative (17 ♔c2 ♗f5+ 18 ♔c1?? ♘b3 mate).

**17 ♔e2 ♗g4 18 h3**

On 18 ♗g2, Black would have his choice of winning discovered checks. Among them:

(a) 18 ... ♘e5+ (and 18 ... ♘d2+) 19 f3 ♘xc4 20 fxg4 ♖d2+ and

(b) 18 ... ♘d4+ 19 ♔f1 ♘db3 20 ♖e1 ♗e6 21 ♘a3 ♘d3.

**18 ... ♖d2+! White resigned.**



*White to move*

Every amateur dreams of mating a world-class player like this – 19 ♘xd2 ♘d4+ 20 ♔e1 ♘c2 mate.

## *48*

## Boris Spassky – Valery Chekhov

### Team simul/tournament, Moscow 1972

### *Ruy Lopez, Open Variation C83*

This was played in the same event as Game 46. Boris Spassky had an easy time, scoring four wins and a draw against the rest of the team of Moscow youngsters. But he didn't against Valery Chekhov, a then-unknown 16-year-old who earned the GM title 12 years later.

**1 e4 e5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 ♗b5 a6 4 ♗a4 ♘f6 5 0-0 ♘xe4**

The Open Defense is a good, practical weapon against Goliaths. White has relatively little choice for the next several moves if he wants an advantage. That means Black usually doesn't have to start thinking hard until around move 12.

**6 d4 b5 7 ♗b3 d5 8 dxe5 ♗e6 9 c3 ♗e7 10 ♘bd2 0-0 11 ♗c2 f5 12 ♘b3 ♕d7 13 ♘fd4**

White wants to oust the e4-knight with f2-f3. His move is based on 13 ... ♘xe5 14 f3 ♘-moves 15 ♖e1!.

The main alternative is 13 ♘bd4. When this game was played theory claimed that 13 ... ♘a5 gives Black a good game (14 ♘xe6 ♕xe6 15 ♗f4 c5).

**13 ... ♘xd4 14 ♘xd4**

And here Black would obtain good play from 14 cxd4 a5! 15 f3 a4 as Mikhail Tal later showed.

**14 ... c5 15 ♘xe6 ♕xe6 16 f3 ♘g5**



*White to move*

Chekhov reached the same position as Black against Anatoly Karpov in this event. Karpov played quietly, 17 ♖e1 ♖ad8 18 ♕e2 c4 19 ♔h1, and misjudged Black's kingside chances after 19 ... f4!.

Play went 20 b3 ♗c5 21 ♗d2 ♖de8 22 a4 ♕h6 23 axb5 axb5 and it was becoming clear that Black had a deadly plan of 24 ... ♖e6 followed by 25 ... ♕xh2+! 26 ♔xh2 ♖h6 mate.

White avoided that at the cost of the Exchange, 24 b4 ♗b6 25 ♖a6 ♖e6 26 ♖xb6 and soon lost (26 ... ♖xb6 27 ♕f2 ♖a6 28 g3 fxg3! 29 ♕xg3 ♘e4!).

**17 ♗xg5!? ♗xg5 18 f4**



*Black to move*

This position has been known since the 1920s, when it was regarded as better for Black. Later it was considered just double-edged.

White has a protected passed e-pawn and potential targets for his bishop at d5 and, after g2-g4, at f5. But Black can try to break through with ... c4 and ... d4 or ... b4 and use his queenside majority.

One of the earliest games in this line, Chajes-Tarrasch, Karlsbad 1923, went 18 ... ♗d8 19 ♕f3 ♗b6 20 ♖ad1 ♖ad8 21 ♔h1 ♖d7 22 h3 c4 23 g4 g6! 24 gxf5 gxf5 25 ♖d2 d4! and Black won.

**18 ... ♗e7 19 ♕e2 ♖ad8 20 ♖ad1 c4 21 ♔h1 ♗c5 22 h3 g6**

With his last move Black advertises his intent to make a stand on f5. If instead 22 ... b4 23 g4 fxg4?! 24 hxg4, White is ready for an edge with 25 f5 or 25 ♗f5.

Black may have avoided 22 ... d4 because of the complications of 23 ♕f2!, e.g. 23 ... ♕b6 24 b4! (23 ... cxb3 24 ♗xb3+ ♔h8 25 cxd4 ♗xd4 26 ♕f3 followed by ♖d3/♖fd1).

**23 g4! ♔h8 24 ♔h2 ♖d7 25 ♖d2**

Cautious play on both sides. Spassky passed up 24 gxf5 gxf5 25 ♕h5, which would have led to approximate equality after 25 ... d4.

Black, meanwhile, focused on ... b4 and ... bxc3 in order to create a target at c3, rather than simplifying with ... d4.

**25 ... b4 26 gxf5 gxf5 27 ♖fd1 bxc3 28 bxc3 ♖g8!**



*White to move*

White said after the game that he was feeling good about his position because 29 ♕f3 and 29 ♕h5 both threaten to win a pawn.

When he looked deeper he thought 29 ♕h5 was very strong. For instance 29 ... ♖f7 30 ♖xd5 or 29 ... ♖f8 30 ♕f3! ♖fd8 31 ♗a4! followed by ♗xd7 or ♖xd5.

But then he noticed that 29 ♕h5 could be met by 29 ... ♗e3!.

After the forcing sequence 30 ♕xf5 ♕xf5 31 ♗xf5 ♗xf4+ 32 ♔h1 ♗xd2 33 ♗xd7 ♗xc3 34 ♖xd5 ♖g5, he would land in an ending that is almost certain to be drawn because the e5- and c4-pawns are doomed (35 ♗e6 ♗xe5 36 ♖d8+ ♔g7 37 ♗xc4).

As a Goliath, he naturally wanted more. So he examined 30 ♗xf5 instead of 30 ♕xf5. But he rejected it because 30 ... ♗xf4+ 31 ♔h1 ♕e7 looked adequate for Black.

Actually 31 ... ♕xe5 was also possible, e.g. 32 ♖xd5 ♕g7! (not 32 ... ♖xd5?? 33 ♕xh7 mate) with equality. Or 32 ♖e2? ♗e3! with a Black advantage (33 ♕f3 ♖f7).

White felt his position had to be the superior one so ...

**29 ♕f3?? ♖dg7!**

What did White overlook? Since Spassky didn't say, we'll have to investigate:

He may have intended 30 ♕xd5 ♕xd5 31 ♖xd5 ♖g2+ 32 ♔h1 ♖xc2 33 ♖xc5 – only to realize Black can win with the superior 31 ... ♗e3! 32 ♗xf5 ♖g2+ 33 ♔h1 ♗xf4, threatening mate on h2.

Or perhaps he saw all that – and figured that in the last variation he could defend with 34 ♗g4. But that failed to 34 ... ♖h2+ 35 ♔g1 ♖xh3!.

**30 ♖xd5**



*Black to move*

Or he may have expected 30 ... ♖g2+ 31 ♕xg2 ♖xg2+ 32 ♔xg2, when he would have excellent winning chances.

**30 ... ♗g1+! 31 ♖xg1**

This loses in the long run but 31 ♔h1 ♖g3 is worse (32 ♕f1 ♗e3 or 32 ♕h5 ♖g2 33 ♖5d2 ♖xd2 34 ♖xd2 ♕c6+ and mates).

The game lasted to the end of the time control, **31 ... ♖xg1 32 ♖d6 ♕f7 33 ♖d2 ♕g6 34 ♕f2 ♖g3 35 ♗d1 h6 36 ♖b2 ♖g7 37 ♖c2 ♔h7 38 h4 h5 39 ♗f3 ♖g1 40 ♖d2 ♖c1**, but was **adjudicated a win** for Black by former world champion Mikhail Botvinnik.

## *49*

# Alexander Alekhine – Leonard B. Meyer & Lester Samuels

### Clock simul, New York 1929

### *Reti Opening A12*

Alekhine was famous for his "show" games. Not just simultaneous games, but blindfold simuls, games against consulting teams and so on. He made tandem simuls famous, particularly after his 1932 display against fifty four-man teams in New York. He included the finest examples from exhibitions in his best-game collections – something a modern GM wouldn't consider.

This was played in a mere three-board simul. But it was under tournament conditions – using clocks and normal time controls – against strong consulting teams. One team, Isaac Kashdan and Herman Steiner, was crushed in 21 moves. A second team, Alexander Kevitz and Albert Pinkus, was beaten in a positional gem. This was the third game.

**1 ♘f3 d5 2 b3 ♘f6 3 ♗b2 ♗f5**

This was the heyday of Richard Reti's opening. Black adopts the common-sense defense that Emanuel Lasker had used to beat Reti at the great New York 1924 tournament.

**4 d3 e6 5 g3 ♘bd7 6 ♗g2 c6 7 0-0 ♕c7 8 c4 ♗e7 9 ♘c3**

Later experience showed that White does better by trying to expand on the queenside, with a2-a3 and b3-b4.

**9 ... ♖d8 10 ♕c2 0-0 11 e4**

Another modern treatment of White's position is to punish Black's failure to play ... h6 by trading off his bishop after 11 ♘h4.

The weakening of the White kingside after 11 ... ♗g4 12 h3 ♗h5 13 g4 ♗g6 14 ♘xg6 is not as important as his two-bishop edge.

**11 ... dxe4 12 dxe4 ♗g6**



*White to move*

This pawn trade on e4 may be better than the immediate retreat 11 ... ♗g6. That would have given White some extra options, such as 12 ♘h4 dxe4 13 ♘xg6 hxg6 and then 14 d4 followed by ♘xe4.

**13 ♖ad1 e5**

This Hypermodern opening has had a somewhat unusual result: White is the one with the weaker center. He has lost pawn control of d4 and his e4-pawn is a potential target (... ♘c5).

Black might also have been happy with 13 ... ♘c5 14 ♘h4 ♗h5 15 ♗f3 ♗xf3. But why trade off White's bishop?

**14 ♘h4 ♖fe8 15 ♘f5**

This last move was criticized, and 15 ♘xg6 was recommended in its place. However, 15 ... hxg6 followed by ... g5! and ... g4 (if allowed) is excellent for Black. Then he can try to shift a knight powerfully to g5 via e6.

After 15 ♘f5 White was hoping for ... ♗xf5 because exf5 would allow him to push his g-pawn and perhaps drive away the f6-knight. The he could occupy the fine e4 outpost with his own knight.

A solid alternative to Black's next move is 15 ... ♗c5 but the consulting team reserved that square for a knight.

**15 ... ♗f8 16 h3 ♘c5 17 g4?**



*Black to move*

An indication of White's difficulties in this position is that some computers recommend 17 ♘h4 and 18 ♘xg6 – acknowledging that he should have taken on g6 two moves ago.

That's not an awful idea, if White can then continue ♘e2, ♗c3, ♕b2 and b3-b4. But it's hard to imagine a Goliath – least of all the world champion – admitting that his previous play was so wrong. Alekhine made his simul moves for posterity. Perhaps this game would end up in another best-games collection ...

**17 ... ♘e6! 18 ♘e2 ♗c5**

But there was no doubt now that Black had seized the upper hand. At some point (and move 18 was a good one) he could probe the kingside with ... h5.

**19 ♖xd8 ♖xd8 20 ♖d1**

The last refuge of an outplayed simul-giver is the endgame.

**20 ... ♖xd1+ 21 ♕xd1 h5! 22 ♕a1**

Black has multiple targets to exploit, including f2 (by means of ... ♕b6) and g4. White has only one target to work with so he takes aim at e5.

**22 ... ♘d7 23 ♘h4?**

After a pass like 23 ♗c3, Black could have edged forward with 23 ... hxg4 24 hxg4 a5, e.g. 25 ♔f1 b5! 26 cxb5 cxb5 27 ♔e1 b4 28 ♗b2 ♕b6. Now, however, White's position becomes critical.

**23 ... ♕d6**

Perhaps even better is 23 ... ♗h7. Then on 24 gxh5 he could reply 24 ... ♕d6 and shoot for ... ♕d3!.

After the text, White needed to anticipate ... ♕d3 with something like 24 ♘xg6 fxg6 25 ♗c3 ♕d3 26 ♕e1.

**24 ♔f1? ♕d3! 25 ♘xg6 fxg6 26 ♔e1**



*Black to move*

The threat was 26 ... ♘f4. It still wins (26 ... ♘f4 27 ♘xf4 ♗b4+). But the allies preferred:

**26 ... ♗b4+ 27 ♗c3 ♘d4! White resigned.**

In view of 28 ... ♕xe2 mate or 28 ... ♘c2+ (or 28 ♗f1 ♘f3 mate).

Alekhine beat himself: He regarded White's position as better than it really was – perhaps influenced by the reputation that the Reti Opening enjoyed in the 1920s. Then he looked for moves that seemed to make sense in a favorable position (like 17 g4?) and paid the price.

## *50*

## Magnus Carlsen – Hans-Joachim Hofstetter

### ICC charity simul, online 2008

### *Ruy Lopez, Open Defense C82*

In our final game we'll mention one more way that big upsets can come about. Davids know much more about Goliaths than Goliaths know about Davids.

This is particularly important in simuls. When Samuel Reshevsky gave an exhibition against several Moscow schoolboys in the 1930s, he asked the organizer how many of his opponents were first-category players – that is near-masters. The organizer said there were three. But he wouldn't identify them because it would provide Reshevsky with too much help.

**1 e4 e5 2 ♘f3 ♘c6 3 ♗b5 a6 4 ♗a4 ♘f6 5 0-0 ♘xe4 6 d4 b5 7 ♗b3 d5 8 dxe5 ♗e6 9 c3 ♗c5 10 ♘bd2 0-0 11 ♗c2**



*Black to move*

White's threat to win a pawn with 12 ♘xe4 leads to his advantage after 11 ... ♘xd2, 11 ... ♗f5 12 ♘b3 or 11 ... f5 12 ♘b3 ♗b6 13 ♘fd4, with play similar to Game 48.

Black chooses another path, a highly analyzed line known as the Dilworth Variation that is a favorite with correspondence players. Did Magnus Carlsen know that his opponent was a superb correspondence player? Black certainly knew that Carlsen played a wide variety of openings and, inevitably, knew less about some of them.

**11 ... ♘xf2!? 12 ♖xf2 f6 13 exf6 ♗xf2+ 14 ♔xf2 ♕xf6 15 ♘f1 ♘e5 16 ♗e3**

This position had once been considered favorable to White because of 16 ... ♕h4+ 17 ♔g1 ♘xf3+ 18 gxf3 ♖f6 19 ♗d4.

**16 ... ♖ae8! 17 ♗d4**

A key to understanding the position is considering the likely endgames that arise after Black wins another pawn.

For example, 17 ♗c5 ♖f7 18 ♔g1 and then 18 ... ♗g4 19 ♘1d2 ♘xf3+ 20 ♘xf3 ♗xf3 21 ♕xf3 ♕xf3 22 gxf3 ♖xf3.

This kind of position looks fine for Black because of his slight material edge, two pawns and a rook for two bishops.

However, 23 a4! should favor White to some degree (23 ... ♖e2? 24 axb5! axb5 25 ♖a8+ ♔f7 26 ♖f8+ and 27 ♖xf3, or 24 ... ♖xc2 25 bxa6).

Black does much better with 21 ... ♕c6 (rather than 21 ... ♕xf3) because he threatens the queen and bishop. Rough equality follows 21 ♗xh7+ ♔xh7 22 ♕xf7 ♕xc5+.

**17 ... ♗g4 18 ♘1d2**



*Black to move*

Now the endgame, 18 ... ♕f4 19 ♔g1 ♘xf3+ 20 ♘xf3 ♗xf3 21 ♕xf3 ♕xf3 22 gxf3 ♖xf3, isn't as good for White because of 23 a4? ♖e2!.

There is no possibility of ♖a8+-f8+, which was crucial in the long 17 ♗c5 variation mentioned above. In this version, however, Black would stand better (24 ♗d1? ♖e1+ 25 ♔g2 ♖d3!).

This means White should play something safer, such as 23 ♖f1. But Black can avoid that with:

**18 ... ♕g5!**

"Play a solid opening you know well." Black demonstrates that he knows this line better than the world champion.

He threatens 19 ... ♘xf3 20 ♘xf3 ♕h5 (21 ♔g1 ♖xf3! 22 gxf3 ♗xf3 with a winning attack).

**19 ♗xe5**

An important tactical point is that 19 ♔g1, the move he would play after 18 ... ♕f4 or 18 ... ♕h6, loses here, 19 ... ♘xf3+ 20 ♘xf3 ♗xf3.

**19 ... ♕xe5 20 ♔g1**

The Black queen will be so powerfully placed now that White might have fared better with 20 h3 ♕e3+ 21 ♔f1.

**20 ... ♕e3+ 21 ♔h1 ♕f2!**



*White to move*

White's difficulty is illustrated by 22 ♕f1, which allows 22 ... ♖xf3! 23 ♘xf3 ♕xc2 or 23 gxf3 ♕xd2.

White can improve on this with 22 ♗b3! and then 22 ... c6 23 ♕f1 because then the bishop isn't hanging on c2 in the ... ♖xf3 scenario. The outcome would be unclear after 23 ... ♕e2 or 23 ... ♕e3. Or 23 ♕g1 ♕xg1+ 24 ♔xg1 ♖e2.

**22 ♗d3? ♖e3!**

Things are getting bad. On 23 ♕c2 Black wins with 23 ... ♗xf3 24 ♘xf3 ♖fxf3!.

White's best is 23 ♗f1 but Black can then enjoy a major edge after 23 ... c6. By safeguarding the d5-pawn, he would threaten 24 ... ♗xf3 25 ♘xf3 ♕xb2. Then his two potential queenside passers are dangerous.

But he has bigger game in mind with 24 ... ♖f6 followed by 25 ... ♖h6! and 26 ... ♗xf3 or 26 ... ♖xh2+ 27 ♔xh2 ♖e6, winning.

**23 ♕f1?**



*Black to move*

As Larry Christiansen advised opponents in a simul, "I can make blunders like anybody because I'm moving so fast." To exploit that, Davids have to be observant opportunists.

**23 ... ♖exf3!**

Now 24 gxf3 ♕xd2 is quite lost. White must try his chances in the pawn-down bishop endgame, **24 ♘xf3 ♖xf3! 25 ♗e2 ♕xf1+ 26 ♖xf1 ♖xf1+ 27 ♗xf1 c5**.

But this is lost. For the record, the rest was:

**28 ♔g1 ♔f7 29 ♔f2 ♔f6 30 ♔e3 ♗c8 31 a3 ♔e5 32 g3 d4+ 33 cxd4+ cxd4+ 34 ♔d2 ♔d5 35 ♗d3 g6 36 b4 ♗h3 37 ♔e1 ♗f5 38 ♗e2 ♔e4 39 ♔d2 h5 40 ♗d1 d3! 41 ♗b3 ♔f3 42 ♗d5+ ♗e4 43 ♗e6 ♔g2 44 ♗c8 ♔xh2 45 ♗xa6 ♔xg3** and **White resigned.**

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